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I. Introduction 
At the beginning of the 21st century, after the wide-scale collapse of centrally 
planned economies, the consensus perception prevails that prosperity and eco-
nomic growth are generated by private enterprise and free markets. Neverthe-
less, government policy has maintained its role as a major factor, responsible for 
creating the necessary conditions for promoting enterprise and growth. In this 
context, monetary policy has emerged as an important means for achieving these 
goals1. The arguments for this statement are twofold, concerning both how 
quickly and how accurately the intervention takes effect on the market. In the 
first place, unlike fiscal policy, which often serves multiple (sometimes conflict-
ing) goals and may be subject to political influences and lengthy legislative de-
cision-making and approval procedures, monetary policy conducted by an inde-
pendent central bank can be adjusted relatively quickly to respond to the latest 
macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, the impact of monetary impulses 
especially on the financial markets under a sufficient degree of central bank 
credibility takes place immediately. Sometimes the financial market response 
even precedes the actual central bank intervention, as market participants antici-
pate the envisaged measures and act accordingly in advance.
The last decades have witnessed major transformations pertaining to both 
monetary policy theory and practice. Since the Bretton Woods collapse central 
banks exposed not only to a higher degree of freedom, but also to the need to 
define clear monetary policy goals and communicate them to the public. In the 
last two decades, a growing number of central banks (such as the Bank of Eng-
land, Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Swedish Riks-
bank) have opted for systematic policy behaviour by means of introducing infla-
tion-targeting. On the theoretical side, major advances have been made in the 
last two decades. One facet of the new consensus on monetary policy is that low, 
stable inflation is crucial for market-driven growth and that the monetary policy 
stance in the medium to long run is the major determinant of inflation. After a 
long period of focusing on the impact of non-monetary factors on the business 
cycle, empirical studies since the late 1980s have argued that monetary policy 
significantly influences the short-term course of the economy. Another facet is 
the strengthened focus on monetary policy design and the interest for optimal 
rule-based monetary policy in particular. Recent macroeconomic research fea-
tures nominal rigidities and output fluctuations and focuses on the stabilization 
role of monetary policy, by allowing the monetary authorities to choose from a 
1  Or, as Bernanke et al. (1999) argue: “… of all the government’s tools for influencing the 
economy, monetary policy has proven to be the most flexible instrument for achieving 
medium-term stabilization objectives.” 
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variety of monetary policy rule specifications2 in terms of policy instruments, 
target variables and size of the response coefficients assigned to the target vari-
ables.  Since the results obtained in the literature when assessing the different 
monetary policy rule specifications are to a large extent model-dependent, the 
choice of a macroeconomic framework based on sufficiently realistic assump-
tions is crucial for the analysis of the implications of different rule 
specifications. 
Building on the arguments of the New Classical Critique3 in the 1970s, New 
Keynesian models that incorporate rational expectations, as well as microeco-
nomic foundations, have been developed. The optimizing behaviour on the part 
of households and firms, as well as the intertemporal methodology of New 
Keynesian models with nominal rigidities enable detailed study of the monetary 
transmission mechanism and optimal monetary policy design. However, with 
respect to investment and capital, most of these models (e.g. Woodford (1995), 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999b)) abstract 
from investment (constant-capital specification). One reason is that introducing 
endogenous capital and investment to a model with sticky prices may lead to 
multiple rational-expectations equilibria under certain monetary policy rule 
specifications4. Moreover, the exclusion of capital is often justified on the 
grounds that capital does not exhibit substantial volatility at business cycle fre-
quencies (e.g. McCallum and Nelson, 1997). However, such an approach is 
clearly unsatisfactory, as it leaves out an important monetary transmission chan-
nel and shock propagation mechanism.  
In the following chapters, the analysis is carried out within a New Keynes-
ian framework with endogenous capital, sticky prices and wages and capital ad-
justment costs. The purpose of this study is to assess different interest rate rule 
specifications with respect to the degree of activeness (measured by the inflation 
response coefficient) and the target variables included, based on two criteria: (i) 
the existence of a determinate rational expectations equilibrium and (ii) the 
characteristics of the convergence path towards steady state after a shock occurs. 
In particular, policy rule specifications that yield determinacy of rational expec-
tations equilibrium and in addition involve quantitatively smaller deviations and 
fast, monotonic convergence after a shock occurs would be preferred. The re-
sults obtained confirm that the introduction of endogenous capital and invest-
ment has important implications for the monetary policy outcomes. A stronger 
than one-on-one nominal interest rate response to inflation in the policy rule (i.e. 
2  The most famous example in recent years being the Taylor rule as in Taylor (1993). 
3  The New Classical Critique focused on the use of conventional methods of econometric 
policy evaluation (Lucas (1976)) and of optimal control (Kydland and Prescott (1977)). 
In general, according to the real-business cycle theory, monetary policy has no relevance 
for economic welfare when rational expectations of economic agents are assumed.  
4  E.g. forward-looking rules (see Huang and Meng (2007)). 
18
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adherence to the Taylor principle) does not per se guarantee the best outcomes 
in terms of equilibrium uniqueness and responses to shocks. Under endogenous 
capital and investment, the inclusion of an output target in the policy rule is cru-
cial under both criteria.
The study is organised as follows. In Chapter II, I summarise the main is-
sues in monetary policy theory and practice, including the possible rule specifi-
cations (Section 1). In Section 2, I give an overview of the criteria for assessing 
the performance of monetary policy rules. The focus is on determinacy of ra-
tional expectations equilibrium and the response to shocks, explicitly used for 
the analysis in Chapters III and IV. In the last subsection I present formally the 
Taylor principle, which since 1999 has been a benchmark for formulating rule-
based policy and forms the basis for the distinction between “active” and “pas-
sive” policy rules made in the subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides a pre-
liminary summary. 
In Chapter III I derive the New Keynesian framework with sticky prices and 
wages, endogenous capital and investment and capital adjustment costs and 
study the system’s determinacy properties under different values assigned to the 
inflation and output gap response coefficients in the interest-rate rule. In particu-
lar, Section 1 provides an overview to the New Keynesian framework, while 
Section 2 presents the main approaches to modelling capital and investment in 
the literature. Then in Section 3, I concentrate the model with endogenous capi-
tal and adjustment costs, by examining the household optimisation problem and 
the resulting first-order conditions, deriving the “IS block” equations, the aggre-
gate supply and real-wage relation and adding an interest rate rule to the system. 
As a next step, in Section 4 I complete the calibration of the model, so as to 
permit quantitative analysis of its properties. In addition, I provide some nu-
merical analysis of the systems’ determinacy properties under different rule 
specifications. 
The findings from Section 4 in Chapter III are then considered when assess-
ing the shock impulse responses under different monetary policy specifications 
in Chapter IV. Active and passive rules in three possible specifications for each 
class are tested in this chapter: (i) rules with a sole inflation target; (ii) rules with 
an inflation and output target and (iii) rules with inflation and output gap target 
and interest-rate smoothing. Results are obtained for three types of shocks: (i) a 
monetary policy unit shock; (ii) a technology unit shock and (iii) a consumption 
preference shock. The results are summarised in Section 4. Chapter V summa-
rises the main findings and concludes.
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II. Monetary policy design and criteria for assessing 
monetary policy rules
In this chapter, I provide a more general perspective to the main theoretical and 
practical issues in monetary policy design, which are relevant for the assessment 
of the several interest rate rule specifications in the subsequent parts. The issues 
covered in Section 1 include the advantages and implications of systematic pol-
icy behaviour (as opposed to discretionary measures) and choice of instru-
ments/target variables that enter the rule specification. In addition, Section 2 
presents the main criteria that will be used in the subsequent determinacy and 
impulse response analysis in Chapters III and IV. The Taylor principle, which 
forms the basis for the classification of monetary policy rules in terms of the de-
gree of their “activeness” (measured by the size of the inflation response coeffi-
cient), is presented formally in the last subsection. Later on, in Section 4 in the 
subsequent chapter the main findings will be centred on the question whether 
adherence to the Taylor principle guarantees a determinate rational-expectations 
equilibrium when endogenous capital with adjustment costs is introduced to a 
New Keynesian model with staggered price-and wage-setting.  
1. Monetary policy issues 
In the 1960s and 1970s “activist” monetary policies, aimed at achieving “full 
employment” have been widely discussed and implemented5. The rise of such 
policies has been motivated by the conviction that there exists a stable long-run 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment, captured by the Phillips curve6.
According to this view, in the long run the monetary authority can attain a per-
manent reduction in the unemployment rate by allowing for a higher rate of in-
flation. At the same time, estimates of these (allegedly) stable relations between 
inflation and unemployment have been computed by using large econometric 
models that assigned precise quantitative dimensions to the policy trade-off. The 
actual experience with the activist pursuit of full employment by monetary pol-
icy means has contradicted the policy-makers’ anticipated outcome. Not only 
did the business cycle fluctuations not disappear in the 1970s, but the world-
wide recessions of 1973-74 and 1981-82 were among the most severe in the 
second half of the twentieth century, characterised by high unemployment and 
inflation (“stagflation”). Thus, in spite of not attaining the aspired policy objec-
tive, the “sacrifice” in terms of higher inflation rate has still been realised: the 
late 1960s and most of the 1970s were characterised by rising and variable rates 
of inflation in many countries. 
5  For a more detailed discussion of monetary policy strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, see 
Mishkin (2006). 
6  See Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960). 
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Parallel to the practical experience with activist policies, there has also been
an academic critique of using monetary policy as a tool to obtain full employ-
ment at the expense of a higher inflation rate. Among the most influential argu-
ments are Milton Friedman’s monetary critique concerning the uncertain out-
comes of monetary policy interventions7, the Lucas critique of the optimal cont-
rol paradigm for monetary policy8, the conclusion reached by Friedman (1968) 
and Phelps (1968) that there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and un-
employment, as well as the warning against the perils of time inconsistency un-
der discretionary policy delivered by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) 
and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
Without denying the significant impact of monetary policy on the economy, 
Friedman argued that monetary policy is a tool that cannot be used with preci-
sion for stabilisation purposes. In “The Role of Monetary Policy” he explicitly 
warns against “the belief that the state of employment itself should be the 
proximate criterion of policy”, adding that 
…I fear that… the pendulum may well have swung too far, that… we are in danger 
of assigning to monetary policy a larger role than it can perform, in danger of asking 
it to accomplish tasks that it cannot achieve, and, as a result, in danger of preventing 
it from making the contribution that it is capable of making (Friedman, 1968, p. 5).  
Friedman emphasised that, due to long and variable lags of monetary policy, a 
too strong policy response might have a destabilising effect on the economy. 
This forms the basis for the subsequent discussion on the appropriate degree of 
activism of monetary policy. As argued by Blanchard and Fischer (1993), under 
long and variable lags very strong policy responses to shocks could create in-
strument instability. Instrument instability arises when the current effects of 
changes in the monetary policy instrument are small and the lagged effects 
large, so that large changes in the policy instrument are required to offset the 
effects of a recent shock, creating the need for even larger changes later on. An 
even more powerful argument for more moderate policy responses has to do 
with uncertainty about the structural coefficients in the model, i.e. to what extent 
the variability of the instrument increases the variability of the target variables.
Although Friedman’s criticism emphasises the technical difficulties in con-
trolling the policy outcomes, it does not fundamentally rule out activist central 
bank behaviour. If the pitfalls of the active pursuit of short-run output stabilisa-
tion had been predominately of instrumental nature, implementing more elabo-
rate methods such as the (at that time increasingly popular) techniques of opti-
mal control would have been sufficient to compensate for lags between policy 
measures and their effects. Thus, for policy activism to be ruled out as an appro-
priate central bank strategy, a formal methodological critique of the proposed 
7  See Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
8  See Lucas (1976). 
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techniques of optimal control or a substantial re-evaluation of the implied stable 
relation between inflation and unemployment were needed. 
The formal methodological critique of optimal control has been put forward 
by Lucas (1976) who argues that macroeconomic models that are not based on 
consistent microeconomic underpinning are non-structural and cannot be useful 
for policy evaluation. The underlying reason for that finding is that the estimated 
coefficients of such models’ equations include both structural and policy pa-
rameters and are therefore not invariant to the choice of monetary policy regime. 
1.1. The case for rules rather than discretion 
The general equilibrium framework adopted in recent research permits explicit 
utility-based welfare analysis by introducing a quadratic central bank loss func-
tion that involves stabilizing inflation around an inflation target and stabilizing 
the real economy, represented by the output gap. Some examples of research 
incorporating such a loss function include Clarida et al. (1999), McCallum et al.
(1999, 2000), Svensson et al. (2000), Woodford (2001).
One of the main issues in monetary policy research in recent years has been 
whether central banks should commit themselves to a systematic approach to 
monetary policy that involves an explicit framework for decision-making and is 
communicated to the public.  
1.1.1. Analytical distinction between rules and discretion 
For the subsequent analysis, it is necessary to introduce an analytical distinction 
between the two main strategies of monetary policy conduct - discretionary and 
rule-based monetary policy. In an argument on rule—based monetary policy 
Friedman (1962) notes that under a policy rule decisions are made by following 
a procedure applicable to many distinct cases and not on a case-by case basis, 
which has favourable effects on expectations. He notes that, under discretionary 
policy, wrong decisions are likely to be made in a large fraction of cases because 
the decision-makers are not taking into account the cumulative consequences of 
the policy as a whole. By contrast, adopting a general rule is adopted for a group 
of cases as a bundle would have favourable effects on people’s attitudes and ex-
pectations that would not follow even from the discretionary adoption of 
precisely the same actions on a series of separate occasions. 
Taylor (1993) emphasises that under pure discretion, “the settings for the in-
struments of policy are determined from scratch each period with no attempt to 
follow a reasonably well-defined contingency plan for the future.” Alternatively, 
rule-based behaviour is systematic, or in other words “methodical, according to 
a plan, and not casual or random.” McCallum (1993) argues that although this 
condition is necessary, it is not sufficient for a rule-based policy. Under rational 
expectations, in order for rule-like behaviour to be at place, the central bank 
should not only be systematic in the sense of applying the same type of response 
23
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
each period, but should also design the systematic response pattern taking into 
account the private sector’s expectational behaviour. Under a theoretical point of 
view the distinction is between: (i) responding to existing conditions as pre-
scribed by a prearranged formula specifying instrument settings. The formula 
could be derived as a result of optimisation analysis, but is not influenced by 
current conditions in each period; and (ii) period-by-period optimisation based 
on current conditions while treating past experiences and policies as irrelevant 
bygones.
Last but not least, a rule-based monetary policy procedure should rule out 
the temptation to exploit existing expectations for temporary output gains by 
creating an inflationary bias as in the baseline framework on dynamic inconsis-
tency developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
1.1.2. The problem of dynamic inconsistency 
According to the definition of Blanchard and Fischer (1993) “a policy is dy-
namically inconsistent when a future policy decision that forms part of an opti-
mal plan formulated at an initial date is no longer optimal from the viewpoint of 
a later date, even if no relevant new information has appeared in the meantime”. 
Extensive theoretical research has been devoted to this subject since Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) first argued that optimal macroeconomic policies could be 
dynamically inconsistent. The basic question refers to the costs of a government 
not being able to commit itself to implementing announced policy actions or, 
equivalently, of the benefits of policy rules over discretion. Under rational ex-
pectations, a policy commitment (such as following a rule) means carrying out 
the policy that is optimal and expected. By contrast, under discretionary policy 
the private sector in each period may anticipate that the government will opt for 
the short-run optimal decision and react accordingly.
Barro and Gordon (1983) reveal the motivation behind inconsistent behave-
iour in monetary policy conduct. They point to two main sources of temporary 
benefits from inducing surprise inflation. One source of benefits can be derived 
from the dependence of the output gap on inflation expectations, whereby unan-
ticipated monetary expansions lead to increases in real economic activity, lower-
ing the unemployment rate below the natural rate9. The other source of potential 
benefits from surprise inflation involves the reductions in real value of the gov-
ernment’s liabilities that are fixed in nominal terms. However, since under ra-
tional expectations the private sector is able to understand the central bank’s in-
centives and adjust its inflationary expectations accordingly, surprise inflation 
9  The natural rate is defined by Barro and Gordon (1983) as “the value that would be 
ground out by the private sector in the absence of monetary disturbances”. The natural 
rate can shift over time because of supply shocks, demographic changes, shifts in gov-
ernmental tax and transfer programs, etc. As the authors point out, the natural rate need 
not be optimal. 
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and the benefits arising from it cannot be induced systematically in equilibrium. 
If the private sector anticipates the potential for introducing inflationary shocks, 
in equilibrium the average rate of inflation and its corresponding costs will be 
higher than under maintained credible monetary policy commitment. Thus, un-
der rational expectations, nothing is gained from opportunism and the outcome 
is in general worse compared to the commitment scenario. 
1.1.3. Advantages of central bank commitment to a monetary policy 
rule
Based on the time-inconsistency literature findings presented in the previous 
subsection, two main advantages of central bank commitment to an explicit pol-
icy rule can be derived10.
The first benefit of such an approach includes increased predictability of 
central bank actions, which is essential for improving policy effectiveness that 
depends not only on the actual measures taken, but also on the public’s expecta-
tions about future policy. This provides central banks with an important tool of 
stabilisation policy, as market expectations about the future path of short-run 
interest rates influence other financial-market prices (such as long-term interest 
rates, equity prices and exchange rates) that ultimately affect spending decisions. 
In order for this mechanism to function, the public needs to have a clear enough 
understanding of the rule that the central bank follows in deciding on policy ac-
tions. To this end, it could be enough that the central bank commits itself to a 
systematic way of determining an appropriate response to future developments, 
without having to explicitly specify actions under every circumstance possible. 
The second main benefit from a systematic approach has to do with the op-
timal outcomes of a behaviour bound by past commitments. As first postulated 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977), even if the central bank has a correct quantita-
tive model of the economy and of its policy trade-offs in each period and the 
private sector forms correct expectations about future policy, the outcome under 
discretion may be substantially worse than under commitment. In this line of 
argument, Woodford (2003) argues that the main gains from commitment in this 
respect are in terms of eliminating the inflation bias11 characterising sequential 
(discretionary) optimisation and an optimal reaction to shocks/real distur-
bances12.
10  It should be noted that the benefits that are elaborated in this subsection are model-
specific.
11  For further elaboration on inflation bias under discretion, see Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) und Barro and Gordon (1983). 
12  Rule-based (forward-looking) decision making allows for a more persistent reaction to 
real disturbances over time and thus implies reducing the volatility in short-run interest 
rates.
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An interesting new topic in the rules vs. discretion debate concerns the role 
of credibility. The main finding is that in the presence of a trade-off between the 
two policy objectives (price stability and actual output), a credible central bank 
commitment to a state-contingent policy results in a greater welfare gain as 
compared to discretionary policy. An example for this approach can be found in 
Woodford (1999),  where the inefficiency that arises from discretionary policy-
making equals the discounted present value of current and future period losses 
(squared deviations of inflation and output from their target levels). 
1.2. Design of monetary policy rules 
The issue of how a monetary policy rule should be designed has been subject to 
much theoretical debate in the last several decades. The discussion could be 
traced back to Friedman’s arguments in the 50s and 60s for a rule of constant 
money growth13.  Apart from that particular instrument setting, in more general 
terms Friedman argued that monetary policy should be fixed by a rule, thus rul-
ing out discretionary policy. 
Before discussing the theoretical and practical developments concerning 
monetary policy design, it would be useful to identify the transmission channels 
of monetary impulses to the economy. Among others, Arestis and Sawyer (2002, 
2003) identify six channels of monetary policy transmission: (i) the interest rate 
channel; (ii) the wealth effect channel; (iii) the exchange rate channel (under an 
open-economy perspective); (iv) the monetarist channel; (v) the narrow credit 
channel and (vi) the broad credit channel. 
Both the narrow and the broad credit channel refer to how changes in the fi-
nancial positions of borrowers and lenders affect aggregate demand in an econ-
omy with credit market frictions. The narrow credit channel emphasised by Hall 
(2001)14 and Bernanke and Blinder (1988) concerns the role of the banking sec-
tor as lender. When monetary policy induces changes of banking sector’s total 
reserves, the supply of loans to the private sector will be affected. Given the fact 
that normally a significant number of producers and consumers depend on bank 
lending to finance their investment and consumption spending, ultimately mone-
tary policy interventions are bound to affect aggregate demand and inflation in 
the economy. In addition, the broad credit channel described by Hall (2001)15,
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke et al. (1998) takes into consideration 
the effect of the monetary policy stance on the financial position of borrowers. If 
imperfect information in terms of the supply of external finance to the private 
13  See Friedman (1960, 1962). 
14  Hall (2001) originally refers to the narrow credit channel as “bank lending channel”. 
15  The broad credit channel is called “balance sheet channel” in the Hall (2001) classifica-
tion.
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sector is assumed, lenders charge a (risk) premium16 on loans dependent on the 
borrower’s financial position. Generally, low gearing17 implies small external 
finance premium and vice versa. In this setting, the monetary policy stance af-
fects aggregate demand through corporate cash flows and asset price develop-
ments. As to the former mechanism, a policy-induced increase in the interest 
rate raises the individual firm’s gearing ratio, thereby boosting the required pre-
mium on external finance. The second effect of policy-induced interest rate 
hikes pertains to asset prices that determine the value of loan collateral. Accord-
ing to this “financial accelerator” effect, higher interest rates may lead to falling 
asset prices and consequently a decline in the value of the collateral, thus lead-
ing to an increase in the borrower premium. On a broader scale, monetary im-
pulses channelled through the financial sector by means of the narrow or broad 
credit channel affect investment and consumption decisions and consequently 
aggregate demand in the economy.  
Apart from the importance for gaining access to external finance, asset 
prices affect aggregate demand through the wealth effect channel. If the con-
sumption function is constructed to depend on consumer wealth, consumption 
expenditure is affected by the value of real consumer wealth (i.e. by asset 
prices).
Next, the distinction between the interest rate and the monetarist channels is 
explained by the choice of a monetary aggregate or the interest rate as a mone-
tary policy instrument. If the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument, the 
money supply is endogenous and vice versa. The choice between both instru-
ments determines the particular type of the initial monetary impulse; still, if the 
degree of substitutability between money and financial (especially short-term 
liquid) assets is very high, changes in money supply have a significant impact on 
interest rates. Under a sufficient degree of price stickiness, the real interest rate 
and the return on capital will also be affected. As a result, as long as consump-
tion and investment decisions are interest-rate sensitive, the interest rate changes 
influence aggregate demand. Of course, the transmission of the monetary policy 
impulse to the economy is to a great extent dependent on the functioning of the 
financial sector. Instead of symmetrically adjusting their interest rates in re-
sponse to the policy-induced interest rate changes, financial institutions may 
choose to perform some type of credit rationing18. In the context of the interest 
and the monetary transmission channels, a broader perspective to the implica-
tions of money supply as a policy instrument beyond the effect on interest rates 
may also be relevant. In case a high degree of substitutability between money 
16  In this context, Arestis and Sawyer (2003) mention a “premium to cover monitoring 
costs” charged by lenders. 
17  I.e. a low debt-to-equity ratio. 
18  For a thorough study of the determinants and forms of credit rationing, see Jaffee and 
Modigliani (1969), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Blinder and Stiglitz (1983). 
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and real assets is assumed, the impact of money supply changes would also de-
pend on relative price changes. In this case, apart from interest rates, asset prices 
also affect aggregate demand and should be considered by the monetary author-
ity.
The last monetary policy transmission channel, the exchange rate channel, 
concerns the open economy and links monetary policy to inflation through sev-
eral effects. One of them pertains to aggregate demand and functions through 
the uncovered interest rate parity condition, matching interest rate differentials 
to expected exchange rate changes. Another type of effect works through import 
prices.
The six transmission channels identified by Arestis and Sawyer (2002, 
2003) all describe variations of aggregate demand channel. Thus, from a broader 
perspective, monetary policy transmission can be classified as giving an initial 
impulse either to aggregate demand or to aggregate supply19. In this context, 
Taylor (2000) speaks of “aggregate demand” and “staggered price adjustment” 
component of the monetary transmission mechanism. As far as monetary policy 
transmission from the aggregate demand perspective is concerned, Taylor 
(2000) identifies the “financial market price view” and the “credit view”. The 
former emphasizes the impact of monetary policy on the prices and rates of re-
turn on financial assets (e.g. bonds prices, interest and exchange rates) and con-
sequently on firm and household spending decisions. The credit view stresses 
the impact of monetary policy on lending by banks or other financial institutions 
as alternative to internal finance. The “staggered price adjustment” channel (de-
noted “expectations channel” in Svensson (1999b)) allows monetary policy to 
affect inflation expectations which, in turn, affect inflation with a lag via the 
wage- and price-setting decisions of economic agents.  
Last but not least, incorporating an aggregate supply transmission channel of 
monetary policy allows for a more thorough analysis of monetary policy out-
comes. The framework with endogenous capital presented in the next chapter 
enables tracking the supply-side response to shocks induced under several rule 
specifications, thus offering a broader insight into medium- to long-run adjust-
ments in the economy. 
1.2.1. Rules, instruments and targets 
In the recent decades interest-rate rules have attracted much theoretical atten-
tion. Despite the fact that central banks have been reluctant to publicly commit 
to an interest-rate rule of a specific form, there is some evidence that past behav-
19  For a closed-economy setting, building blocks, micro-foundations and different specifi-
cations of these two general transmission mechanism channels are modeled by King and 
Wolman (1996), Woodford (1996), Yun (1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998), McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Clarida et al. (1999). 
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iour of some monetary authorities can be described by an explicit rule20, the cen-
tral banks of some major economies nowadays apply explicit inflation targets 
(inter alia, the ECB, the Bank of England and Bank of Canada).
In the subsequent exposition, I will concentrate on interest-rate rules for 
conducing monetary policy. Although other definitions of a monetary policy 
rule could be possible, for the purpose of this work I adopt the definition of Tay-
lor (1998): 
“…a monetary policy rule is defined as a description—expressed algebraically, 
numerically or graphically-of how the instruments of policy, such as the monetary 
base or the federal funds rate, change in response to economic variables” (Taylor, 
1998, p.3). 
Furthermore, for the subsequent analysis it is necessary to provide a definition 
of instruments, targets, goals/objectives and indicators of monetary policy. From 
a practical perspective, Borio (1997) and Ho (2008) distinguish between the 
strategic and tactical level of the monetary authorities’ pursuit of policy goals 
(see Figure 2.1). At the strategic level, certain macroeconomic goals or final ob-
jectives are pursued, such as price stability, long-term growth or employment. 
By contrast, the tactical (operating) level covers the choice of instruments and 
operating objectives/targets. The latter are variables which can be influenced 
quite fast and closely by the central bank21. Examples of monetary policy in-
struments include the official interest rates (e.g. on standing facilities), market 
operations (e.g. repo tenders, FX operations), reserve requirements and, in the 
past, direct controls (e.g. ceilings on loans or on bank depositor loan rates). 
According to McCallum (2001b), instruments are variables that the central 
bank can control quickly and directly or at least accurately, the usual contenders 
being short-term interest rates, the monetary base or a measure of bank reserves. 
Goals/Objectives are variables that enter the central bank objective function. In 
case the ultimate goals are not promptly observable, the central bank employs a 
two-step procedure, attempting to hit target variables that are treated as surro-
gates for the ultimate objectives. Examples for target variables are the monetary 
aggregates M1, M2 and nominal GDP. Indicators are information variables, for 
which the central bank does not try to hit specified paths. 
20  For example, the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)) seems to have described the actions of the 
Fed remarkably accurately during most of the 80s and 90s of the past century. 
21  For example, short-term financial market interest rates, exchange rates, etc. 
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Figure 2.1: The monetary policy framework (Borio (1997) 
1.2.2. Choice of instruments 
A long-standing discussion in monetary policy research has concentrated on the 
issue whether the monetary authority should use money22 or the interest rate to 
target inflation and/or output. Money supply as a policy instrument gained in-
creasing popularity in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, in his policy proposals 
Friedman went even further and argued for a rule involving money supply not 
only as an instrument, but as a policy target as well. Actually, Friedman (1960) 
acknowledged that a constant money growth rule does not correspond to optimal 
policy. Still, arguments such as imperfect knowledge about the “true” objectives 
inflation and output, the possibly inaccurate estimation of the unobserved natu-
22  In the form of a monetary aggregate. 
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ral rates of interest, output or employment and their dynamics, as well as the dif-
ficulties with obtaining real-time measures of policy objectives seemed to sup-
port choosing a rule expressed in terms of money supply only.  
Of course, the above arguments to a greater extent address the question 
whether the central bank should target an intermediate variable or its final objec-
tives directly and provides less insight to the choice of instruments. A further 
contribution by Poole (1970) analyses the conditions under which pegging 
money or interest rates are appropriate. For a static IS-LM framework, Poole 
suggested that if disturbances originate primarily in the money demand, fixing 
the level of the interest rates is appropriate. For the case of goods market shocks, 
the money stock should be pegged. Despite the simplicity of the framework and 
the lack of supply side in particular, the Poole model provides an essential in-
sight to understanding the choice between money and interest rates as monetary 
policy instruments.  
Taylor (1995, 1998) suggests that a constant money growth rule will gener-
ally induce an interest rate response to inflation and output similar in form as in 
the case of interest rate policy rules, but not necessarily similar in size. For ex-
ample, for very high or negative inflation rate, the resulting variability of infla-
tion expectations can render interest rate rules less efficient than controlling the 
money supply23. That is why, even when pursuing an interest rate rule, it is ad-
visable for the central bank to still monitor money supply. 
Recent models, such as Casares and McCallum (2006), McCallum and Nel-
son (1999b) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998a) all include an interest rate 
instrument, whereby the money supply is endogenous since the central bank 
must vary it in order to sustain its desired interest rate level. In these models the 
path for money growth followed by the monetary authority in the long run under 
an interest rate instrument exactly coincides with the one that would be followed 
under a money supply instrument. In line with the choice of instrument in these 
studies and the recent central bank practice, the monetary policy rules that I in-
troduce in the next chapter include the nominal interest rate as a policy instru-
ment.
1.2.3. Choice of target variables 
A second issue in policy design (apart from the choice of the instrument) con-
cerns the choice of target variables. In this subsection, the variables entering the 
rule specifications in Chapter III (inflation, the output gap and the lagged inter-
est rate) will be briefly discussed from a theoretical point of view. 
23  As Taylor (1995) shows, in such circumstances interest rate rules can break down com-
pletely.
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Inflation-targeting
There has been consensus in the literature on the fact that in the recent years a 
growing number of countries has opted for some form of inflation targeting24
combined with central bank independence25. Inflation-targeting is subject to dif-
fering definitions in the literature. For example, according to Svensson (2002) 
inflation targeting involves stabilizing inflation around an inflation target26.
With respect to the target variables selected, it could be distinguished between 
inflation targeting in a narrower sense27 (involving a central bank reaction to in-
flation deviations from a target level only) and a broader definition where infla-
tion and a measure of real economic activity are both considered. Adhering to 
the former perspective, Bernanke et al. (1999) define inflation-targeting as a 
framework, rather than a rule for monetary policy28. According to them, infla-
tion-targeting is characterised by public announcement of official quantitative 
targets (or target ranges) for the inflation rate over one or more time horizons, 
and by explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is monetary policy’s 
primary long-run goal. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003)29 offer a definition of inflation targeting com-
plemented by certain institutional requirements. Thus, inflation targeting in-
volves more than just targeting the rate of inflation as an objective of economic 
policy and implies: (i) setting a numerical target range for the inflation object-
tive; (ii) using monetary policy as an instrument to achieve the target by adjust-
ing the nominal interest rate; (iii) central bank independence; and (iv) monetary 
policy only targeting the inflation rate with the possible effects of monetary pol-
icy on other objectives ignored, with the exception of short-term effects. 
24  Snowdon and Vane (2005) distinguish between four types of monetary regimes that 
have been implemented since the middle of the 20th century: exchange rate targeting 
(e.g. in the UK, 1990-1992), monetary targeting (e.g. in the UK, 1976-1987), explicit in-
flation targeting (UK, 1992-to date) and implicit inflation targeting (USA).The differ-
ence between explicit and implicit inflation targeting pertains to whether the central 
bank announces an exact inflation target. In this sense, the ECB policy would qualify as 
“explicit inflation targeting”. 
25  For more detailed contributions on modern central bank practice issues, see Alesina and 
Summers (1993), Fischer (1995a, 1995b, 1996), Bernanke and Mishkin (1992, 1997), 
Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), King (1997), Svensson (1997a 
1999b, 2000), Mishkin (1999, 2000), Bernanke and Woodford (2006). 
26  P. 6. 
27  The inflation-targeting rules referred to in Chapter IV abide by this narrower definition 
of the term. 
28  In the terms of Bernanke et al. (1999) inflation-targeting as a framework for monetary 
policy implies that the inherent discipline of a rule is extended by maintaining some de-
gree of flexibility.
29  See p. 2. 
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The broader definition of inflation targeting with reference to the target 
variables entering the central bank’s loss function (or monetary policy rule) is 
denoted as “flexible” inflation targeting30. Svensson (1997b, 2002) argues that 
in the central bank practice inflation targeting is flexible31, as it also involves 
some concern about the stability of the real economy. The latter means that 
monetary policy should contribute to the welfare of the representative citizen. 
However, as this objective is not operational, stabilising output around potential 
output is in-cluded in the central bank reaction function32.
There exists a general consensus in the recent empirical literature that main-
taining a low and stable rate of inflation is an appropriate monetary policy ob-
jective33. Yet the justification of such a policy emphasis from a theoretical point 
of view may not be straightforward. According to the real-business-cycle mod-
els of the 1980s relative prices rather than the absolute level of prices are rele-
vant for the allocation of resources in the economy34. Traditional Keynesian 
models, by contrast, postulate that variations in the growth rates of prices and 
wages induce variations in output and employment35. However, this inflation-
output relation has typically been considered as an argument in favour of achiev-
ing output and employment goals rather than a justification for establishing price 
stability as a primary objective of monetary policy. 
With the introduction of rational expectations to a framework with nominal 
rigidities, keeping inflation low and less volatile “locks in” expectations about 
future inflation and helps to contain the possible inflationary impact of macro-
economic shocks. Furthermore, in the short run and with sluggish price adjust-
ment inflationary impulses can have a destabilising impact on output and em-
ployment. In this line, Woodford (2003) argues that, since instability of the gen-
eral level of prices causes substantial real distortions – leading to inefficient 
variation both in aggregate employment and output and in the sectoral composi-
tion of economic activity –price stability is important and should therefore be 
the primary aim of monetary policy. 
In addition, the theoretical literature so far suggests a distinction between the 
costs of anticipated and unanticipated inflation. Anticipated inflation causes loss 
of social welfare because it promotes economising on real money balances, gen-
erates costs for frequent price adjustments and increases relative price uncer-
30  As opposed to “strict” inflation targeting, with low and stable inflation being the only 
goal of monetary policy (i.e. when the reaction coefficient to inflation solely is different 
from zero). 
31  See pp. 6-7. 
32  For further analysis of the output target, see Subsection 3.2.3.2. 
33  See, for example, Fischer (1996) and Mishkin (2000). 
34  Real business cycle authors support „real“ as opposed to “monetary” theories of fluctua-
tions. For example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986) construct models 
that include real variables only. 
35  For a thorough discussion, see Leeson (1994, 1997a, 1997b). 
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tainty. Unanticipated inflation, on the other hand, increases relative price vari-
ability and costs of information gathering and leads to income redistribution. 
Finally, as Blanchard and Fischer (1993)36 put it: “Its presence as the only mac-
roeconomic variable in addition to output in the loss function reflects in part the 
fact that, right or wrong, inflation is perceived as costly by people and is costly 
for policymakers to ignore.” 
An essential practical issue in policy design concerns the specification of the 
inflation target. Commonly under inflation-targeting the rule followed by the 
monetary authority includes a weighted measure of the deviation of the inflation 
rate from its target value. Concerning the choice of an appropriate target, Taylor 
(1986) emphasises that the policy objective is to minimize fluctuations around 
the target, regardless of what the actual value of the target is.
Output-targeting 
Svensson (1997a) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) show that it is advisable 
that the monetary policy instrument responds to the determinants of the target 
variables rather than the target variables themselves. Thus, even under a primary 
price stability goal, it is generally appropriate to respond to both current infla-
tion and the output gap, since both are determinants of future inflation. The rele-
vance of simple policy rules that, as proposed by Taylor (1993), include both an 
inflation and an output  target for recent central bank practice can be substanti-
ated by the following statement by Federal Reserve Board Governor Yellen, 
made in January 1995: 
“Now, if you take the case of the FOMC, it seems to me that a reaction function in 
which the real funds rate changes by roughly equal amounts in response to devia-
tions of inflation from a target of 2 percent and to deviations of actual from potential 
output describes tolerably well what this Committee has done since 1986. This pol-
icy, which fits the behavior of this Committee, is an example of the type of hybrid 
rule that would be preferable in my view, if we wanted a rule. I think the Greenspan 
Fed has done very well by following such a rule, and I think that is what sensible 
central banks do.” (Federal Reserve Board, 1995, pp. 43-44) 
Different definitions of the output gap with respect to the reference term are 
common in the literature. According to Galí (2002) the output gap is defined as 
“the deviation of output from its equilibrium level in the absence of nominal ri-
gidities”. Woodford (1999) on the other hand, distinguishes in his proposed 
model between “potential output” and “natural rate of output” as reference val-
ues for the deviation of actual output. The former term represents steady state 
(or long-term equilibrium) output in the presence of nominal rigidities and mar-
ket frictions, while the second term denotes the “equilibrium level of output un-
der perfectly flexible prices”. The natural rate of output can is relatively time-
36  Chapter 11, p.569. 
34
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
invariant and, at least in the short run, cannot be influenced by economic policy 
actions.
Walsh (2003) provides an alternative definition of the output policy objec-
tive - a “speed-limit policy” that targets growth in demand relative to growth in 
potential, i.e. output gap changes. He finds that targeting the change in the out-
put gap introduces inertia into monetary policy under central bank discretion, as 
the lagged output gap becomes an endogenous state variable. The final outcome 
is that targeting the output gap change is superior to inflation targeting unless 
inflation adjustment is prevailing backward-looking. In contrast, McCallum 
(2001a) argues that the output gap is unobservable and instead assesses the im-
plications of using a trend-type measure. His results show that highly undesir-
able consequences in terms of higher inflation variability arise in case policy 
responds strongly to the measured gap.  However, this result is obtained in a 
framework with constant capital. By contrast, the results obtained in Chapter IV 
in a model with endogenous capital and adjustment costs reveal that including 
the output gap in the monetary policy rule plays an important stabilising role in 
the occurrence of shocks. 
The central bank’s output objective is often included as a quadratic term on 
output deviations in the loss function, so that deviations of output from the target 
(natural or potential) level are symmetrically penalised. This feature is subject to 
critique by some authors37 who argue that in sticky-prices Keynesian models in 
the presence of market frictions (e.g. monopoly power by firms), the equilibrium 
level of output is too low, in which case a negative output gap should be penal-
ised more heavily by the central bank. Whereas this argument rests on the sub-
tleties of defining target output38, a more general critique point could be elabo-
rated in terms of whether a positive and a negative gap actually impose the same 
welfare loss to the economy.   
Another critique on interest rate rules including an output gap target (such 
as, for instance, the Taylor rule as in Taylor (1993)) arises from measurement 
difficulties. In the first place, no real-time data on the value of current output are 
available to policy-makers. Thus, the operational usefulness of the output gap 
target is limited by the availability of timely and reliable estimates39. This short-
coming can be alleviated to a certain extend by assuming that the current output 
gap is equal to the expectation in the previous period. Secondly, as McCallum 
and Nelson (1999b) point out40, “…there is considerable uncertainty regarding 
37  See Blanchard and Fischer (1993), Chapter 11. 
38  In Blanchard and Fischer (1993) the full-employment level of output denotes potential 
level of output when certain distortions have been taken account of, instead of the level 
of output under flexible prices and perfect competition.   
39  This argument has been used by Orphanides and van Norden (2004) to describe the dif-
ficulties when using the output gap to predict inflation within the Phillips curve relation. 
40  P. 5. 
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the realised value of real GDP even at the end of the quarter in actual econo-
mies”. The reason is that empirical estimates of the output gap are in general 
subject to significant and highly persistent revisions. The third source of practi-
cal difficulties when measuring the output gap target pertains to correctly esti-
mating the value of potential output41. Kuttner (1994) and McCallum (1997) ar-
gue that monetary policy decisions are in practice complicated by the risk of 
output gap mismeasurement. Smets (1998) analyses the effect of measurement 
error in the output gap on efficient policy rules in a simple estimated model of 
the US economy. The conclusion is that output gap uncertainty can have a sig-
nificant impact on the efficient response coefficients in instrument rules (such as 
the Taylor rule) by reducing the response to the current estimated output gap 
relative to current inflation. Orphanides (1998)42 shows that output gap real-time 
measurement errors “lead to a significant deterioration of feasible policy out-
comes and cause efficient policies to be less activist”. 
Interest-rate smoothing
A policy rule with the short-term interest rate as instrument can be designed to 
involve interest-rate smoothing. Here it should be differentiated between 
smoothing in the sense of lowering the variance of the level of interest rates, as 
opposed to lowering the variability of interest-rate changes. According to Wood-
ford (1999) reducing short-term interest rate level variability can be justified un-
der the assumption that the distortions associated with positive nominal interest 
rates are described by a convex function of the interest rate. In this case, for any 
average level of nominal interest rates, a lower variance in them will reduce the 
size of the distortions. The case for lowering interest rate level variability could 
easily be illustrated by analysing the implications of significant interest rate 
changes in the two extreme scenarios of a low and a high average level of nomi-
nal interest rates respectively. A policy consistent with a low average rate of in-
flation and nominal interest rates faces the zero nominal interest rate bound and 
therefore cannot apply large interest rate reductions to combat deflationary 
shocks. On the other hand, when the levels of inflation and nominal interest 
rates are already relative high, in order to avoid distortions (as private sector’s 
resources are wasted on attempts to economise on cash balances), the monetary 
authority should avoid significant further increases in interest rates in response 
to inflationary shocks. 
Interest-rate smoothing in the sense of seeking to minimise the variability of 
interest rate changes is a widely observed phenomenon in actual central bank 
41  The difficulties associated with measurement of potential (and, by analogy, the natural 
rate of) output and resource utilization and their implications for monetary policy and 
macroeconomic stabilization have a long tradition in modern economic literature, be-
ginning with Friedman (1947, 1953).  
42  See also Orphanides et al. (2000). 
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practice. From a theoretical point of view, minimising the variability of interest-
rate changes by adjusting official interest rates in a sequence of relatively small 
steps in the same direction means that central bank behaviour depends not only 
on current states and current forecasts of future conditions, but also on past con-
ditions and commitments. Sack (1998)43, for example, estimates the optimal fed-
eral funds rate policy given the structural form of the US economy and com-
pares it to actual historical data. He finds that in the absence of parameter uncer-
tainty, the calculated optimal policy responds more aggressively to changes in 
the economy than the observed policy, resulting in a substantially higher volatil-
ity of the funds rate than observed. He explains lower variability of interest rates 
in actual policy with the existence of parameter uncertainty, which limits the 
willingness of the Fed to deviate from the policy rule that has been previously 
implemented.  
There are several possible explanations of interest-rate smoothing that have 
been discussed in the recent literature on central bank practice. First, as Lowe 
and Ellis (1997) point out, policy-makers are averse to frequent changes in the 
direction of interest rate movements as it may undermine confidence in the cen-
tral bank and therefore its ability to influence private sector expectations and 
behaviour in a desirable manner. Second, it can be argued that the nature of the 
decision-making process on monetary policy leads to conservatism that is at the 
heart of interest-rate smoothing44. According to this line of argument, central 
banks are not able to gain broad political support for prospective interest rate 
changes until sufficient evidence has been gathered. Because the evidence 
needed accumulates slowly, interest rates tend to be changed gradually. A third 
motive for interest-rate smoothing, as discussed by Sellon and Roley (1995), 
concerns the fact that a predictable path for short-term interest rates confers the 
central bank greater influence over long-term bond yields, and consequently 
over future output and inflation. Similarly, Lowe and Ellis (1997) provide the 
explanation that central banks tend to modify interest rates gradually in order to 
be able to assess the policy impact on longer rates and adjust the direction and 
pace of changes accordingly. 
2. Criteria for assessing monetary policy rules 
After having presented some main theoretical insights concerning monetary pol-
icy design (which are taken into account when specifying the policy rules to be 
assessed in the next two chapters), I will discuss several criteria for assessing 
rule-based monetary policy performance, including operationality/simplicity, 
local determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium and its implications for 
response to shocks, as well as adherence to the Taylor principle. In the next 
43  For further empirical evidence of interest-rate smoothing, see Clarida et al. (1998) and 
Rudebusch (1995). 
44     Also in Lowe and Ellis (1997).
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chapters, I will assess several interest-rate rule specifications in terms of whether 
they induce a locally determinate rational expectations equilibrium and desirable 
responses to a number of shocks45. By definition, the operationality/simplicity 
criterion is fulfilled for all the interest-rate rule specifications assessed in Chap-
ters III and IV. In the next parts, adherence to the Taylor principle is discussed 
from a broader perspective in terms of critically examining whether within the 
model chosen fulfilling this criterion actually guarantees local determinacy of 
rational expectations equilibrium46.
2.1. Operationality/Simplicity 
In a series of studies on monetary policy rules, McCallum (1988, 1989, 1993, 
1994) has emphasised operationality47 as a crucial property when deciding on a 
policy strategy. The operationality criterion limits consideration to policy rules 
(i) that are expressed in terms of instrument variables that could be controlled on 
a high-frequency basis by the monetary authority and (ii) that require only in-
formation that could actually be possessed by this authority.   
The use of simple instrument rules to specify rule-based monetary policy 
behaviour has a long tradition in the literature. Wicksell (1898) and Henderson 
and McKibbin (1993) suggested simple instrument rules with the interest rate as 
the instrument. Meltzer (1987) and McCallum (1988) proposed simple instru-
ment rules with the monetary base as the instrument. The most prominent simple 
instrument rule is the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)), incorporating an interest-rate 
instrument responding to the inflation and output gaps. Recent discussions of 
Taylor rules include Clarida et al. (1999), Hetzel (2000), Kozicki (1999), Wood-
ford (2001b). 
A certain degree of disaccord pertains to the definition of a simple rule in 
the existing literature. Earlier contributions, such as Blanchard and Fischer 
(1993) use the term “simple rules” to refer to non-activist rules48. Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2004) define simple rules in terms of restricting attention to rules 
whereby policy variables are set as a function of a small number of easily ob-
servable macroeconomic indicators.  In compliance with this criterion they 
propose studying central bank interest-rate feedback rules that include measures 
of inflation and output. 
Svensson (1997b, 1999a, 2002) offers a more detailed classification of 
monetary policy rules. According to him, a rule-based monetary policy proce-
dure could take the form of either an instrument or a targeting rule. An instru-
45  „Desirable responses to shocks“ here refers to quantitatively modest and short-lived 
model variable deviations from steady state as a result of a shock. 
46  This means that solely the fact that a policy rule is active is not seen as a positive trait. 
The determinacy results in Section 4 in Chapter III support this critical perspective. 
47  In the studies mentioned, McCallum treats simple rules as being operational as well.  
48  See pp. 581-583. 
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ment rule expresses the central bank’s instrument (e.g. the short-term nominal 
interest rate) as an explicit function of information available to the monetary au-
thority. In particular, in the case of a simple instrument rule (such as the Taylor 
rule, for instance)49 the monetary policy instrument is a function of a small sub-
set of the information available and no optimal reaction function is derived. 
Apart from the simple type, instrument rules (at least in theory) can be designed 
to involve optimisation, whereby the monetary policy problem is solved once-
and-for-all for the central bank’s optimal reaction function. After the optimal 
explicit reaction function is determined, the central bank makes a commitment 
and follows it ever after50.
However methodically appealing the optimal-control approach may seem, it 
is hardly practicable. Its complexity renders it unverifiable, i.e. it cannot be ob-
jectively and unambiguously determined whether monetary policy actions di-
verge from the prescriptions of the underlying reaction function. In addition, it 
cannot be expected that every possible circumstance be anticipated as required 
by the optimal reaction function. What is more, even if the perspective is limited 
to a certain number of realistic assumptions, the complexity of the optimal reac-
tion function is still exuberant.
Targeting rules are designed by presenting a central bank loss function 
whose arguments are the monetary policy targets. The loss function is then 
minimised subject to aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations describ-
ing the model of the economy. Thus, the monetary policy rule is an implicit re-
action function and can be written as the optimal response of the monetary pol-
icy instrument to current and/or expected values of state variables. A general 
targeting rule is a high-level specification of a monetary-policy rule that speci-
fies operational objectives, the targets and the loss function to be minimised. A 
“specific targeting rule” is instead expressed directly as an operational condition 
for the target variables (or their forecasts)51.
The use of simple monetary policy rules has both practical advantages and 
disadvantages. According to Rotemberg and Woodford (1998a), the simplicity 
of such rules makes them more easily understandable, so that the central bank 
should have less difficulties in explaining its course of action. Indeed, once the 
decision to adopt a simple rule is made and announced to the general public, the 
decision process of the monetary authority becomes exceedingly transparent and 
simple. Based on the data on the target variables available, the instrument-
setting can be calculated. As a result, the public is to a greater extent able to 
monitor the monetary authority’s compliance with the adopted rule. Taylor 
(1998a) summarises simulation results on simple policy rules and concludes that 
49  Taylor-like specifications of the monetary policy rule enter the analysis in Chapter IV. 
50  According to Svensson (2002) this can be called a commitment to an optimal instrument 
rule.
51  See Svensson (2002), p. 30. 
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they seem to be “a surprisingly good approximation to fully optimal policy.” He 
also states a further advantage of this type of rules, namely their greater robust-
ness in comparison with complex rules across a variety of models. The idea has 
been recently restated by McCallum (1997) and supported by the results of 
Levin et al. (1999) who find that simple monetary policy rules may be robust 
across a set of models of the U.S. economy. In a later study, Levin and Williams 
(2003) offer a more sophisticated analysis of the robustness property of simple 
rules and conclude that a robust outcome is attainable only when the objective 
function places substantial weight on stabilising not only inflation, but output as 
well52.
As far as the disadvantages of adopting a simple monetary policy rule are 
concerned, Svensson (1999a, 1999c) argues that a commitment to a simple in-
strument rule does not leave any possibility for judgmental adjustments and ex-
tra-model information. He concludes that for both of these reasons, a commit-
ment to an instrument rule would be inefficient. An interesting example for 
practical difficulties with implementing the theoretically much appealing con-
cept of a simple Taylor rule refers to the inclusion of the output gap as a target 
variable, to which nominal interest rates respond. As McCallum (2000b) points 
out, various measures of potential or natural-rate output levels differ widely and 
there is no professional consensus regarding the most appropriate measure or 
even concept to be used. Furthermore, McCallum and Nelson (1999b) argue that 
most detrending procedures in use inappropriately attribute the effects of tech-
nology shocks to the output gap, instead to the reference value of potential out-
put itself. A more general critique refers to the real-time availability and reliabil-
ity of output gap data. Orphanides (2001) provides real-time non-revised data 
series for 1987-1992 on macroeconomic indicators available for the Federal 
Open Market Committee’s decisions on the federal funds rate. In this respect, 
potential output estimates are particularly problematical. Data revisions had such 
a decisive magnitude that, as a result policy recommendations based on real-
time data might differ widely from those obtained with the revised published 
data employed later on. Lastly, Svensson (1999a) emphasises the fact that, how-
ever appealing the idea of a simple monetary policy rule might seem, no central 
bank has yet actually committed to such a rule, as this would mean that “Mone-
tary policy could be delegated to the staff, or even to a computer, and it would 
be completely static and mechanical… Such a degradation of the decision-
making process would naturally be strongly resisted by any central bank and, I 
believe, arguments about its inefficiency would also easily convince legislators 
to reject it”. 
52  For the case when the monetary policy objective is to stabilize inflation only, the authors 
are unable to find a robust simple rule. 
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2.2. Local determinacy of a rational-expectations 
equilibrium and monetary policy analysis 
2.2.1. An overview 
A central issue when evaluating alternative monetary policy rules is whether 
they can induce a determinate rational expectations equilibrium53. A vast litera-
ture starting with Sargent and Wallace (1975)54 and McCallum (1981) has con-
sidered the fact that certain types of monetary policy rules may be associated 
with multiple rational expectations equilibria, some of which involving fluctua-
tions of inflation and output as a result of self-fulfilling expectations. Such rules 
should clearly be avoided if the monetary authority aims at stabilising the vari-
ables previously mentioned. Giannoni and Woodford (2002) define determinacy 
of a rational-expectations equilibrium55 as “A unique equilibrium with the prop-
erty that bounded disturbance processes result in bounded fluctuations in the en-
dogenous variables”. 
Blanchard and Fischer (1993) offer a classification of various types of mul-
tiplicity of equilibria, such as bubbles, “components that explode in expected 
value over time” and equilibria that exhibit sunspots. As McCallum (2004, 
2003b) emphasizes, apart from finding a unique determinate equilibrium, a well-
defined policy rule should lead to a bubble-free solution56.
A related issue often consistent with the existence of a rational expectations 
equilibrium is what is called a “sunspot equilibrium”, i.e. endogenous variables 
changing according to random states that are not associated with any changes in 
economic fundamentals. This is the case of changes in equilibrium resulting 
from self-fulfilling expectations. Such self-fulfilling arbitrary changes in expec-
tations introduce endogenous instability. Therefore, the design of a set-up that 
53  Here a steady-state equilibrium (also known as a stationary equilibrium, a rest point, an 
equilibrium point, or a fixed point) is referred to. According to Galor (2007), a steady-
state equilibrium of a n-dimensional system is a value of the n-dimensional vector of the 
state variables that is invariant under further iterations to the dynamic system. Thus, 
once each of the state variables reaches its steady-state level, the system will not evolve 
in the absence of exogenous disturbances. 
54  For more recent research on determinacy of rational expectations equilibria under 
different monetary policy rules see Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Bullard and Mitra 
(2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), McCallum 
(2002b) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999). 
55  In the subsequent exposition only real determinacy is being considered.
56  In other words, a solution reflecting only “market fundamentals”, as specified in the 
model. For a detailed definition of a bubble, see Burmeister, Flood and Garber (1983). 
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does not allow multiplicity of equilibria is of very important practical signifi-
cance for the design of macroeconomic policies57.
2.2.2. Presenting the criterion 
In order to assess in terms of determinacy the implications of different model 
settings with forward-looking elements, it is important to specify how individu-
als form expectations. In the subsequent analysis I assume rational expectations 
consistent with the definition of Muth (1961), that is, expectations equal to the 
mathematical expectation of the variable in 1t   based on information at time t .
For simplicity, I further assume that individuals know the underlying model and 
its parameters and all have the same information set at time t 58. In the next 
chapter, the assessment of monetary policy alternatives regarding determinacy 
of rational-expectations equilibrium will be based on the formal setting provided 
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where E is the expectation operator; t is the information set at t, such that 
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The above specification of the information set implies no loss of memory, as all 
the information known at time t is still known at time t+1. In order to rule out 
exponential growth of , the following condition needs to be met:  t t iE Z 
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57  An exception to this consensus opinion in the literature is expressed by McCallum 
(2003b), who argues that in the case of multiple equilibria only fundamental, minimal 
state variable solutions are likely to be observed in practice, and therefore the existence 
of a number of non-fundamental equilibria should be granted less attention in the litera-
ture.
58  As opposed to the alternative assumption that individuals are learning about the model 
as they are forming their expectations. The issues of learning and expectational stability 
have been studied by several key papers in the 1980s, including Bray (1982), Evans 
(1985), Lucas (1987), and Marcet and Sargent (1989).
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Analogously to (2.4), for a unique determinate rational expectations solution it is 
required that the expectations of t iX  and t iY   at time t do not explode. Thus, con-
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According to Blanchard and Kahn (1980), in order to obtain a unique solution,
the number of eigenvalues of A outside the unit circle (denoted by m ) should be 
equal to the number of  non-predetermined variables (m). The unique solution is 
“forward-looking” in the sense that the non-predetermined variables depend on 
the past only through its effect on current predetermined variables. The condi-
tion m m actually states that a unique solution exists if and only if A has the 
strict saddle point property. If  m m+  , there is no unique non-explosive solution 
satisfying all necessary conditions (2.1)-(2.5). For the opposite case, m m, , i.e. 
when the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less than the number of 
the predetermined variables, there is an infinity of solutions. In particular, it 
could be the case that the non-predetermined variables depend directly on the 
past or that a variable not belonging to Z directly affects X and Y. By contrast, 
these possibilities are ruled out when m m .
2.2.3. Determinacy and reactions to shocks 
When assessing the impact of shocks, the issue of dynamic stability (conver-
gence) plays a crucial role. Stability analysis facilitates the study of the local 
(and sometimes the global) behaviour of a dynamic system and of the implica-
tions of disturbances occurring once the system is in the vicinity of a steady-
state equilibrium. According to Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002) a stable sys-
tem is defined as “one in which the unique equilibrium (also called steady state) 
is eventually restored following a shock to one or more of the exogenous vari-
ables”. In case of multiple equilibria (or stationary points), there may exist stable 
(convergent) and unstable (divergent) equilibria. Still, even under multiple equi-
libria, if there is a unique stable equilibrium, the system can still be regarded as 
stable. The arguments in favour of using stable systems only can be traced back 
to the correspondence principle in Samuelson (1947)59. Indeed, unstable systems 
are not particularly useful for economic analysis. Even if one or more (unstable) 
equilibria exist, the system is not very likely to be at any of these at a particular 
point in time. Moreover, even if, by coincidence, the system is in an equilibrium, 
a minor shock will suffice to displace it permanently from that equilibrium. Sta-
                                                
59  Early applications of dynamic methods in macroeconomics can also be found in Baumol 
(1959) and Allen (1967). 
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ble systems, by contrast, converge along an adjustment path to a stable equilib-
rium. An additional convenient feature of stable systems is that it is often possi-
ble to derive steady-state multipliers for the impact of changes in government 
policy and other exogenous variables on the endogenous ones in the system. 
Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002) distinguish between backward-looking and 
forward-looking stability. The former implies that, at a particular moment, the 
model determines the endogenous variables as a function of the exogenous and 
the predetermined state variables. Under forward-looking stability, lagged (his-
torical) and expectational (future) values jointly determine the current situation. 
A perhaps more important issue for stability analysis is the distinction be-
tween local and global stability of a dynamic system60. In the mathematical lit-
erature stability refers to situations in which trajectories that are initiated from 
an  -neighbourhood of a fixed point remain sufficiently close to this fixed point 
subsequently. Galor (2007) defines a system as being locally (asymptotically) 
stable if for a sufficiently small perturbation the dynamic system converges as-
ymptotically to the original equilibrium. In the case when, regardless of the 
magnitude of the perturbation, the system converges asymptotically to the origi-
nal equilibrium, the system is globally (asymptotically) stable. In other words, a 
steady-state equilibrium is locally (asymptotically) stable if there exists an  -
neighborhood of the steady-state equilibrium such that for every initial condition 
within this neighborhood the system converges to this steady-state equilibrium, 
whereas a steady-state equilibrium is globally (asymptotically) stable if the sys-
tem converges to the steady-state equilibrium regardless of the initial condition. 
Local stability of a steady-state equilibrium requires the local uniqueness of 
the steady-state equilibrium61. Thus, if the system is characterized by a contin-
uum of equilibria none of these steady-state equilibria is locally stable. Local 
stability necessitates therefore local uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium. 
Global stability of a steady-state equilibrium requires global uniqueness of the 
steady-state equilibrium62. In the case of a linear system, local uniqueness im-
plies global uniqueness and local stability necessarily implies global stability. 
In Chapter IV (Sections 2 and 3), the model variables’ responses to a num-
ber of shocks (monetary policy unit shock, technology shock and consumption 
preference shock) under a variety of interest-rate rule specifications are illus-
trated by impulse response analysis. Clearly, convergence to the steady state 
values is regarded as crucial when assessing the performance of different policy 
rule specifications. Beyond that, the existence of a monotonic convergence path 
                                                
60  In the subsequent analysis in Chapter IV, local determinacy of rational-expectations 
equilibrium will be assessed. 
61  I.e. the absence of any additional point in the steady-state neighbourhood from which 
there is no escape. 
62  I.e. the absence of any additional point in the space from which there is no escape. 
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and relatively small and short-lived initial variable deviations from steady state 
values are also considered to be advantageous63.
2.3. The Taylor principle 
Taylor (1999) derives a relationship between the stability of inflation and the 
size of the interest rate coefficient on inflation in the policy rule. He shows that 
it is crucial to set the interest rate response coefficient on inflation above a criti-
cal “stability threshold” of one. The interest rate rule is given by64
- . *t t t ti r y y         ,            (2.6) 
where t  is the nominal interest rate in t, ti   denotes the inflation rate over the 
previous four quarters, *  is the central bank’s inflation target65,  ty  is the output 
gap66, r is the equilibrium (steady-state) real interest rate67,   an yd   are policy 
parameters, denoting the central bank’s response to inflation and output gap de-
viations from target68. The total response to inflation in (2.6) is given by 




. It is assumed that the monetary policy stance is counter-cyclical, i.e. 
. Taylor (1999) combines (2.6) with backward-looking IS- and AS- 
specifications given by 
 ( )t tt ty i r      g             (2.7) 
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
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   ,            (2.8) 
where   , >0 are reduced-form parameters that depend on the policy parame-
ters; t  and tu  are serially uncorrelated stochastic shocks with zero mean. By 
substituting equation (2.6) in equation (2.7), an aggregate demand (AD) relation 










.            (2.9) 
                                                
63  The reason for this is quite straightforward: considerable deviations from the steady-
state level and/or long-lasting adjustment all induce losses and uncertainty in the econ-
omy. 
64  The rule specified by Taylor (1999) is a more general form of the Taylor (1993) one.  
65  Taylor (1993) sets the inflation target to be equal to 2 percent per annum. In Taylor 
(1999) only t  enters the policy rule, i.e. 
* 0  .
66  In Taylor (1993) the output gap denotes the percent deviation of real GDP from a target 
(trend real GDP). Taylor (1999) defines the output gap as the percentage deviation of 
real GDP from potential GDP. For the purpose of this work, the latter definition will be 
used.
67  The steady-state real interest rate is estimated in Taylor (1993) using US data and set at 
2 percent per annum. 
68  In Taylor (1993), 0.5y  
g69 The stochastic term  is left out here. t
45
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
The slope of the AD curve - ./ 1 y    is determined by the choice of the pol-
icy parameters   and y . For 0 +
< 0
 (i.e. ), the aggregate demand curve is 
downward-sloping
* 1 +
70 and for   it is upward-sloping.  Figure 2.2 reveals 
graphically the stability properties of a Taylor rule for an effective inflation re-
sponse coefficient greater or smaller than unity (the upper two panels) and the 
resulting AD relations for these two cases (the two lower panels). The horizontal 
lines in the two lower panels represent the aggregate supply (price adjustment) 
relation. The zero slope of the AS line is determined by the fact that in equation 
(2.8) current-period inflation depends in the previous-period output gap, rather 
than on the contemporaneous one. Changes in ty  are thus transmitted to the in-
flation dynamics with a time lag. The intersection of the two solid lines (the AS 
and the AD line) in the two lower panels represents a situation when ty y  (ac-
tual output is equal to the potential output), i.e. y 0t  . The AS line eventually 
moves up when the output gap is positive and vice versa. A positive supply 
shock also shifts the line upwards. 
Stable case      Unstable case
Figure 2.2: Stable and unstable monetary policy rules 
                                                
70  As .0y +
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The two left-hand panels in Figure 2.2 present a rule with  and the two 
right-hand panels one with . The case on the left is stable because an up-
ward shift in the AS line (a positive inflation shock) results in a decline of the 
output gap below zero, which leads to a downward adjustment of the inflation 
rate, represented by a downward shift of the price adjustment (AS) line. The 
case on the right is unstable, as, by contrast to the previous case, a positively 
sloped AD line implies that an upward shock to inflation leads to a positive out-
put gap and contributes to further increases in inflation. This explosive property 
of the system has as consequence that supply-side shocks will tend to have a 
permanent, self-accelerating effect on inflation, bringing the system farther 
away from its equilibrium. 
* 1 +
* < 1
Algebraically, the above results can be substantiated as follows. The stabil-
ity question can be expressed in terms of whether shocks will have a permanent, 








  ?              (2.10) 
whereby only under 1/t td d   1,  does the system converge to steady state after 







   ?              (2.10’) 
and 1 /t td d  ,1 as a condition for stability respectively. The policy-
dependence of the stability property of the system becomes evident after one last 
transformation, this time of the AS relation. One period forward, equation (2.8) 
becomes 

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Equivalently,
!
0 + ,                        (2.11’) 
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* 1 + .                      (2.11”) 
The relationship between the stability of inflation and the size of the inflation 
response coefficient in the central bank’s monetary policy rule has been reaf-
firmed by empirical analysis, such as Clarida et al. (2000), Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) and Wright (1998). Benhabib et al. (1999) also argue that real determi-
nacy could be attributed to the degree of activeness of monetary policy and the 
inflation measure that enters the central bank’s interest rule. They find that un-
der sticky prices and an active monetary policy stance (i.e. a policy that aggres-
sively fights inflation by raising the nominal interest rate by more than the regis-
tered increase in inflation), a forward-looking component in the intermediate 
target is more likely to lead to indeterminacy than a backward-looking compo-
nent. The assumption that the demand for money also plays a role in the mone-
tary-transmission mechanism and that productivity is affected by the cost of 
funds leads to novel results concerning equilibrium determinacy. A further point 
is recognising the difference between local and global determinacy of equilib-
rium. An active policy stance may appear to lead to macroeconomic stability as 
it ensures locally unique equilibrium, but in fact be destabilizing because it is 
associated with global indeterminacy and equilibria in which the economy con-
verges to a cycle71.
Clarida et al. (2000) provide empirical analysis of US monetary policy, 
based on a baseline sticky-prices model72 with a modified Taylor rule where the 
Fed responds to expected future deviations of inflation and the output from their 
target values, instead of to their current values.  Their findings support the re-
sults of and Kerr and King (1996) concerning the destabilising impact of an ex-
cessively weak reaction of the policy instrument to an increase in expected infla-
tion. This is the case of an effective policy reaction coefficient on the inflation 
gap . Values of * 1 ( *  below unity lead to equilibrium indeterminacy and 
monotone divergence or fluctuations around the steady-state values of inflation 
and output, resulting from self-fulfilling changes in expectations. The rise of 
self-fulfilling changes in expected inflation can be explained by the fact that 
with , a rise in anticipated inflation is accompanied by a decline in the real
interest rate which stimulates aggregate demand and causes a rise in inflation. 
Thus, due to the accommodating stance of monetary policy, the initial rise in 
expected inflation becomes “self-confirmed”. As shown by Clarida et al. (2000), 
the unity threshold value of 
* 1 ,
*
  is obtained only in the absence of a systematic 
policy response to output variations (i.e. 0y  ). For values of the policy reac-
tion coefficient on the output gap 0y + , the lower bound for   decreases be-
                                                
71  For further analysis, see Benhabib et al. (2001). 
72  For similar models, see King and Wolman (1996), Woodford (1996, 1998) and Yun 
(1996).
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low unity, although the deviation from unity is quantitatively negligible, and is 
independent of whether an interesting-smoothing parameter (i.e. the lagged 
nominal interest rate) enters the rule specification. As far as the upper bound for 
the unique equilibrium defined by the range of values of *  is concerned, Ber-
nanke and Woodford (1997) find that an excessive response to variations in ex-
pected inflation may also lead to indeterminacy. 
3. Preliminary summary 
Since the middle of the last century, the design, transmission channels and out-
comes of monetary policy have been the focus of extensive research. The practi-
cal experience with “activist” monetary policies in the 1960s and 1970s, moti-
vated by the conviction that in the long run the monetary authority can attain a 
permanent reduction in the unemployment rate by allowing for a higher rate of 
inflation, has been disappointing. Parallel to the practical experience with active-
ist policies, there has also been an academic critique of using monetary policy as 
a tool to obtain full employment at the expense of a higher inflation rate. Among 
the most influential arguments are Milton Friedman’s monetary critique con-
cerning the uncertain outcomes of monetary policy interventions, the Lucas cri-
tique of the optimal control paradigm for monetary policy, the conclusion 
reached by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) that there is no long-run trade-
off between inflation and unemployment, as well as the warning against the per-
ils of time inconsistency under discretionary policy delivered by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983).  
The experience with time-inconsistent discretionary policy has not only fu-
elled the debate on the benefits of systematic policy behaviour vs. discretion, but 
has also given an impetus for extensive research on how monetary policy rules 
should be designed and assessed. In terms of policy instrument choice, in the 
last two decades setting the nominal interest rate has generally prevailed over 
directly controlling money supply in both theory and practice.  However, select-
ing the target variables and their response coefficients in the policy rule cur-
rently remains a controversial issue, since the estimated outcomes are to a great 
extent model-dependent. In order to ensure a comprehensive assessment of the 
different rule specifications, it is essential to consider not only the aggregate 
demand, but also the aggregate supply monetary transmission channel, which 
requires using a comprehensive macroeconomic framework incorporating en-
dogenous capital (as the one used in Chapter III). Under such a framework, the 
determinacy and shock response properties of different rule specifications, as 
well as the relevance of the Taylor principle will be examined and assessed in 
the next two chapters. 
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III. A New Keynesian model with endogenous 
capital with adjustment costs 
One of the main findings concerning rule-based monetary policy design in 
Chapter II has been that the assessment of different rule specifications in terms 
of the criteria presented in Section 2 (determinacy of rational-expectations equi-
librium and response to shocks), as well as the evaluation of the relevance of the 
Taylor principle for fulfilling these criteria are to a great extent dependent on the 
model used and the inclusion of a supply-side transmission channel in particular.  
Therefore, in this chapter I focus on deriving a New Keynesian model with 
endogenous capital and adjustment costs and proceed with examining the sys-
tem’s determinacy properties under different rule specifications. In terms of the 
general applicability of the Taylor principle, the findings are non-trivial. In the 
model with endogenous capital an inflation response coefficient greater than 
unity is not sufficient per se for ensuring a unique rational-expectations equilib-
rium. Apart from a small value interval of the inflation response coefficient 
above unity, implying a moderately strong policy reaction, determinacy under an 
“active” rule requires some degree of output gap response. Moreover, even 
within the inflation coefficient interval yielding determinacy under a sole infla-
tion target in the rule, adding an output gap term is still associated with a unique 
equilibrium. In terms of “passive” rules (with an inflation response coefficient 
below one), the Taylor principle is only partially valid as well. Indeed, if 
inflation is the only target variable entering the rule, a smaller than one-on-one 
nominal interest rate response to inflation deviations yields indeterminacy of 
rational-expectations equilibrium. However, introducing a sufficiently large out-
put gap response can lead to a unique equilibrium even under a passive rule73.
Thus, modelling endogenous capital provides important new insights and an 
extension to the baseline formulation of the Taylor principle, namely by adding 
the requirement of introducing an output gap response in order to guarantee 
uniqueness of the system’s rational-expectations equilibrium.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In Sections 1 and 2, I give an overview 
to the baseline New Keynesian framework and possible approaches to modelling 
capital and investment. The model with endogenous capital and adjustment 
costs, which is the basis for the determinacy and impulse response analysis to 
follow in the next chapters, is presented in Section 3. In this section, I first ex-
amine the households’ optimisation problem. The resulting first-order conditions 
describe the aggregate demand side of the model. Then I present the producers’ 
optimisation and derive the aggregate supply curve and the real-wage equation 
and add an interest rate rule to the system. Dynamics of the whole economy are 
73  In fact, as it is evident in the analysis in Section 4, the output gap response required for 
determinacy increses as the inflation response coefficient decreases.
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
thus fully characterised by combining equilibrium conditions from both the de-
mand and the supply side. As a next step, in Section 4 these log-linearised equi-
librium conditions are used to study the determinacy property of interest rate 
rules. Then, in Section 4 I present the responses generated under different inter-
est-rate-rule specifications to three types of shocks. Section 5 provides a pre-
liminary summary of results.  
1. The New Keynesian framework: an overview 
Over the past decade numerous examples of small-scale monetary business cy-
cle optimising models featuring nominal rigidities have appeared in the litera-
ture. They are generally known as New Keynesian models. Both their theoretical 
appeal as micro-founded models, and their ability to explain the short-run effects 
of monetary policy, have contributed to their popularity among researchers. Tay-
lor (2000) describes New Keynesian models as “…dynamic, stochastic, econ-
omy wide models with forward-looking behaviour and some rigidities that make 
them useful for policy evaluation”. This kind of models are also sometimes re-
ferred to as “Dynamic New Keynesian” (Bernanke et al. (1998)) or New Neo-
classical Synthesis (Goodfriend and King (1997)).
New Keynesian models typically integrate standard Keynesian elements 
(imperfect competition, nominal rigidities in price- and wage-setting) into a dy-
namic general equilibrium framework with rational expectations of market par-
ticipants. One substantial improvement in recent research in comparison to the 
traditional Keynesian framework consists in stronger theoretical and microeco-
nomic foundations. Behavioural functions for aggregate variables are derived 
from optimal individual behavior of households and firms with simultaneous 
clearing of all markets. Thus, these models are an appropriate tool for analysing 
the connection between interest rates, inflation and the business cycle, as well as 
for comparing the impact of alternative monetary policies. 
An important feature of New Keynesian models is the inclusion of rational 
expectations of market participants. Muth (1961) first formulated the rational 
expectations hypothesis, which requires that the subjective expectation of eco-
nomic actors (households and firms) regarding a particular variable be equal to 
the objective expectation for that variable conditional on the information set 
available74. In the following decade the idea has been further developed, among 
others, by Lucas (1972, 1973), Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1975, 
1976) and Barro (1976).
Another essential characteristic of New Keynesian models concerns the na-
ture of inflation dynamics under monopolistic competition reflected in the New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve. Under the widely adopted staggered price specifica-
74  In the original paper, Muth suggested that „...expectations, since they are informed pre-
dictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant eco-
nomic theory” (1961, p. 316).  
52
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
tion as in Calvo (1983), inflation has forward-looking character as a result of the 
assumption that firms face constraints on the frequency of price-adjustment. 
This means that previously adjusted prices are likely to remain effective for 
longer than one period, i.e. current price-setting decisions (and therefore current 
inflation) are based on expectations about future cost and demand developments. 
Another determinant of inflation dynamics are mark-up variations (or real mar-
ginal cost variations) that arise from the monopolistic firms’ repeated attempts 
to adjust actual to desired mark-ups. Roberts (1998) suggests that the aggregate 
supply equation fits better to empirical data if the rational expectations assump-
tion is replaced by a partially backward-looking model of expected inflation. 
The output gap is an endogenous variable in the New Keynesian models, related 
to the ex ante real interest rate and expected output gap in the aggregate demand 
relation. Frequently the variable enters as an inflation fluctuations determinant 
the aggregate supply relation75 and as a policy target the central bank reaction 
function.
The empirical relevance of New Keynesian models has often been criticised. 
The dependence of optimising New Keynesian models on a forward-looking de-
cision making process limits their capacity to capture some of the business cycle 
regularities observed in the data. For instance, most optimising models are not 
very successful in replicating the delay in the responses of output and inflation 
to a monetary shock. In particular, an optimising model should explain why, 
rather than immediately, responses of both output and inflation to a monetary 
impulse reach their maximal impact several quarters after the shock. This phe-
nomenon has been widely investigated in recent papers using optimising models 
incorporating frictions in price-setting and/or wage-setting, e.g. in Chari et al. 
(2000), Christiano et al. (2001) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
The canonical New Keynesian model, as well as most of its standard gener-
alisations, abstracts from investment in order to maintain simplicity76. One pos-
sible explanation is the emphasis on short-run analysis of macroeconomic stabi-
lisation processes that allows abstracting from long-term capital accumulation 
implications. Moreover, the exclusion of capital is often justified on the grounds 
that the capital stock is not characterised by substantial volatility at business cy-
cle frequencies and empirically there is a very small correlation between capital 
75  As mentioned in the last paragraph, the output gap is sometimes substituted at the place 
of real marginal cost as inflation determinant. In fact, the Phillips curve relation derived 
from staggered price-setting as in Calvo (1983) involves the deviation of real marginal 
cost from its steady-state value. As Galí and Gertler (1999) and Clarida et al. (1999)
show, certain assumptions about technology, preferences and the labour market 
structure can be made that infer a proportionate relation between real marginal cost and 
the output gap.
76  This view has been expressed by McCallum and Nelson (1999b). Examples of New 
Keynesian models with constant (exogenous) capital and investment include, among 
others, Kerr and King (1996), Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Clarida et al. (2000). 
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and aggregate output measures (see McCallum and Nelson (1999a)). Difficulties 
with empirical measures of the capital stock also discourage developing models 
that involve capital accumulation.  
However, Dennis (2004) argues that abstracting from investment may imply 
that an important shock propagation mechanism that may have important impli-
cations for the design and implementation of an optimal monetary policy is 
omitted. Woodford (2003) provides a further critique on models with constant 
capital: “while this has kept our analysis of the effects of interest rates on aggre-
gate demand quite simple, one may doubt the accuracy of the conclusions ob-
tained, given the obvious importance of variations in investment spending both 
in business fluctuations and in the transmission mechanism for monetary policy 
in particular.” Casares and McCallum (2006) provide a further argument for the 
inclusion of endogenous capital and investment, as it enables not only studying 
issues relating to capital formation and growth, but also provides an endogenous 
explanation for the empirically observed contrasting variability of consumption 
and investment spending. 
When introducing investment within a New Keynesian framework, a crucial 
choice to make involves modelling the speed of capital stock adjustment in the 
occurrence of shocks. The case when capital adjusts relatively fast can be repre-
sented by modelling endogenous investment with an economy-wide rental mar-
ket77 as in Hairault and Portier (1993), Kimball (1995), Yun (1996), King and 
Watson (1996), King and Wolman (1996) and Chari et al. (2000). A further op-
tion consists in introducing a certain degree of inertia in capital accumulation in 
the model, which, as an additional advantage, seems to match better empirical 
data on capital stock dynamics. This can be achieved by introducing assump-
tions that prevent the capital stock from immediately responding to shocks. As 
already mentioned in Section 1, three possible assumptions about investment 
and the capital stock could generate an inertial response on part of capital: capi-
tal accumulation adjustment costs, a time-to-build requirement and firm-specific 
capital. As shown by Casares and McCallum (2006), an appropriate possibility 
to endogenise investment in a less complex manner is to incorporate endogenous 
investment with capital adjustment costs under sluggish price adjustment in a 
dynamic model of the IS-LM type with optimising behaviour78. This is approach 
chosen in the next section for deriving the New Keynesian model that is later 
used for examining the determinacy and shock response properties of different 
77  My results obtained under such a specification without adjustment costs (not included 
here) confirm the intuition that variable responses to shocks in such a case are unrealis-
tically large. This makes the choice of such a modelling option quite unappealing for 
policy analysis. 
78  Such models have been used by Woodford (1995), Kerr and King (1996), Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1998a, 1998b), Clarida et al. (1999) and Galí and Gertler (1999). 
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interest rate rule specifications in Section 4 (Chapter III) and Sections 2 and 3 
(Chapter IV).
2. Modelling capital and investment 
Ever since Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1939), the role of investment dynamics in 
business cycle fluctuations has been highlighted in macroeconomic analysis79.
Some prominent models include the neoclassical theory of investment, the ac-
celerator model and Tobin’s q theory.  
The neoclassical theory of investment80 uses the firm's production function 
and IS curve to derive demand for capital. Based on the IS curve and production 
function a relation between a firm's cash flow and its contemporaneous stock of 
fixed capital (plant and equipment) is obtained. The firm's demand for fixed 
capital is then set at a level that equates the marginal profit of capital with the 
user cost of capital81. The neoclassical theory of investment postulates that a 
firm's demand for capital is positively related to the firm's level of output and 
negatively related to the user cost of capital. Among the more significant em-
pirical results reported by Jorgenson and associates82 are that (i) investment de-
mand is highly responsive to changes in relative prices, including policy vari-
ables such as the interest rate and taxes; (ii) the lag to the investment  response 
to changes in its determinants is relatively long (on the average, about eight to 
nine quarters) and there is no response in the first few quarters and (iii) the dis-
tributed lag structure of investment behavior is bell-shaped; gross investment 
initially rises at an increasing rate and then increases at a decreasing rate as 
long-run equilibrium is approached. A more simplistic neoclassical framework, 
in which the demand for capital is still determined by the output level, but not by 
the user cost of capital, is the accelerator model of investment83.
Both the Jorgenson and the accelerator model treat steady-state capital stock 
as the desired level of capital stock and then impose an adjustment mechanism 
of actual capital stock towards its desired (steady-state) level84. Rather than de-
79  Abel (1988) offers a very comprehensive overview of investment literature. The empiri-
cal performance of different investment models is studied by Bischoff (1971) and Clark 
(1979).
80  As in Jorgenson (1963), Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) and Jorgenson and Stephenson 
(1969).
81  The user cost denotes the cost of using a unit of capital in production over a certain pe-
riod of time. 
82  The studies are based on quarterly postwar time-series for U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries.
83  In the accelerator model, no capital-labour substitutability either ex ante or ex post is 
assumed.  
84  This deficit is corrected by the flexible accelerator model of Eisner and Strotz (1963), 
where dynamic capital adjustment costs are a convex function of the rate of investment. 
Thus, firms would not find it profitable to adjust instantaneously to long-run equilib-
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riving a particular dynamic capital adjustment mechanism in the firm’s optimi-
sation problem (for instance, based on an adjustment cost function), these mod-
els assume that there exists an exogenous mechanism that determines the speed 
of the adjustment of actual to desired capital stock. 
An alternative approach is to incorporate adjustment costs and the price of 
investment goods directly into the maximization problem and then to derive the 
optimal rate of investment in each period. The q theory of investment as in 
Tobin (1969) explicitly derives the dynamic response of investment to perma-
nent and temporary (as well as anticipated and unanticipated) changes in the un-
derlying determinants.  Tobin’s q theory of investment builds on a baseline 
Keynesian idea that the investment decision is influenced by the market value of 
capital relative to the cost of acquiring additional capital. In case an additional 
unit of capital would increase the market value of the firm by more than the cost 
of acquiring the capital and putting it in place, then an optimizing firm should 
decide in favour of investment85. Although the original version of the q theory 
did not explicitly model the firms' production function and demand curve, it is 
possible to start with the IS curve and the production function and then derive 
the q theory as the result of intertemporal maximisation by firms. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, numerous contributions have aimed at in-
corporating the findings of neoclassical investment theory on the lagged charac-
ter of capital and investment responses within a forward-looking New Keynes-
ian framework with dynamic adjustment costs, micro-foundation and nominal 
price and wage rigidities. As Casares (2006) argues, introducing slow capital ad-
justment over time helps to replicate the delay in the responses of output and 
inflation to a shock, observed in the data. Several options to model the slow 
adjustment of the capital stock have been discussed in the recent literature: dy-
namic capital adjustment costs, time-to-build assumption, restricted capital stock 
mobility across sectors or firms (firm-specific capital).   
The approach of assuming capital adjustment costs reflects the fact that 
modifying the scale of capital services in a firm generates disruption costs dur-
ing installation of any new or replacement capital. As a result, costly learning 
must be incurred as the structure of production may have been changed. Install-
ing new equipment or structures frequently implies delivery lags and time to in-
stall/build. The irreversibility of many projects caused by a lack of secondary 
rium, because of the increasing marginal costs of doing so. Instead, they would find it 
optimal to adjust slowly and distribute the adjustment costs over time. This notion has 
been later expanded by Lucas (1967), Gould (1968), Treadway (1969) and others. 
85  Tobin (1969) defined q to be the ratio of the market value of a firm to the capital re-
placement cost of the firm. This ratio measures the value of fixed capital relative to its 
cost. A high ratio enhances incentive to acquire the capital and therefore the rate of in-
vestment. As the value of the firm is measured using data from financial markets, the 
link between asset markets and investment expenditure is quite straightforward. 
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markets for capital goods acts as another form of adjustment cost86. Among oth-
ers, Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucas and Prescott (1971), and Hayashi (1982) 
have incorporated the assumption that the process of installing capital goods re-
quires the use of resources. The baseline model in the investment literature has 
been a standard neoclassical model with convex (often approximated to be quad-
ratic) costs of adjustment87. Caballero (1999) shows that this model has not per-
formed well at an aggregate level; besides, some industry studies88 suggest that 
both convex and non-convex adjustment costs can be observed in practice. That 
is why an alternative approach to the standard convex cost model has been ad-
vocated recently by Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996), Caballero et al. (1995), and 
Cooper et al. (1999), emphasizing that non-convexities and irreversibility play 
an important role in the investment process. Paez-Farrell (2003) points out that 
the realistic modeling of adjustment costs is hindered by the fact that they are 
difficult to quantify. 
Still, Caballero and Engel (1999), Thomas (2002) and Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006) find that, despite performing poorly at the plant level, a model 
with convex costs fits the aggregate data reasonably well89. Therefore, despite 
the inaccuracy problems that are incurred by approximating capital adjustment 
costs by convex costs, this modeling choice is appealing due to it relative sim-
plicity. The above deficiencies notwithstanding, models with endogenous capital 
and convex capital adjustment costs still perform better than the ones with en-
dogenous capital only. This is confirmed by Casares and McCallum (2006) who 
argue that models with endogenous capital/investment choices but no adjust-
ment costs imply highly unrealistic responses to monetary-policy shocks under 
the assumption of sticky prices and wages.  
A second option of modelling the slow adjustment of capital over time, con-
sistent with the empirical data, is to introduce lags to the investment process, for 
instance by adopting a time-to-build assumption.  This approach can be traced 
back to Kydland and Prescott (1982) who construct a one-sector optimal growth 
model with persistent technology shocks. In order to design a more complex 
propagation mechanism for such shocks and to incorporate the co-movement of 
output and investment over time in a more realistic manner, they introduce a 
time-to-build lag in capital stock adjustment and achieve a good match of the 
86  McDonald and Siegel (1986) argue that if investment is irreversible (e.g. building a 
plant), the optimal decision of firms might be to forego some investments whose present 
value exceeds their cost. Then the correct calculation involves comparing the value of 
investing today with the (present) value of investing at all possible times in the future.  
87  A detailed overview of convex adjustment cost models and numerous references to the 
motivation and results of the literature are provided by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996). 
88  See, for example, Holt et al. (1960) and Peck (1974). 
89  However, they also find that convex cost models tend not to track investment at turning 
points well. 
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simulation results to quarterly U.S. postwar business cycle data. In a similar line, 
Taylor (1983) calculates optimal investment cost-reducing policy rules to offset 
investment fluctuations in a model with dynamic investment optimisation at 
firms’ level. In the Taylor (1983) model, investment dynamics are generated by 
heterogeneous gestation lags between the start and completion of investment 
projects rather than by introducing capital adjustment costs. A more recent paper 
by Paez-Farrell (2003) highlights that, by introducing the time-to-build assump-
tion, two key difficulties surrounding basic sticky price models can be over-
come, namely, the high volatility of the variables and the immediate impact of 
monetary policy shocks.  
Other recent contributions study the responses to monetary shocks under a 
time-to-build assumption in a more elaborated framework. Casares (2006) ex-
amines the effects of a monetary policy shock across two alternative time-to-
build specifications and a model with no time-to-build feature and finds that the 
inclusion of the time-to-build assumption matters for the response of investment, 
output and inflation to an interest rate shock. The multiple-period time-to-build 
model reports realistic (u-shaped) responses of the above mentioned variables, 
while the models with no or a one-period time-to-build structure fail to replicate 
empirical developments. Edge (2007) also develops a model with several time-
to-build requirements for household capital accumulation but without imposing 
a time-to-build constraint on the demand for capital of the production sector. His 
findings provide further arguments in favour of the introduction of a time-to-
build feature in order to replicate the adjustment pattern as a result of a monetary 
shock, evident in the data. He concludes that the assumptions that capital takes 
time to build and to plan, and that investment plans are costly to change once 
they are underway act to reduce the response of investment following a mone-
tary shock.
On the other hand, Rouwenhorst (1991) criticizes the conclusion that the 
time-to-build feature can actually be crucial to the explanation of business cy-
cles. By comparing models with and without this assumption, he finds that time-
to-build can introduce cyclical behaviour to the dynamic adjustment of con-
sumption, output and investment only as a result of the stochastic processes for 
the shocks that hit the economy and concludes: “Time to build, by itself, con-
tains only relatively weak material-propagation mechanisms for transferring real 
shocks, in terms of effects on output, labour input, and consumption. For persis-
tent deviations of output and investment to occur in the neoclassical model, it is 
required that the time series of shocks that hit the economy behave very much 
like the fluctuations which the model aims to explain… Thus the paper con-
cludes that time to build does not seem to be central to the explanation of busi-
ness cycles” (p. 242). A more general critique is provided by Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989) who argue that the time-to-build approach becomes much less 
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tractable once no capital rental markets are assumed90. In this case, when mak-
ing an investment decision, the firm must also assess the probability that the 
conditions could change in the meantime and cause it to want to stop the project. 
The notion that capital can be firm-specific in the Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989) critique above has been further highlighted by more recent research. 
Woodford (2005) finds that the assumption of a competitive rental market for 
capital services in which at every point in time the shadow cost of capital is 
equal across firms and sectors is unrealistic, as it could imply that a substantial 
part of the aggregate capital stock shifts each period from low-demand to high-
demand producers. He also argues that the rental market feature has non-trivial 
implications for the evolution of marginal cost at the firm level and hence for 
price-setting and inflation dynamics. He finds that, in terms of price stickiness, 
incorporating a rental market for capital results in a substantial exaggeration of 
the infrequency of price adjustment, while assuming exogenous capital instead 
results in a smaller underestimate. The insight that firm-specific capital leads to 
a lower estimate of the degree of price stickiness has been confirmed in a 
framework with constant firm-specific capital by Sbordone (1998) and Galí et 
al. (2001). Later Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), as well as Altig et al. (2005), 
building on the research by Woodford91 have analysed the consequences of en-
dogenous firm-specific capital for the estimated frequency of price adjustment in 
empirical versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in order to allow a 
closer fit to U.S. empirical data. Woodford (2005) highlights that the introduce-
tion of firm-specific capital solves the “micro/macro” conflict, i.e. the differing 
parameter values required to explain the co-movement between aggregate infla-
tion and aggregate output (as estimated by Phillips curve time series) and the 
parameter values consistent with microeconomic observations. He argues that 
the discrepancy between the frequency of price adjustment required to explain 
the aggregate inflation/output co-movements and the one that is suggested by 
microeconomic data disappears once certain more realistic assumptions are in-
troduced to the model (such as firm-specific capital, industry-specific labour 
markets, intermediate inputs entering production, non-constant elasticity of sub-
stitution among differentiated consumption and investment goods). 
As far as aggregate inflation dynamics is concerned, Sveen and Weinke 
(2004), as well as Woodford (2005) find that the introduction of firm-specific 
endogenous capital does not alter the results under constant (exogenous) capital 
stock. Woodford (2005) argues that the same form of equilibrium relation be-
tween inflation dynamics and the evolution of average real marginal cost can be 
derived under firm-specific capital. Moreover, he finds that the relation between 
the slope of the Phillips curve and the frequency of price adjustment that can be 
90  See Chapter 6, p. 297. 
91  The first version of Woodford (2005) with form-specific endogenous capital dates back 
to 2003 (see Chapter 5 in “Interest and Prices”). 
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derived under the simpler assumption of an exogenously given capital stock for 
each firm seems to be fairly accurate as an approximation to the correct relation 
in the case of firm-specific capital with an empirically realistic size of invest-
ment adjustment costs. In addition, Sveen and Weinke (2004) provide an elabo-
rate explanation of the similarity in terms of inflation dynamics resulting from a 
monetary shock between the model with endogenous firm-specific capital and 
the baseline version with exogenous capital stock. Under firm-specific capital, 
there are two opposite effects on marginal costs92. In the first place, the addi-
tional output generated by investment demand raises marginal costs; on the 
other hand, the additionally accumulated capital stock enhances the economy’s 
productive capacity and thus reduces marginal costs. In terms of the output re-
sponse, Sveen and Weinke (2004) find that, both on impact and during the tran-
sition period, the response of output is higher under the assumption of firm-
specific capital than in a model with exogenous capital. 
3. The model with endogenous capital and 
adjustment costs 
3.1. Household utility function and optimality conditions 
Under the assumption of identical capital and non-capital wealth in the initial 
period, complete financial markets and homogenous factor prices, all house-
holds make identical consumption, investment and factor supply decisions. Thus 
the household sector of the economy can be characterised by a representative 
household that is both a consumer and an owner of production factors. It seeks 
to optimise the intertemporal utility function 
0
( , , , ,jt t j t j t j t j
j
E U c l m
 
'
    

/ )t j
              (3.1) 
where , t , and t  are consumption, leisure and the stock of real money bal-











 0 +  is the household’s discount factor. The terms t  and t
denote two preference shocks, affecting consumption and the household’s hold-
ings of the economy’s medium of exchange, respectively. On the supply side, 
the representative household is engaged in producing specialised output. The 
household’s production is described by a homogenous Cobb-Douglas production 
function of degree 1: 
1( , ) ( ) PF PFd dt t t t t tf An k An k
  , 0 1PF, ,           (3.2) 
                                                
92  Here the plural form used reflects the fact that, under firm-specific capital, due to the 
absence of an economy-wide rental market, there exist as many quantitatively differing 
marginal costs as there are individual producers in the economy. 
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where PF  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, t  is a (la-
bour-augmenting) technology shock,  and t  denote the household’s labour 
demand and capital stock at time t . Sales of the household’s specialised output 













,             (3.3) 
where , t  and  denote aggregate demand, the price of the household’s 
product and the aggregate price level. The elasticity of substitution across differ-





 . In addition, the representative 
household supplies differentiated labour services on the monopolistically com-











,              (3.4) 
where aggregate labour is denoted by , t  is the household’s nominal wage, 




tW   is the elasticity of substitution for the 
differentiated labour services. At the same time, the representative household 
buys time units of a Dixit-Stiglitz composite labour input at the real wage rate 
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                 (3.5)
where  is the inflation rate, - .1/A At t tP P  1tb   denotes one-period government 
bonds purchased in t with real price 1(1 )tr 
k
, t  stands for lump-sum taxes (net 
of transfers) paid by the household and t  is the capital stock and 
tx
  is the capi-
tal depreciation rate. Next, I introduce two equilibrium conditions for the repre-
sentative household’s production and labour supply. Production is equal to the 
quantity that is demanded as in 
( , )d A tt t t t A
t






.     (3.6) 
Labour supply is determined by the labour demand in the monopolistic competi-













                                                
.             (3.7) 
93  If constant labour input is assumed, (3.5) is reduced to 




             1 t .
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The household’s optimality conditions consist of (3.5) - (3.7), together with94
1( , , , , ) 0t t t t t tU c m l           (3.8) 




    
( , , , , ) 0U c m l
1

!        (3.9)
3 t t t t t t         (3.10) 
1( , )
d




       (3.11) 
1 1 2 1 1(1 ) ( , ) 0
d
t t t t t t t tE E f A n k 
   
                 (3.12)
1
1(1 ) 0t t t tr E 
 

                  (3.13)
1 ( 1)(1 ) /( ) /( ) 0A A A At t t t t t t tY P P Y P P
                (3.14) 
1 ( 1)(1 ) /( ) /( ) 0W W W WA A A At t t W t t t t W t tn W W n W W
                  (3.15)
whereby t , t  and t  are the Lagrange multipliers to  (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) re-
spectively. The marginal product of labour and capital are denoted by  and 
:
tmpl
tmpk 1 t t( , )
d
t tf An k m pl  and 2 ( , )dt t t tf A n k mpk .
Equations (3.5)- (3.15) determine the paths of t , t , t , , 1t , 1t , t , tW ,
t
c m l dtn k  b  P
 , t  and t  given t , t , t , ,  and . For general equilibrium, there are 























                (3.18) 
and the government’s budget constraint 
1 1
1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t tg tx m m r b b
 
      1 t ,        (3.19) 
whereby tM  and tg  denote the nominal money supply and government con-
sumption of goods and services per household, while tr  is the real interest rate. 
Without nominal rigidities,  and tW . Altogether, equations (3.5)- 






dn k bl An P W  ,  ,  ,  ,  and r
  in response to the exogenous paths of tM , t  and ttx . Alternatively, it can be 
assumed that the government sets the path of t  instead of t  or t . By analogy, 
the central bank can implement monetary policy by determining the nominal 
interest rate t , instead of using 
g
b g tx
i tM as an instrument. The latter option will be 
pursued further in Subsection 3.5. 
                                                
94  Here (.)if denotes the partial derivative of the function (.)f  with respect to its i-th ar-
gument.  
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3.2. The “IS sector” 
Having presented the model’s micro-foundations in Subsection 3.1, some of the 
“IS sector” relations will be derived in this subsection, including the consump-
tion equation and the overall resource constraint. The equations relating to capi-
tal and investment will be presented in Subsection 3.3. In order to derive the 
consumption relation for the “IS block”, (3.8) and (3.13) can be combined to 
yield
# $1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) (1 )t t t t t t t t t t t tU c m l E U c m l r1  
              (3.20)
Then, combining (3.8), (3.9) and (3.13) yields 
2 1( , , , , ) ( , , , , )1
t
t t t t t t t t t t
t
iU c m l U c m l
i
   

     (3.21)
with 11 (1 )(1t t t ti r E )     .
The period utility function is approximated by95
1 1
( , , , , ) exp( ) (1 )exp( )
1 (1 )
t t
t t t t t t t





   
 
 





    (3.22) 
or
1 1exp( ) ( ) (1 )t t t t t tc E exp c r
   
     ! ,          (3.23) 
with 1( , , , , ) exp( )t t t t t t tU c m l c     = , 2 ( , , , , ) (1 )exp( )t t t t t t tU c m l m      = ,
and
0 1, = ,
, , , 0   > + . Equation  (3.23) can be transformed to yield 
1 1
1 1( ) (t tt t t tc E c r r E )t   
 
       ,         (3.24) 
whereby the “hat” variables denote logarithmic fractional deviations from the 
respective steady-state values, i.e. - .log /t tc c c . Assuming that the consumption 
preference shock follows the AR (1) process 1 tt t      and also substituting 
1t t t tr i E     in (3.24) yields the following consumption equation: 
1 1
1 1( ) (1t tt t t tc E c i E r  ) t   
 
         .        (3.25) 
Next, the log-linear approximation to the overall resource constraint can be writ-
ten as 
   
t c t g t invy c g in     tv ,           (3.26) 
where the value of the coefficient inv  depends on the share of investment in to-
tal output in steady-state, i.e. (1 ( , )) /inv inv f inv k y   . By analogy, the steady-
state shares in output of consumption and government expenditure are given by 
/c c y   and /g g y  .
                                                
95  The period utility function is separable in terms of consumption and real money bal-
ances.
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3.3. Capital accumulation adjustment costs 
In order to specify realistic movements of capital and investment, it is necessary 
to add investment adjustments costs to the model. As already discussed in Sec-
tion 1, some plausible ways of achieving this would include adopting the as-
sumption that capital investment (or capital good “installation”) creates certain 
costs or adding exogenous “time to build” constraints. Here I choose to en-
dogenise the sluggishness of capital stock adjustments and adopt the adjustment-
cost specification as in Hayashi (1982) and Casares and McCallum (2006). 
Gross investment is given by: 
1 (1 )t tinv k kt                (3.27) 
Adjustment costs take the form 
( , ) tt t t
t








            (3.28) 
where the unit capital installation cost depends on the investment-capital ratio 
 according to/tinv k
( , )t t t
t t






3 ,            (3.28’) 
with  and 2'(.) 0f + '(.) ''(.) 0f f
( , ) (dt t t
+ . Within this specification, total adjustment 




, )f An k C inv k is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 
1, implying constant returns to scale96, i.e. the size of the plant has no influence 
on the steady-state ratio of adjustment cost to output ( , ) /C inv k y . If the func-
tional form - . -1/t t tk inv k ./ 2tnvf i











  .             (3.29) 
If adjustment costs for investment are introduced, the household’s budget con-
straint (3.5) from Subsection 3.1 becomes 
                                                
96  Another possibility is to specify adjustment costs as in Abel (1983), where total adjust-
ment cost of investment in t varies only with gross investment according to 
t( )tC inv inv
  where the scale parameter 0 +  represents adjustment costs and 1 +  is 
the elasticity of total adjustment costs with respect to investment. Then, the values of the 
parameters   and   imply increasing marginal adjustment costs as result of a rise in 
gross investment. Under a homogeneous production function of degree 1, subtracting 
adjustment costs from the production function ( , ) (
t
d
t t t )f A n k C inv  implies decreasing 
returns to scale. 
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After introducing capital adjustment costs of the form (3.29), the capital stock 
first-order optimality condition in t+197 takes the form 
# $ # $ # $1 1 2 1 1 11 ( , ) 1 ( , )t t t t t t t t t tC inv k E C inv k E mpk 1 0 
   





Marginal adjustment costs in t and t+1 are given by 1 tC C  and 
. After substituting for next period’s real marginal cost 
( ,t tinv k
1 2 1 1( ,t tC C inv k 
1 1 1/t t trmc A mpl     from (3.11), (3.12’) takes the form 
- .1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t t tC E C E rmc mpk 
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    1
r
.
.            (3.12’’) 
Substituting  from (3.13) into (3.12’’) yields 11 (1 )t t t tE
     
-1 111
1
t t t t t
t
t
E C E rmc mpk
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     

1 ,         (3.30) 
where  is the return on the financial asset (the opportunity cost for invest-
ment). The right-hand side denotes the expected net marginal return on invest-
ment in the real asset. After substituting tC  and 1t t
1 r
E C  , the marginal cost in t and
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Using the log approximation, (3.31) yields the following semi-log-linear expec-
tational investment equation98:
   - . 1 1 1
1 12 2
1 * 1
1 ((1 ) (1 )
t t tt t t t t




            1 )
t ,
(3.32)
where  /t tinv inv inv , with 21 1 2( 1)C      . Steady-state adjustment costs are 
denoted by 1C ; rmc , mpk  and inv  are the steady-state values of real marginal 
cost, marginal product of capital and investment respectively. The gap between 
the expected net return on capital and the return on the financial asset is denoted 
by 1t t tE mpk r . Equation (3.32) shows that current investment depends not 
only on current, but also on the expected future premiums on investment in real 
 
97  See equation (3.12) in Subsection 3.1. 
98  For steady-state analysis, see Appendix. 
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assets because of the inclusion of the forward-looking term  1ttE inv  . For simplic-
ity, a parameter   denoting the semi-elasticity of investment with respect to the 
real asset’s premium in (3.32) can be introduced as 121/ (1 ) C    . Thus, in-
vestment behaviour is described by 
  - . 1 1 tt tr k1 1 1
1 * *t t tt t tinv E inv rmc mpk E rmc E mpk

 
       
  .
(3.32’)
Thus, under endogenous capital and investment adjustment costs, the model 
consists of an “IS sector” in the form 
1 1
1 ( ) (1 )t tt tc E c r r  t  
 
               (3.25)
  - . 1 1 11 * *1 1t t tt t t tinv E inv rmc mpk E rmc E mpk r k tt

 
         
(3.32’)
   - .1
PF
t t t tt
PF
rmc k y A

   

          (3.33) 
 (t tmpk mpk y k  )t               (3.34)
  
1 (1 ) tt tk k     inv              (3.35) 
   
t c t g t invy c g in     tv             (3.26) 
where (3.25) describes consumption decisions made by the households as de-
rived in Subsection 3.2, (3.32’) represents investment behaviour by firms, (3.33) 
and (3.34) are log-linear approximations to real marginal cost and the marginal 
product of capital for the Cobb-Douglas production function (3.2), (3.35) is a 
log-linearisation around the steady state of the investment specification (3.27) 
and (3.26) is the overall resource constraint with investment from Subsection 
3.2.  The technology shock t   and the consumption preference shock A t  are 
modelled as AR(1) processes, with 1 tt A tA A A    and 1 tt t      .
3.4. Inflation and real wage equations under sticky prices 
and wages 
In this section, I derive the inflation and real wage relations under sticky prices 
and wages, which will be used in the subsequent determinacy and impulse re-
sponse analysis. For illustration, the corresponding equations under flexible 
prices and wages are presented in Appendix. As a first step, I assume that P is
the fixed probability that households cannot adjust their price as in Calvo 
(1983), so that the first-order condition on price-setting (3.14) becomes 
1 ( 1)
0
(1 ) /( ) /( ) 0i i A A A At P t i t i t t i t i t i t t i
i
E Y P P Y P P   
     
'
    
     

   !/  ,     (3.14’) 
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which can be log-linearised to yield an equation describing sluggish price ad-
justment99





    
  
   
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   
 
.     (3.36)
Similarly to prices, for nominal wages it may be assumed that they cannot be 
adjusted with a fixed probability W , so that the nominal wage first-order condi-
tion (3.15) is transformed into
1 ( 1)(1 ) /( ) /( ) 0W W W Wi i A A A At W t i t i t i W t t i t i t i W t t iE n W W n W W
   
      
'
    
         !/  . (3.15’) 
0i
Log-linearising (3.15’) yields an expression for the dynamic real wage behav-
iour under sticky prices of the form 
   - . - . 1 1 11 11 1 1 1 1t t t tt t t t
aE E d
 






             

(3.37)
with - .(1 )(1 ) / 1 /W W W Wa n  tdl
         !  and  denoting the log deviations 
from steady state of the ratio of the average leisure-consumption marginal rate 
of substitution over the real wage or the left-hand side in (A3.10)100.
3.5. Interest-rate rule specifications 
This subsection concludes the derivation of the New Keynesian model with en-
dogenous capital and capital adjustment costs by adding a monetary policy rule. 
For the sake of realism, monetary policy is assumed to be implemented through 
a nominal interest rate instrument, so that money supply becomes an endoge-
nous variable101. Policy behaviour can be specified in terms of a Taylor rule as 
in Taylor (1993): 
- . * tt t t y ti r y i           ,          (3.38) 
, 0y  + ,
where t  is the nominal interest rate, ti   denotes the inflation rate,  ty  is the de-
viation of actual output from its steady-state (potential) level, r  is the steady-
                                                
99  For a more detailed derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, see Sbordone 
(2002) Sveen and Weinke (2004) and Woodford (2005). 
100  See Appendix. Sbordone (2001) offers a detailed derivation of this real wage equation 
under sticky wages. 
101  The money-demand relation is derived in Appendix. However, with the nominal interest 
rate chosen as a monetary policy instrument and with a separable period utility function 
(3.22), the LM equation can be excluded from the model relations that will be calibrated 
in Subsection 4.1 and used for the subsequent determinacy and impulse response analy-
sis.
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state real interest rate and *  is the central bank’s target inflation rate102. The 
term 
ti
 stands for is a monetary policy unit shock103. The reaction coefficients 
  and y determine how strongly the monetary authority stresses inflation and 
output stabilisation respectively. The response to inflation deviations in (3.38) is 
actually  for * 1 1    + 0 + . Thus, in the classification of Leeper (1991), the 
Taylor rule as in (3.38) is an “active” monetary policy rule, describing a more 
than one-on-one increase in the policy instrument as a result of deviation of the 
actual inflation rate from the target (steady-state) rate. Another possible specifi-
cation of policy behaviour is given by a rule proposed by Casares and 
McCallum (2006) 
- .  - .1 ty t i t ii i(1 ) (1 )t i t yi i   
1 )
          !
)(i
,      (3.39) 
and
* (1   
*  ; (1y )i y    , (3.40)
 and whereby * *y  are the effective inflation and output gap response coeffi-
cients implied by the policy rule. Additionally, the real interest rate equals the 
difference between the nominal interest rate and next period’s expected inflation 
in accordance with the Fisher equation, i.e. 
1t .               (3.41) t tr i tE  
Equations (3.25), (3.26), (3.32’) and (3.33)-(3.35), together with (3.36), (3.37), 
(3.39) or (3.38) and (3.41) determine time paths for the ten endogenous 
variables in the model: tc ,  tinv , , , tmpk  trmc 1tk  , ty , , tr t ,  t  and .ti
4. Determinacy analysis 
After the New Keynesian model with endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
has been derived in the previous section, I proceed with studying the system’s 
determinacy properties under several policy rule specifications. Since, when de-
riving the model’s reduced forms, the ten system equations yield quite complex 
coefficients, it is not possible to use the analytical approach to assessing the sys-
tem’s determinacy properties. Thus, as a second-best solution, the eigenvalues 
                                                
102  In the following subsections instead of the target rate *  the steady-state inflation rate 
  enters the Taylor rule, reflecting the assumption that the central bank correctly as-
sesses the steady-state inflation rate and uses it as a target value. 
103  The term 
ti
 is not included in the original Taylor (1993) version, but is added here in 
order to enable analysis of the impact of a monetary policy shock on the system under 
different policy specifications. The monetary policy shock term captures nominal inter-
est rate changes that are not a result of the central bank’s response to the target variables 
as prescribed by the rule. The monetary policy unit shock is modelled as an upward blip 
of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the policy rules (3.38) and (3.39) that is transmitted 
to the policy instrument, causing it to rise.  
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of the system are examined after substituting the coefficients with the numerical 
values provided in Subsection 4.1. Then, I offer some preliminary insights to the 
relevance of the Taylor principle using the calibration in the previous subsection 
for active and passive rules with and without an output target. Finally, in the last 
subsection a more global perspective to determinacy outcomes under a wide 
range of inflation and output gap response coefficients is provided. 
4.1. Calibration 
In order to enable quantitative analysis of the model’s properties it should be 
specified in numerical terms. Table 3.1 presents the values of the model parame-
ters104, used for the determinacy analysis in Subsection 4.2 and the impulse re-
sponses in Chapter IV. In addition, some of the calibration choices should be 
considered in detail. For equation (3.25), 5   implies an intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution in consumption  as in Hall (1988) and Fuhrer (2000). 
The value of the steady-state real interest rate 
1 0.2  
0.005r 
5363
corresponds to an annual 
value of 2 percent. In equation (3.32’), 1   and 2  yield 3.14 
2
1 0.05C 
   , implying that the unit adjustment cost in steady state equals 5 
percent of investment. The marginal adjustment cost in steady state is then 
21 1 2( 1) 0.2C 
     1.  The steady-state values of real marginal cost are de-
rived from the relation for the steady-state marginal product of capital (A3.6)105.
In equations (3.25) and (3.33), the autocorrelation coefficients assigned to the 
preference and technology shocks 1 tt t      and 1t A tA A tA    are 0.3 
and 0.95A  .
Table 3.1: Parameter values (in order of appearance) 
“IS sector”: 5 









                                                
104  The parameter values chosen are based on the calibration in Casares and McCallum 
(2006).
105  See Appendix. 
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Real wage equation (3.37): 4W 
0.75W 
2 
/ 0.n l  5
Monetary policy rule (3.38), active 0.5 
* 1.5 
* 0.5y y  
Monetary policy rule (3.38), passive * 0.5 
* 0.5y y  
*
;
0.1y y  
106





In the aggregate supply equation (3.36) 0.005   corresponds to an annual value 
of steady-state inflation of 2 percent. The degree of price and wage stickiness is 
represented by the probability that the representative household is not able to 
adjust its price or wage; 0.75P W  
6
 implies that prices and wages are reset 
once a year on average107. The value of the elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated consumption goods   is frequently assigned in the business-
cycle literature. Thus some simple calculations show that in (3.36) the coeffi-
                                                
106  In Chapter III, Subsection 4.2 the value  has been used for the determinacy 
analysis. Based on the finding that such a value of the output gap coefficient cannot 
yield a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium, the value has been 
chosen for the impulse-response analysis in Chapter IV, Subsections 3.2 and 3.3. 
* 0.1y y  
* 0.5y y  
107 As in Erceg et al. (1999). 
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cient (1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 )P P PF P PF PF
            is equal to 0.02, i.e. the deviations 
of real marginal cost have a relatively modest impact on inflation dynamics, es-
pecially in comparison to the influence of inflation expectations. In the wage 
adjustment equation (3.37) the leisure relative risk aversion coefficient 2  im-
plies that in the steady state leisure is twice the labour hours ( / 0.5n l  ). When 
calibrating the monetary policy rule specifications (3.38) and (3.39), I have in-
cluded for convenience the terms * and *y , which denote the effective inflation 
and output gap response coefficients implied by the policy rule.  
In the forthcoming determinacy and shock response analysis two main sim-
ple monetary rule specifications will be tested, namely an “active” and a “pas-
sive” monetary policy rule. The former possibility can be illustrated by a base-
line Taylor rule that incorporates an active policy stance with regard to the infla-
tion objective and a more moderate response to output fluctuations as in (3.38). 
The latter option can be represented by a passive Taylor rule with a reaction co-
efficient assigned to inflation smaller than unity (for instance, 0.5) and no inter-
est-rate smoothing as in (3.38). The passive policy stance can also be illustrated 
by a rule of the form (3.39), proposed by Casares and McCallum (2006), where 
the effective coefficients assigned to inflation and output deviations are consid-
erably smaller than in the previous case (0.3 and 0.02 respectively) and interest-
rate smoothing has a considerable weight for setting the policy instrument.  
The above mentioned options for the design of a simple monetary policy 
rule can be reduced to three main issues to be explored. Firstly, whether the Tay-
lor principle requiring an active policy stance with respect to inflation still needs 
to be adhered to in a framework with endogenous capital, capital adjustment 
costs and sticky prices and wages. Secondly, whether the introduction of output-
targeting ensures determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and/or 
can alleviate the negative effects of shocks. Thirdly, whether interest-rate 
smoothing can compensate for the impact of non-compliance with the Taylor 
principle in the case of passive policy stance or, alternatively, improve the re-
sults attained by active policy. In order to enable comparability of the results 
concerning the effect of the degree of “activism”, response to output fluctuations 
and interest-rate smoothing, six cases will be considered: active rule with infla-
tion-targeting only, active rule with inflation- and output-targeting and no inter-
est-rate smoothing (as in the Taylor rule), active rule with inflation- and output-
targeting and interest-rate smoothing, passive rule with inflation-targeting only, 
passive rule with inflation- and output-targeting and no interest-rate smoothing 
(as in the Taylor rule) and finally a passive rule with inflation- and output-
targeting and interest-rate smoothing108. In the case of passive policy, experi-
                                                
108  In order to limit the dimensions of the reduced-form system, in the determinacy analysis 
in Chapter III, Subsection 4.2 interest-rate smoothing is abstracted from. Later on, for 
the impulse-response analysis in Chapter IV the interest-rate smoothing option is in-
cluded.
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menting with the size of the inflation and output response coefficients provides 
additional insights to whether the magnitude of the monetary authority’s re-
sponse when passive policy is pursued has a significant impact on the results 
obtained. For this purpose, in Chapter IV, Subsection 3.3 I include impulse re-
sponse results under both (3.38) entailing a relatively stronger passive response 
with inflation and output coefficients of 0.5 each and (3.39) implying a weaker 
reaction , with parameter values of 0.3 and 0.02 respectively.
4.2. Determinacy and the Taylor principle: some 
numerical examples 
The structural equations (3.25), (3.26), (3.32’) and (3.33)-(3.35), together with 
(3.36), (3.41), (3.39) or (3.38) and (3.41)  can be reduced to a system of four 
equations109, expressed in terms of inflation, consumption, capital and the real 
wage. Unfortunately, when deriving the four reduced forms, the ten system 
equations yield quite complex coefficients, which makes the analytical approach 
to assessing the system’s determinacy properties impossible. Thus, as a second-
best solution, the eigenvalues of the system will be studied after substituting the 
coefficients with the numerical values included in the previous subsection. First, 
in the next two subsections I offer some preliminary insights using the calibra-
tion in the previous subsection for active and passive rules with and without an 
output target. Then, in Subsection 4.2.3 a more global perspective to determi-
nacy outcomes under a wide range of inflation and output gap response coeffi-
cients is provided. 
For convenience, the system’s reduced forms are presented as: 
    
12 11 2 3 4 5 6 tt t t t ttk k ka a a a c a a                  (A3.13) 
  
11 7 8 9 10 11tt tt t tk k cE a a a a a t                (A3.14) 
    
1 112 13 14 15 16tt t t tE k ka a a c a a 1t t                 (A3.15) 
  
1 117 18 19 20 21tt t t t tE c k k ca a a a a t                (A3.16) 
The system (A3.13)- (A3.16) can be written in the vector form . If 
the identities 
1t t tE X AX 
 
1tk k  1t t and  t   are added to the system, vector tX  contains 
the six elements  1tk  ,  tk , t , , tc  t  and  1t   of which only the capital stock k  is a 
pre-determined state variable: 
                                                
109  The step-by-step derivation, as well as the analytical form of the reduced forms’ coeffi-
cients, are included in Appendix. 
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        (3.42)
Under the parameter values chosen in Chapter III, Subsection 4.1110,
a1 = 1.99+ *0.33 y ,
a2 = -(0.98+ *0.32 y ),
a3 = 0.04-0.04 * ,
a4 = 0.001-0.03 *y ,
a5 = 0.002, 
a6 = 0.001, 
a7 = 0.1, 
a8 = 0.11, 
a9 = 1.01, 
a10 = 0.01, 
a11 = 0.02, 
a12 = 0.1, 
a13 = 0.11, 
a14 = 0.01, 
a15 = 2.03, 
a16 = a9 = 1.01, 
a17 = 0.02+1.76 ,*y
a18 = 0.02+1.72 ,*y
a19 = 0.2 -0.2,*
a20 = 1.002+0.16 ,*y
a21 = 0.004. 
                                                
110  Here the parameters a5 = 0.002, a6 = 0.001 and a21 = 0.004 will be taken as equal to 
zero, as all three of them are significantly smaller than 0.01. 
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4.2.1. Active rule 
The case with inflation-targeting only 
For an active interest rate rule with inflation-targeting only with  and 
, the coefficient matrix F is given by: 
* 1.5 
* 0y 
1.99 0.98 0.02 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0.02 0
0.02 0.02 0.1 1 0 0
0.1 0.11 0 0.01 2.03 1.01





   






tkAgain, only  is a pre-determined state variable, which implies that for deter-
minacy of rational expectations equilibrium F should have exactly one eigen-
value inside the unit circle and the remaining five eigenvalues should be greater 
than unity. In order to guarantee methodical consistence, coefficient values are 
represented with a 0.01 accuracy as in the previous subsection. Thus a5 = 0.002, 
a6 = 0.001 and a21 = 0.004 are set to equal zero and a20= 1.002 is taken to be 
equal to 1.  Since after this procedure the dynamics of the capital stock, inflation 
and consumption are independent of the realisations of the real wage in t-1 and 
one eigenvalue of F is given by 16 , stability of the system is completely de-




1.99 0.98 0.02 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0.02
0.02 0.02 0.1 1 0









F - .0.91, 0.997 0.03 , 0.997 0.03 , 1.1, 2.03i i are given by The eigenvalues of ,
of which the first three eigenvalues of the system are within the unit circle. 
Thus, an active rule satisfying the Taylor principle under inflation-targeting only 
does not necessarily yield determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium in a 
model with endogenous capital and investment under the parameter values cho-
sen.
The case with inflation- and output-targeting 
For an active interest rate rule with  and 111* 1.5  * 0.5y  , the coefficient matrix 
G is given by: 
                                                
111  The same parameter values are assigned in Taylor (1993). 
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2.16 1.14 0.02 0.01 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0.02 0
0.9 0.88 0.1 1.08 0 0
0.1 0.11 0 0.01 2.03 1.01





   




.     
As in the system of equations (3.42) only  is a pre-determined state variable, 
the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy of rational expectations 
equilibrium is that G should have exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle 
and the remaining five eigenvalues greater than unity. By analogy to the previ-
ous case, since the dynamics of the capital stock, inflation and consumption are 
independent of the realisations of the real wage in t-1 and one eigenvalue of G is







2.16 1.14 0.02 0.01 0
1 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0.02
0.9 0.88 0.1 1.08 0









G are given by - .0.94, 1.01, 1.52 0.02 , 1.52 0.02 , 2.03i i The eigenvalues of ,
of which only the first eigenvalue of the system is within the unit circle. Thus, 
an active rule satisfying the Taylor principle can yield a determinate rational ex-
pectations equilibrium when both inflation and output enter the interest rate rule. 
4.2.2. Passive rule 
The case with inflation-targeting only
For a passive interest rate rule with inflation-targeting only with  and 
, the coefficient matrix H is given by: 
* 0.5 
* 0y 
1.99 0.98 0.02 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0.02 0
0.02 0.02 0.1 1 0 0
0.1 0.11 0 0.01 2.03 1.01





   






tkAgain, only  is a pre-determined state variable, which implies that for deter-
minacy of rational expectations equilibrium H should have exactly one eigen-
value inside the unit circle and the remaining five eigenvalues greater than unity. 
In order to guarantee methodical consistence coefficient values are represented 
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with an 0.01 accuracy as in the previous subsection. Thus a5 = 0.002, a6 = 0.001 
and a21 = 0.004 are set to equal zero and a20= 1.002 is taken to be equal to 1. 
Since after this procedure the dynamics of the capital stock, inflation and con-
sumption are independent of the realisations of the real wage in t-1 and one ei-
genvalue of H is given by , stability of the system is completely deter-









1.99 0.98 0.02 0
1 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0
0.02 0.02 0.1 1





   
   
  !
 .
The eigenvalues of are given by H - .0.88, 0.98, 1.05, 1.1, 2.03 , of which the 
first and the second eigenvalues of the system are within the unit circle. Thus, a 
passive rule under inflation-targeting only yields indeterminacy of rational ex-
pectations equilibrium under the parameter values chosen.
The case with inflation- and output-targeting 
For a passive interest rate rule with  and 112* 0.5  * 0.1y  , the coefficient matrix 
J is given by: 
2.02 1.01 0.02 0 0
1 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0
0.2 0.2 0.1 1.02 0
0.1 0.11 0 0.01 1.01





   











 tKAgain, as in the system of equations (3.42) only  is a pre-determined state 
variable, the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy of rational ex-
pectations equilibrium is that J should have exactly one eigenvalue inside the 
unit circle and the remaining five eigenvalues greater than unity. Since the dy-
namics of the capital stock, inflation and consumption are independent of the 
realisations of the real wage in t-1 and one eigenvalue of J is given by ,




2.02 1.01 0.02 0
1 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01
0.2 0.2 0.1 1.02





   







                                                
.
112  See the calibration of a passive rule under (3.38). 
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J are given by - .0.89, 0.99, 1.05, 1.11, 2.03
0.1
The eigenvalues of , of which the 
first and the second eigenvalues of the system are within the unit circle113. Thus, 
a passive rule with  and y , cannot yield a determinate rational ex-




4.2.3. Interest-rate rule response coefficient values and determinacy: a 
global perspective 
The previous numeric examples reveal differing stability properties of the sys-
tem when certain numeric values of the monetary policy response coefficients 
are assumed. Subsection 4.2.1 shows that adherence to the Taylor principle 
alone does not guarantee determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium under 
endogenous capital, as the output gap coefficient also plays an important role. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the results for a greater number of parame-
ter values within a plausible interval, in order to identify the stability regions for 
the values of  and .* *y
More generally, the system’s coefficient matrix can be represented in terms 
of both policy parameters from the interest rate rule as: 
* * * *
* * * *
1.99 0.33 0.98 0.32 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.001 0
1 0 0 0
0.1 0.11 1.01 0.01 0.02
1.76 0.02 1.72 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.16 1.002 0





   
   









Fig. 3.1 shows in three-dimensional space the determinacy results for values of 
the policy response parameters 114 and  from 0 to 2* *y . The vertical axis repre-
sents the unit circle. Whenever only one eigenvalue of the system is smaller than 
unity, the respective combination of values of  and * *y  is marked in blue. Al-
ternatively, the cases when the parameter values generate less or more than one 
eigenvalue within the unit circle are denoted by blank space. The intersection of 
the  and * *y  axes with the unit circle (1.0) plane is represented from a two-
dimensional perspective on Fig. 3.2, where the black regions stand for indeter-
minacy of rational expectations equilibrium (none or two or more eigenvalues 
within the unit circle) and the white areas correspond to parameter values induc-
ing a unique convergence path with a single eigenvalue smaller than unity. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 reveal a picture that is consistent with the numeric re-
sults in the previous section. With endogenous capital, the introduction of out-
put-targeting is crucial for the determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium. 
                                                
113  The exact value of the second eigenvalue of the system is 0.99341, i.e. very close to 
unity, but still within the unit circle. 
114  For the purpose of the analysis, the values of *  and 
*
y  are being altered with a 0.05 
step.
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What is more, adherence to the Taylor principle alone does not necessary guar-
antee a unique convergence path of the system when capital is endogenous. 
Only within a very limited value interval of the inflation reaction coefficient be-
tween 1.0 and 1.3 does an active rule with no output gap response yield determi-
nacy. For all other values of *  above 1.3 and under 1.0, setting  leads to 
more than one eigenvalue within the unit circle, i.e. to multiple rational expecta-
tions equilibria. Still, bearing in mind the above mentioned findings on output-
targeting, an active policy in terms of inflation (i.e. ) is more likely to lead 
to a unique equilibrium, as the required intensity of the output response in this 
case is significantly smaller than under a passive rule. For example, for 
* 0y 
* 1 +
* 2  ,
any *y  higher than 0.1 yields determinacy; for values of the inflation coefficient 
significantly smaller than unity, a much stronger output gap response is needed, 













Figure 3.2: Determinacy regions (2D) 
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Apart from the requirement that some small degree of output-targeting should be 
introduced when *  is above 1.3 in order to guarantee determinacy of rational 
expectations equilibrium, the above findings in general reaffirm adherence to the 
Taylor principle as a policy recommendation. Except for a small indeterminacy 
region, active policy in fact generates determinacy and even unconditionally so 
for the interval . The second, more controversial, conclusion refers to 
the implications of passive policy. Contrary to the results of Taylor (1993), in a 
model specification with endogenous capital 
*1  1.3, ,
* 1 ,  does not necessarily induce 
indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium. With a sufficient (ever-
increasing as *  decreases) degree of an output gap response, a determinate 
equilibrium may still be obtained even if .* 1,
Generally, the results plotted on Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that an active in-
terest rate rule might be more advantageous as it is associated with a wider range 
of response coefficients’ values inducing a unique equilibrium. Determinacy of 
rational expectations equilibrium is a highly desirable quality, as it assures that, 
after some disturbance has occurred, the system will converge to steady state 
following a unique, predictable path. Still, the exact unique adjustment path of 
the economy and especially the size and the persistence of deviations from 
steady state also play a crucial role in monetary policy decision-making. For ex-
ample, a monetary policy stance that guarantees a faster convergence to steady 
state with smaller and less fluctuating deviations in variables such as interest 
rates, inflation, the output gap, consumption and investment (to name a few) will 
clearly be preferred to scenarios generating more uncertainty and distress in the 
economy. The adjustment paths induced by several different interest rate rule 
specifications will be presented and discussed in the next chapter. 
5. Preliminary summary of results 
In Sections 1 and 2, I gave an overview to the baseline New Keynesian frame-
work and possible approaches to modelling capital and investment. Then, in 
Section 3 I derived a model with endogenous capital, sticky prices and wages 
and capital adjustment costs. As a next step, different specifications of the inter-
est rate rule with respect to the degree of activeness of the rule (measured by the 
inflation coefficient) and the target variables included were assessed based on 
the existence of a determinate rational expectations equilibrium.
The numerical experiments pertaining to the specification of the central 
bank’s interest rate rule were illustrated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2 that plot deter-
minacy and indeterminacy regions for each combination of values for the infla-
tion and the output gap reaction coefficients  in the interval # $0,2 and * *y . The 
determinacy analysis in Section 4 led to the conclusion that, under the assump-
tion of endogenous capital and investment with capital adjustment costs and 
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115calibration of the model parameters consistent with the existing literature , ad-
herence to the Taylor principle alone does not guarantee determinacy of rational 
expectations equilibrium under endogenous capital, as the output gap coefficient 
also plays an important role. Even under an active rule, some degree of output-
targeting is needed to guarantee determinacy (except for the very limited value 
interval of the inflation reaction coefficient between 1.0 and 1.3). Secondly and 
more interestingly, a passive interest rate rule does not necessarily yield inde-
terminacy of rational expectations equilibrium. With a significantly strong re-
sponse of monetary policy to the output gap (ever-increasing as *  decreases), a 
determinate equilibrium may still be obtained even if the inflation response co-
efficient is smaller than unity.     
The general conclusion from the numerical experiments in Subsection 4.2.3 
that an output target improves the performance of policy rules irrespective of the 
degree of the inflation response is a useful starting point for assessing the results 
from the shock impulse responses in the next chapter.
                                                
115  See, for example, Casares and McCallum (2006). 
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IV. Shock impulse responses  
In Chapter III, I studied the determinacy properties of different interest rate rule 
specifications with respect to the degree of activeness of the rule (measured by 
the inflation coefficient) and the target variables included were assessed within a 
New Keynesian framework with endogenous capital and adjustment costs. 
Based on the results obtained, I will now assess the characteristics of the con-
vergence path back to steady state after a shock occurs, implied by active and 
passive rules under three possible specifications for each class: (i) rules with a 
sole inflation target; (ii) rules with an inflation and output target and (iii) rules 
with inflation and output gap target and interest-rate smoothing. The types of 
shocks entering the impulse responses are threefold: (i) a monetary policy unit 
shock; (ii) a technology unit shock and (iii) a consumption preference shock. In 
the subsequent analysis, policy rule specifications that yield determinacy of 
rational-expectations equilibrium (REE) and in addition involve quantitatively 
smaller deviations and fast, monotonic convergence path after a shock occurs 
would be preferred. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 provides some general pre-
liminary insights to the adjustment mechanisms in the system as a result of three 
types of shocks (monetary policy unit shock, technology unit shock and con-
sumption preference unit shock) and identifies the two main transmission chan-
nels in the model (the real interest rate and the real marginal cost channel). Then 
in Sections 2 and 3 the adjustment paths of consumption, investment, the capital 
stock, real marginal cost, the output gap, the marginal product of capital, infla-
tion, real wages and the nominal and real interest rate are traced for the case of 
active and passive rule specifications. Section 4 summarises the impulse re-
sponse results.
1. Some preliminary remarks on the adjustment 
mechanisms in the system 
In this subsection, I will offer some general preliminary insights to the adjust-
ment mechanisms in the system as a result of three types of shocks (monetary 
policy unit shock, technology unit shock and consumption preference unit 
shock). As it will be further revealed in more detail, the deviations registered as 
a result of the occurrence of shocks within each of the two main group of rules 
(active vs. passive) share the same sign. The differences observed under the dif-
ferent interest-rate rule specifications within each group pertain rather to the 
magnitude of the responses and the period convergence to the steady-state level 
takes. More generally, a comparison between active and passive specifications 
reveals the crucial role of the real-rate response that is the determinant of differ-
ing dynamics of the remaining variables. A second initial transmission channel 
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pertains to real marginal cost (i.e. in the case of a technology shock)116. A closer 
look at the ten system equations reveals a common pattern of adjustment dynam-
ics that can be anticipated before assigning numerical values to the reaction co-
efficients in the monetary policy specification.
1.1. Monetary policy unit shock 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a monetary policy unit 
shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the pol-
icy rules (3.38) and (3.39) that is transmitted to the policy instrument, causing it 
to rise. The monetary policy shock term captures nominal interest rate changes 
that are not a result of the central bank’s response to the target variables as pre-
scribed by the rule. Under rational expectations, expected inflation will sink. 
Investment, consumption and output gap dynamics as evident by (3.32’), 
(3.25) and (3.26) are all triggered by the impulse to the real interest rate. The 
Fisher equation 1t t t tr i E     postulates that the dynamics of the real interest rate 
is approximated by the difference between the deviations of expected inflation 
and the nominal interest rate. Due to the expected rise in the real interest rate as 
a result of the shock under both active and passive policy117, negative spikes of 
differing magnitude depending on the policy rule specification selected occur in 
investment, consumption and the output gap immediately after the shock, fol-
lowed by a gradual return to the steady-state level118. The stronger deviation in 
investment compared to consumption is straightforward in the case of a mone-
tary policy shock as the real interest rate enters (3.32’) with a coefficient 1.5 
and (3.25) with a coefficient 1 0.2   . Since according to equation (3.26) the 
output gap is a weighted average of consumption and investment, its immediate 
response can be expected to have an intermediate value. The magnitude of the 
output gap response reveals the significance of the endogenous capital assump-
tion for the model’s quantitative results: under constant capital, the output gap 
response to a monetary policy unit shock would still be negative, but of a con-
siderably smaller magnitude, as it would only incorporate the relatively more 
moderate fall in consumption. Still, because of assigning a higher weight to con-
sumption ( 0.78c  ) than to investment ( 0.22inv  ) in (3.26), the adjustment 
path of the output gap can be anticipated to match the dynamics in consumption 
more closely than that of investment. 
                                                
116  Real marginal cost dynamics determine the inflation response. Under sticky prices, the 
real marginal cost channel plays a quantitatively modest role, as firms cannot adjust their 
prices immediately after the shock occurs. Changes in expected inflation, however, play 
a crucial role and are transmitted nearly one-to-one to current inflation (as 0.99
  ).
117  The rise in the real interest rate as a result of the positive blip in the nominal interest rate 
can only be circumvented if an immediate positive spike of comparable magnitude in in-
flation expectations occurs.
118  As the shock is assumed to be of temporary nature.
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The impact on investment is transmitted to capital with a one-period lag as 
evident from (3.35). The value assigned to the rate of depreciation 0.025   in 
the capital accumulation equation determines the significantly smaller maximum 
response of capital compared to the initial deviation in investment. The speed of 
adjustment of the capital stock to its steady-state level can be anticipated as be-
ing slower than that of investment. This result is a logical consequence of the 
fact that capital is a predetermined variable as specified in equation (3.35). By 
contrast, investment according to equation (3.32’) does not depend on the past 
realisations of any of its determinants and can therefore respond immediately 
and in full magnitude as soon as the shock occurs. 
In comparison to the response of capital and the output gap the magnitude of 
the deviation of the marginal product of capital will be of a considerably smaller 
magnitude, due to the relatively small value of the steady-state marginal product 
of capital ( 0.04mpk  ) that enters equation (3.34) as a coefficient. The assump-
tion of a steady-state real interest rate of 2 percent p.a., depreciation rate of 
0.025, steady-state unit adjustment cost and steady-state marginal adjustment 
cost of 0.05 and 0.21 respectively in (A3.6) 1(1 ) (1 ) /mpk C C rmc      imply 
a relatively weaker response of marginal product of capital to deviations in out-
put and capital.
The assumption of sticky wages in (3.37), modelled by the inclusion of a 
fixed probability W ( 0.75W  ) that nominal wages cannot be adjusted in the 
current quarter (which implies that on average wages are re-set once a year) and 
the partial history-dependence of the variable determines the sluggish adjust-
ment of the real wage. The transmission of the shock to real wages occurs 
through the adjustment of the inflation expectations 1t tE    and through the 
dynamics of the inflation differential t  . Quantitatively, with 0.99
  , the 
coefficient on the inflation differential - .1/ 1 
  is only slightly higher than the 
coefficient on expected inflation - ./ 1
 
 . As the two terms enter (3.37) with 
opposite signs, the inflation transmission channel plays a role only as long as the 
changes in expected inflation are not countervailed by a proportional blip in ac-
tual inflation. In the initial period after the shock such a development can be as-
sumed, with a subsequent disappearance of the effect leading to a gradual con-
vergence of the real wage to steady state.  
The responses of capital, the output gap and real wage determine the dynam-
ics of real marginal cost, as evident from equation (3.33). Compared to the out-
put gap dynamics, the path of real marginal cost is expected to show a lengthier 
adjustment process due to its partial dependency on the dynamics of the capital 
stock. A more moderate maximum response compared to output seems also 
plausible for the same reason. 
A monetary policy unit shock can be anticipated to have a quantitatively 
small and non-persistent impact on inflation. As evident from equation (3.36), 
the monetary impulse is transmitted by real marginal cost. Under sticky prices,  
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even with a strong response of real marginal cost to the shock, inflation remains 
hardly affected, as the value of the fixed probability that households cannot ad-
just their price 0.75P   (i.e. priced adjusted once a year on average) implies that 
the coefficient (1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 )P P PF P PF PF
            equals 0.02. Thus, the ini-
tial negative blip in inflation is significantly smaller than the unit shock. Until 
the effect subsides completely, the path of inflation will continue to mimic the 
deviation of real marginal cost on a smaller scale.  
Although the direct impact of the monetary policy unit shock on the nominal 
interest rate is straightforward, the final adjusted outcome is worth further dis-
cussion. As far as the nominal interest rate is concerned, its final response de-
pends essentially on three factors. Firstly, the choice of an active or a passive 
rule with respect to inflation plays quite logically a significant role. Secondly, 
under output-gap targeting, the response of the policy instrument depends on the 
change in inflation in (3.38) and (3.39) and of the output gap. Since the impulse 
to inflation is expected to be quite moderate, the effect of decline in actual out-
put will prevail. A fall in actual output would motivate decreasing the nominal 
interest rate, thus (at least partly) offsetting the initial shock impulse. Thirdly, 
the magnitude of the interest-rate change depends on whether interest-rate 
smoothing is added to the monetary policy rule and on the size of the interest-
rate coefficient i . In the calibration of in Chapter III, Subsection 4.1 the choice 
of 0.8i   implies that under interest-rate smoothing the path of the nominal in-
terest rate is to a significant extent history-dependent. Thus the maximum re-
sponse of the nominal interest rate will remain modest and its adjustment will be 
characterised by a lengthy, graduate convergence to steady state.
1.2. Technology unit shock 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a technology unit shock 
is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
tA
  in the AR(1) 
process 1 tt A t AA A    that enters the real marginal cost condition (3.33).  
The initial transmission of the technology unit shock occurs through the 
immediate and quantitatively large effect on real marginal cost in (3.33). This 
negative initial impulse is then transmitted to inflation as evident from (3.36). 
The assumption of sticky prices, reflected in the reaction coefficient 
0 (1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 ) 1P P PF P PF PF
      ,        determines a relatively modest 
negative deviation of inflation from steady state.  
The negative spike in inflation induces a partial response of the real wage. 
The initial impulse on the real wage bears the opposite sign of the inflation de-
viation- thus, real wage is characterised by a positive deviation from its steady-
state value as a result of the labour-augmenting technology unit shock. The re-
sponse is initially triggered by the inflation expectations and then sustained by 
the inflation differential and the history-dependence on own past realisations of 
the real wage. The latter property implies a more gradual adjustment in time.  
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As a result of the negative blip in actual inflation, the nominal interest rate is 
reduced in accordance with the policy rule. Of course, under a passive rule 
and/or under interest-rate smoothing the response of the policy instrument is 
quantitatively smaller as under an active rule and/or no history-dependence of 
the nominal interest rate. As far as the impact of output-targeting is concerned, 
the results in the case of a technology shock differ from those under a monetary 
policy shock. A technology unit shock typically induces a positive spike in ac-
tual output, thus ceteris paribus requiring an increase in the nominal interest rate. 
A negative blip in the policy instrument as a response to the shock can therefore 
be expected with certainty only in the case when inflation is the only target vari-
able in the policy rule. Under inflation- and output-targeting the path of the 
nominal interest rate is more difficult to predict. Since under a rule of the form 
(3.38) or (3.39) a fall in inflation requires reducing the nominal interest rate, 
whereas increased actual output implies raising it, it can be expected that under 
inflation- and output-targeting the monetary policy response will be weaker un-
der both active and passive policy than in the case of inflation-targeting only. 
The sign of the initial impulse depends on the magnitude of the inflation and the 
output responses, as well as the values of the reaction coefficients   and y .
The responses of investment, consumption, the output gap, capital and the 
marginal product of capital to a technology unit shock all are triggered by the 
dynamics of the real interest rate. Again, differing magnitudes of the maximum 
responses of investment and consumption  can be anticipated due to the values 
of the coefficients assigned to the real interest rate in (3.32’) and (3.25), 
1.5  119 and 1 0.2    respectively. Since according to equation (3.26) the out-
put gap is a weighted average of consumption and investment, its immediate re-
sponse will have an intermediate maximum value. Again, the response of the 
real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation 1t t t tr i E   . Because, as 
explained above, the nominal interest rate response cannot be predicted with cer-
tainly, the initial impulse on the real interest rate can also vary depending on the 
interest-rate rule specification entering the system. What can be concluded even 
without explicit knowledge of the numerical results, however, is that under 
quantitatively too weak a response of the nominal interest rate that is not suffi-
cient to offset the change in the inflation expectations determined by (3.36) the 
real interest rate can actually increase. Alternatively, under a sufficiently strong 
response of the nominal interest rate the deviations of both the nominal and the 
real interest rate will bear the same sign. Thus, a more moderate response to in-
flation (passive rule) in the case of a technology shock acts counter-cyclically; a 
                                                
119  The value of  , the semi-elasticity of investment in the investment function (4.27’), is 
yielded by substituting for the depreciation rate  , the scale parameter of the adjust-
ment-cost function 2  and marginal adjustment cost in steady state 1C  in 
121 / (1 ) C    .
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stronger response to inflation (active rule), on the other hand, reinforces the ef-
fect of the shock.
As far as capital and the marginal product of capital are concerned, the tech-
nology shock is channelled through its impact on investment and the output gap 
respectively. It can therefore be expected that the paths of capital and the mar-
ginal product of capital will be characterised by a weaker initial response and a 
lengthier convergence process. In addition, the deviations in investment are 
channelled with a time lag to the dynamics of capital. In comparison to the re-
sponse of capital and the output gap the magnitude of the deviation of the mar-
ginal product of capital is quite modest, due to the inclusion of steady-state unit 
and marginal adjustment costs.  
1.3. Consumption preference unit shock 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a consumption prefer-
ence unit shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
t

in the AR(1) process 1 tt t       that enters the consumption equation (3.25). 
The consumption preference shock denotes a shift of the household’s prefer-
ences towards consumption in the utility function (3.1). 
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
consumption as in (3.25), causing a positive blip observed immediately after the 
shock. Under the parameter values chosen, the initial impulse to consumption 
can be assessed as being quite moderate (0.14 times the shock). Through its ef-
fect on consumption, the preference shock is channelled to the output gap (see 
equation (3.26)) which is also expected to register a positive spike. The magni-
tude of the output reaction can be predicted as smaller than the initial impulse to 
consumption in (3.25), based on the value of the consumption coefficient 
0.78c   in the output identity (3.26). For a clear-cut prediction of the sign of 
the output deviation, the sign and size of the investment response should also be 
taken into account. 
In order to determine the adjustment path of investment as a result of the 
consumption preference shock, the response of the real interest rate should be 
given detailed consideration. For a prediction about the real-interest rate re-
sponse, the adjustment of the nominal interest rate and of expected inflation are 
to be examined. If the consumption-enhancing effect prevails in (3.26) and a 
positive output gap is registered, the nominal interest rate should be increased in 
accordance with the policy rules (3.38) or (3.39) if output-targeting is pursued. 
As far as inflation is concerned, according to (3.36) the triggering impulse is 
given by the adjustment of real marginal cost. The history-dependence of capital 
in (3.35) and the real wage in (3.33) imply that at least initially after the shock 
the path of the real marginal cost will mimic the dynamics of the output gap on a 
smaller scale, given by the coefficient - .0 / 1 1PF PF ,  , . Thus, if actual output 
is characterised by a positive deviation from steady state, real marginal cost will 
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also register a positive spike, inducing a rise in inflation as given by (3.36). In-
creased inflation has two main impact mechanisms to the system. Firstly, it is an 
additional impulse for the monetary authority to raise the nominal interest rate, 
so that the effect of the positive output gap in the policy rule is reinforced. In 
other words, when both inflation- and output targeting are pursued, it could be 
expected that under an output-boosting scenario the response of the nominal in-
terest rate is likely to be stronger than in the case of inflation-targeting only for 
both an active and a passive policy stance.  The second influence channel of in-
creased inflation can be sought in terms of the real interest rate dynamics. Ac-
cording to (3.36), changes in expected inflation play a comparatively more sig-
nificant role for the dynamics of actual inflation than the deviations of real mar-
ginal cost, as reflected by the size of the coefficients 0.99
   and 
(1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 ) 0.02P P PF P PF PF
            .
The rise in the real interest rate releases an initial fall in investment, fol-
lowed by a monotonic adjustment to its steady-state level. Capital as a prede-
termined variable responds with a time lag. The deviations of capital and the 
output gap from steady state, entering the term  ( )t ty k   in equations (3.34) and 
(3.33) determine the responses of marginal product of capital and real marginal 
cost respectively. A positive, however quantitatively weaker response can be 
expected for both the marginal product of capital and the real marginal cost.  
The positive initial effect on real marginal cost is transmitted to inflation as 
evident from (3.36), whereby the maximum impact on inflation is expected to be 
quantitatively small Finally, as in (3.37) the real wage response is driven by the 
dynamics of inflation expectations and the positive inflation differential and then 
sustained by the and the history-dependence on own past realisations of the real 
wage.
2.  Active rule  
2.1. The case of inflation-targeting only
This subsection shows the impulse responses of tc ,  tinv , ty ,  trmc , tk ,  tmpk ,

t , t , tr  and ti  as for three shocks: the random component of monetary policy 
ti
 , the technology shock 
tA
  and the preference shock 
t
  when monetary policy 
is defined in terms of a slightly modified Taylor rule of the form (3.38)120. Here 
no output-targeting and no interest-rate smoothing enter the monetary policy 
rule and the effective response coefficient to inflation deviations takes the value 
of 1.3121. As already mentioned, the “hat” variables denote deviations of the 
                                                
120The difference to the baseline Taylor specification (3.38) is the exclusion of the output 
gap target.
121  As it is evident from the determinacy analysis in Chapter III, Subsection 4.2.3, for an 
active rule without an output gap target, only inflation coefficient values in the interval 
$#1.0,1.3  guarantee determinacy of REE. The choice of the coefficient value at 1.3 has 
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actually registered variable values from their steady-state levels. The magnitude 
of a variable response to a one-percent shock is measured on the vertical axis of 
each impulse response figure- thus, a value of 0.5 for example means that the 
variable’s response is half as large as the shock. 
2.1.1. Monetary policy unit shock 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a monetary policy unit 
shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the pol-
icy rule (3.38). Figure 4.1 reports impulse responses to a monetary policy unit 
shock for the model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous 
capital and adjustment costs. 
Variable deviations, caused by a monetary unit shock, are as in the case of a 
standard Taylor rule with output-targeting again characterised by a relatively 
fast convergence to the steady state. All variables, including capital, converge 
within 60 quarters. The main distinction from the impulse responses under a 
Taylor specification with output-targeting122 lies in the magnitude of the maxi-
mum deviation from steady state induced by the monetary policy unit shock.  
For all variables, when inflation is the only target variable entering the policy 
rule, the shock generates a stronger response that is up to twice as strong as un-
der an active rule with both inflation- and output-targeting. The reason for these 
differences lies in the dynamics of the nominal interest rate (that also influence 
the real interest rate adjustment path) under the specification (3.38). The strong-
est deviations are reported for investment, the output gap, the nominal and the 
real interest rate. Except for the exact values of the maximum deviations regis-
tered, the results in the case of inflation-targeting only comply with those under 
the standard Taylor specification123.
Again, negative spikes in investment, consumption and the output gap are 
observed immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the 
steady-state level. Here the investment response is characterised by the sharpest 
fall (3 times as large as the shock). Compared to investment, consumption shows 
a more moderate response (about 0.5 times the shock) and a fast adjustment to 
its steady-state value. As a weighted average of consumption and investment, 
the immediate response of the output gap has an intermediate value equal to the 
size of the monetary policy unit shock. The paths of consumption, investment 
and output gap plotted on Fig. 4.1 reveal the significance of the endogenous 
capital assumption for the model’s quantitative results. Under constant capital, 
the output gap response to a monetary policy unit shock would still be negative, 
but of a smaller magnitude, as it would only incorporate the fall in consumption. 
                                                                                                                               
been motivated by the intention to analyse Taylor-like specifications as close to the 
original as possible, while ruling out the option of multiple adjustment paths. 
122  See Chapter IV, Subsection 2.2.
123  I.e. bear the same sign.
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The maximum negative response of capital (approximately 0.15 times the size of 
the shock) is significantly smaller than the initial fall in investment. Again, it 
takes about 6 quarters until capital reaches its largest negative response. As a 
predetermined variable, capital is also characterised by a longer-lasting adjust-
ment to its steady-state level than investment, taking about 60 quarters.
The deviation of the marginal product of capital (-0.04 times the shock at its 
minimum) is twice as strong as when output enters the central bank reaction 
function. Algebraically this is determined by the relatively small value of the 
steady-state marginal cost (0.04) that enters equation (3.34) as a coefficient. The 
assumption of a steady-state real interest rate of 2 percent p.a., depreciation rate 
of 0.03, steady-state unit adjustment cost and steady-state marginal adjustment 
cost of 0.05 and 0.21 respectively in (A3.6)124 1(1 ) (1 ) /mpk C C rmc      im-
ply a relatively weaker response of marginal product of capital to deviations in 
output and capital. The initial negative blip in the marginal product of capital is 
triggered by the fall in actual output and further sustained by the longer-lasting 
adjustment of capital. 
The sluggish adjustment of the real wage over the entire 60 quarters is de-
termined by the partial history-dependence of the variable as seen from (3.37) 
and by the assumption of sticky wages. The latter is modelled by the inclusion 
of a fixed probability W ( 0.75W  ) that nominal wages cannot be adjusted in the 
current quarter, which implies that on average wages are re-set once a year.
The responses of capital, the output gap and real wage determine the dynam-
ics of real marginal cost, as evident from equation (3.33). Compared to the out-
put gap dynamics, the path of real marginal cost reaches a more moderate 
maximum negative value (0.5 times the shock), but does not adjust monotoni-
cally to its steady-state value. Instead, 4 quarters after the shock real marginal 
cost overshoots the steady-state value, reaching a maximum positive value of 
0.08 about 7 quarters after the initial impulse. After that, real marginal cost con-
verges monotonically to the steady—state level. While the initial negative im-
pulse to real marginal cost is mainly a result of the immediate decline of the 
output gap after the shock, the overshooting part is essentially explained by the 
slow and lasting response of capital and the real wage.
A monetary policy unit shock has a quantitatively small and non-persistent 
impact on inflation. As evident from equation (3.36), the monetary impulse is 
transmitted by real marginal cost. Under sticky prices,  despite the strong re-
sponse of real marginal cost to the shock, inflation remains hardly affected, as 
the value of the  fixed probability that households cannot adjust their price 
0.75P   (i.e. priced adjusted once a year on average) implies that the coefficient 
(1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 )P P PF P PF PF
            equals 0.02. Thus, the initial negative 
blip in inflation is negligibly small. Until the effect subsides completely after 16 
                                                
124  See Appendix.
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
90
quarters, the path of inflation includes overshooting dynamics in the fourth quar-
ter before steady-state value is reached.
As far as the nominal interest rate is concerned, according to the policy rule 
(3.38) its deviation depends on the unit shock itself and the responses of the tar-
get variable (the inflation differential). The monetary authority’s reaction to the 
unit shock involves an increase in the nominal interest rate equal to the unit 
shock, followed by a gradual convergence to the steady-state level. The effect of 
the monetary impulse disappears completely after 10 quarters. The Fisher equa-
tion 1t t t tr i E    postulates that the dynamics of the real interest rate is approxi-
mated by the difference between the paths of expected inflation and the nominal 
interest rate. Due to the quantitatively weak response of actual and expected in-
flation, the real interest rate response (a positive blip with a maximum value as 
large as the shock itself, followed by a monotonic decrease) matches the nomi-
nal interest rate dynamics. 
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Figure 4.1: Responses to a monetary policy unit shock under an active rule
with inflation-targeting only  
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a monetary policy unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
and a standard Taylor specification for monetary policy shows that the only 
long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the capital stock and 
the real wage, which take almost 60 quarters to converge. Consumption, the 
output gap, the real and the nominal interest rate, on the other hand, all return to 
their steady-state values within a maximum of 10 quarters. These results basi-
cally confirm the long-run monetary neutrality of the model. 
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2.1.2. Technology unit shock
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a technology unit shock 
is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
tA
  in the AR(1) 
process 1 tt A t AA A    that enters the real marginal cost condition (3.33). Figure
4.2 reports impulse responses to a technology unit shock for the model specifi-
cation with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.  
Variable deviations, caused by a technology unit shock, are generally of a 
much smaller magnitude that those occurring as a result of a monetary policy 
unit shock and in each case of a lower value than the shock itself. In the case of 
a sole inflation target in the monetary policy rule, adjustment of all model vari-
ables considered reveals oscillatory paths. A further distinction in the case of a 
technology shock compared to the monetary policy unit shock’s impact is the 
slower adjustment to the steady-state values of all variables. The strongest de-
viations are reported for real marginal cost, real wage and investment.   
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
real marginal cost. A large negative spike of nearly 0.9 times the shock is ob-
served immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the steady-
state level within the next 20 quarters. This negative initial impulse is then 
transmitted to inflation as evident from (3.36). As evident from the coefficient 
0 (1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 ) 1P P PF P PF PF
      ,       the assumption of sticky prices de-
termines the negative, but relatively modest (0.1 times the shock) deviation of 
inflation from steady state. As a result of the negative inflation differential, the 
nominal interest rate is reduced in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), fol-
lowed by overshooting dynamics between the twelfth and the sixtieth quarter. 
The path of the real interest rate mimics on a smaller scale that of the nominal 
interest rate. Due to the negative response of inflation, the initial negative blip in 
the real interest rate is more moderate than the nominal interest decrease, as ex-
plained by the Fisher equation 1t t t tr i E   .
Investment, consumption, the output gap, capital and the marginal product 
of capital all reveal an initial positive response to the technology shock, fol-
lowed by a countervailing negative deviation of a comparatively larger magni-
tude before their steady-state values are reached. The strongest deviations in 
consumption, the output gap and the marginal product of capital all occur within 
the first 12 quarters, while it takes about 35 quarters until the maximum impact 
of the shock on capital unfolds. The technology shock is channelled to consump-
tion and investment through its impact on the real interest rate; the considerably 
differing magnitudes of the maximum responses of investment and consumption 
can be traced to the values of the coefficients assigned to the real interest rate in 
(3.32’) and (3.25), 1.5  125 and 1 0.2    respectively. Again, since according to 
                                                
125  The value of  , the semi-elasticity of investment in the investment function (4.32’), is 
yielded by substituting for the depreciation rate  , the scale parameter of the adjust-
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equation (3.26) the output gap is a weighted average of consumption and in-
vestment, its immediate response has an intermediate largest positive and nega-
tive value of about 0.1 and –0.1 times the size of the technology shock respect-
tively.
The largest positive and negative responses of capital (approximately 0.02 
and –0.08 times the size of the shock respectively) are significantly smaller than 
the strongest deviations in investment. In addition, the deviations in investment 
are channelled with a time lag to the dynamics of capital. It takes the capital 
stock a whole 35 quarters until it reaches its largest negative deviation. Once 
again, capital is also characterised by a longer-lasting adjustment to its steady-
state level than investment- even after 60 quarters, capital remains under its 
steady-state level. 
In comparison to the response of capital and the output gap the magnitude of 
the deviation of the marginal product of capital (about 0.003 times the shock in 
both directions) is again quite modest, due to the inclusion of steady-state unit 
and marginal adjustment costs. Both the sluggish adjustment of marginal prod-
uct of capital over more than 60 quarters and the undershooting path registered 
after the forth quarter following the shock can be traced back to the different 
adjustment dynamics of capital and output gap discussed above. 
Finally, the impulse response of the real wage is worth some consideration. 
As a result of the labour-augmenting technology shock, the variable reaches a 
quantitatively significant126 maximum positive deviation from steady state of 
nearly 0.5 times the shock after 12 quarters and converges monotonically to its 
steady-state value thereafter. The response is initially triggered by the inflation 
differential and then sustained by the dynamics of inflation expectations and the 
history-dependence on own past realisations of the real wage.
                                                                                                                               
ment-cost function 2  and marginal adjustment cost in steady state 1C  in 
121 / (1 ) C    .
126  The magnitude of the impulse response of real wage is significant especially compared 
to the magnitude of the responses of the other model variables.
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Figure 4.2: Responses to a technology unit shock under an active rule
with inflation-targeting only 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a technology unit shock in a model 
with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs shows 
that the only long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the capital 
stock that takes more than 60 quarters to converge. Compared to the impact of a 
monetary policy shock convergence to the steady-state values generally appears 
to be a longer-lasting process. For most variables (except inflation, real marginal 
cost and real wage) the magnitude of the observed deviations is relatively 
smaller than in the case of a monetary policy unit shock. The reason for the 
milder impact of a technology unit shock is that in the model it induces a more 
moderate response of the nominal interest rate cuts as a reaction to the inflation 
differential that quantitatively exceed the latter and thus generate a moderate 
real-interest rate response. Through the real-interest-rate channel investment and 
consumption report initial positive deviations significantly smaller than the size 
of the shock. 
2.1.3. Consumption preference unit shock
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a consumption prefer-
ence unit shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
t

in the AR(1) process 1 tt t       that enters the consumption equation (3.25).
Figure 4.3 reports impulse responses to a consumption preference unit shock for 
the model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and 
adjustment costs.  
Variable deviations, caused by a technology unit shock, are of a very small 
magnitude and in each case of a much lower value than the shock itself. Another 
distinction in the case of a preference shock is that the adjustment to the steady-
state values for all variables occurs much faster than in the case of a technology 
or a monetary policy shock. Within approximately 16 quarters after the initial 
impulse all variables apart from capital and the real wage have returned to their 
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steady-state values. The strongest deviations as a result of the shock are reported 
for consumption, the output gap and real marginal cost. 
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
consumption as in (3.25). A positive blip of 0.2 percent is observed immediately 
after the shock, followed by a fast return to the steady-state level within the first 
4 quarters. Through its effect on consumption, the preference shock is chan-
nelled to the output gap (see equation (3.26)) which also reports a sharp rise by 
0.15 percent, followed by a rapid convergence to steady state.
The positive output gap transmits the impulse to the real marginal cost 
which shows an initial positive spike of almost 0.09 times the shock, followed 
by a gradual convergence to steady state within the first 4 quarters. The positive 
initial effect on real marginal cost is transmitted to inflation as evident from 
(3.36), whereby the maximum impact on inflation occurs immediately after the 
shock and is quantitatively small (an increase of 0.002 times the shock). The 
impulse disappears in less than 4 quarters. As a result of the inflation differen-
tial, the nominal interest rate is increased in accordance with the policy rule 
(3.38), but the response is of a smaller magnitude (0.003 times the shock at its 
peak). After the first quarter, the nominal interest rate is gradually decreased and 
reaches its steady-state value in the fourteenth quarter. The path of the real inter-
est rate mimics that of the nominal interest rate.
The rise in the real interest rate releases an increase in investment of a very 
small magnitude, followed by a gradual adjustment within 12 quarters. Capital 
initially responds to the increase in investment by a gradual increase, reaching a 
maximum positive deviation from its steady-state level 10 quarters after the 
shock. After that, capital converges to steady state after approximately 60 quar-
ters. The deviations of capital and the output gap from steady state, entering the 
term  ( )t ty k   in equation (3.34) determine the responses of marginal product of 
capital. Due to the combined impact of the output gap and the capital fluctua-
tions, the maximum response of marginal product of capital (0.006 times the 
shock) is stronger than that of capital.  
Finally, as in (3.37) the real wage response is driven by the positive inflation 
differential and then sustained by the dynamics of inflation expectations and the 
history-dependence on own past realisations of the real wage. Unlike inflation, 
the real wage takes about 2 quarters to reach its highest negative deviation of 
0.002 times the shock.  
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Figure 4.3: Responses to a consumption preference unit shock  
under an active rule with inflation-targeting only 
In conclusion, a consumption preference unit shock has quantitatively a rela-
tively modest effect on the model variables. Its initial impact on consumption, 
the output gap and investment is alleviated by the increase in the real interest 
rate (caused by the nominal interest rate hike). The moderate responses of all 
other variables are determined by the magnitude of the deviations in the two lat-
ter variables in particular. 
2.2. The case of inflation- and output-targeting 
This subsection shows the impulse responses of tc ,  tinv , ty ,  trmc , tk ,  tmpk ,

t , t , tr  and ti  as for three shocks: the random component of monetary policy 
ti
 , the technology shock 
tA
  and the preference shock 
t
  when monetary policy 
is defined in terms of a baseline Taylor rule of the form (3.38). Here no interest-
rate smoothing enters the monetary policy rule and the effective response coeffi-
cients to inflation and output deviations take the values of 1.5 and 0.5 respec-
tively.
2.2.1. Monetary policy unit shock
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a monetary policy unit 
shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the pol-
icy rule (3.38). Figure 4.4 reports impulse responses to a monetary policy unit 
shock for the model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous 
capital and adjustment costs.
Variable deviations, caused by a monetary policy unit shock, are character-
ised by a relatively fast convergence to the steady state. Only as far as capital is 
concerned the shock impulse is still present after 60 quarters. The strongest dev-
iations are reported for investment, the output gap, the nominal and the real 
interest rate.
Negative spikes in investment, consumption and the output gap are observed 
immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the steady-state 
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level. Here the investment response is characterised by the sharpest fall (2 times 
as large as the shock). Compared to investment, consumption shows a more 
moderate response (about 0.3 times the shock) and a fast adjustment to its 
steady-state value. The output gap’s immediate response has an intermediate 
value of about 0.7 times the size of the monetary policy unit shock. It takes in-
vestment, consumption and the output gap less than 8 quarters until the effect of 
the monetary policy unit shock subsides completely.  
The maximum negative response of capital (approximately 0.1 times the 
size of the shock) is significantly smaller than the initial fall in investment. Con-
trary to the immediate impact of the shock on investment, it takes about 6 quar-
ters until capital reaches its maximum negative response. Moreover, capital is 
also characterised by a longer-lasting adjustment to its steady-state level than 
investment- even after 60 quarters, capital remains slightly under its steady-state 
level. These results are a logical consequence of the fact that capital is a prede-
termined variable as specified in equation (3.35). Investment according to equa-
tion (3.32’), however, does not depend on the past realisations of any of its de-
terminants and can therefore respond immediately and in full magnitude as soon 
as the shock occurs. As in the case of inflation-targeting only, once again the 
marginal product of capital responds moderately (-0.02 times the shock). 
The sluggish adjustment of the real wage over the entire 60 quarters is de-
termined by the partial history-dependence of the variable as seen from (3.37) 
and by the assumption of sticky wages. The responses of capital, the output gap 
and real wage determine the dynamics of real marginal cost, as evident from 
equation (3.33). Compared to the output gap dynamics, the path of real marginal 
cost reaches a more moderate maximum negative value (0.4 times the shock), 
but does not adjust monotonically to its steady-state value. Instead, 4 quarters 
after the shock real marginal cost overshoots the steady-state value, reaching a 
maximum positive value of 0.05 about 7 quarters after the initial impulse. After 
that, real marginal cost converges monotonically to the steady—state level. 
While the initial negative impulse to real marginal cost is mainly a result of the 
immediate decline of the output gap after the shock, the overshooting part is es-
sentially explained by the slow and lasting response of capital and the real wage.
A monetary policy unit shock has a quantitatively small and non-persistent 
impact on inflation. As evident from equation (3.36), the monetary impulse is 
transmitted by real marginal cost. Under sticky prices, despite the strong re-
sponse of real marginal cost to the shock, inflation remains hardly affected. 
Thus, the initial negative blip in inflation is less than 0.005 times the shock. Un-
til the effect subsides completely after 16 quarters, the path of inflation includes 
overshooting dynamics (a maximum of 0.006 in the fourth quarter) before 
steady-state value is reached.
According to the policy rule (3.38), the nominal interest rate response de-
pends on the unit shock itself and on the responses of the target variables (infla-
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tion differential and output gap). The monetary authority’s reaction to the unit 
shock involves an increase in the nominal interest rate of 0.7 times the shock, 
followed by a gradual convergence to the steady-state level. The effect of the 
monetary impulse disappears completely after 10 quarters. The Fisher equation 
1t t t tr i E    postulates that the dynamics of the real interest rate is approximated 
by the difference between the paths of expected inflation and the nominal inter-
est rate. Due to the quantitatively weak response of actual and expected infla-
tion, the real interest rate response (a positive blip with a maximum value of 
about 0.7 percent, followed by a monotonic decrease) matches the nominal in-
terest rate dynamics. 
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Figure 4.4: Responses to a monetary policy unit shock under an active rule
with inflation- and output-targeting 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a monetary policy unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
and a standard Taylor specification for monetary policy shows that the only 
long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the capital stock and 
the real wage, which take at least 60 quarters to converge. Consumption, in-
vestment, the output gap, the real and the nominal interest rate, on the other 
hand, all return to their steady-state values within a maximum of 10 quarters.  
2.2.2. Technology unit shock 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a technology unit shock 
is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
tA
  in the AR(1) 
process 1 tt A t AA A    that enters the real marginal cost condition (3.33). Figure 
4.5 reports impulse responses to a technology unit shock for the model specifi-
cation with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.  
Again, the strongest deviations are reported for real marginal cost, real wage 
and investment.  The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the imme-
diate effect on real marginal cost. A large negative spike of almost 0.9 percent is 
observed immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the 
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steady-state level within the next 20 quarters. This negative initial impulse is 
then transmitted to inflation as evident from (3.36).  
As a result of the increased inflation differential, the nominal interest rate is 
reduced in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), reaching a minimum value of 
slightly above 0.1 times the shock. As the output gap also enters the monetary 
policy rule, the increase in actual output as a result of the technology shock im-
plies that the actual nominal interest rate hike will eventually be of a smaller 
magnitude than under an active rule incorporating inflation-targeting only. Nev-
ertheless, as a result of the large reaction coefficient assigned to inflation and the 
quantitatively small impact of the shock on the output gap , the path of the 
nominal interest rate mimics that of actual inflation.  
For the model specification chosen, a Taylor rule with no interest-rate 
smoothing induces a negative blip in the real interest rate of approximately 0.03 
percent immediately after the shock occurs, followed by a gradual convergence 
to the steady-state value within the next 20 quarters. The real-interest rate re-
sponse induced by the nominal interest rate fall additionally reinforces the posi-
tive deviations of investment, consumption and the output gap and acts pro-
cyclically. This effect can be offset by a stronger emphasis on output-targeting 
in the monetary policy rule, measured by the value of the coefficient y .
Investment, consumption, the output gap, capital and the marginal product 
of capital all reveal an initial positive response to the technology shock, fol-
lowed by a countervailing negative deviation of a comparatively smaller magni-
tude before their steady-state values are reached. The strongest deviations in 
consumption, the output gap and the marginal product of capital all occur im-
mediately after the shock, while it takes 9 quarters until the maximum impact of 
the shock on capital unfolds. The technology shock is channelled to consump-
tion and investment through its impact on the real interest rate; the considerably 
differing magnitudes of the maximum responses of investment (0.23 times the 
shock) and consumption (0.03 times the shock) can be traced to the values of the 
coefficients assigned to the real interest rate in (3.32’) and (3.25), respectively. 
Again, since according to equation (3.26) the output gap is a weighted average 
of consumption and investment, its immediate response has an intermediate 
maximum value of about 0.08 times the size of the technology shock. 
The maximum positive response of capital (approximately 0.03 times the 
size of the shock) is significantly smaller than the strongest increase in invest-
ment. In addition, the deviation in investment is channelled with a time lag to 
the dynamics of capital. It takes the capital stock whole 9 quarters until it 
reaches its highest positive deviation from its steady-state level. Once again, 
capital is also characterised by a longer-lasting adjustment than investment- 
even after 60 quarters, capital remains under its steady-state level. 
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Figure 4.5: Responses to a technology unit shock under an active rule 
with inflation- and output-targeting 
In comparison to the response of capital and the output gap the magnitude of the 
deviation of the marginal product of capital (about 0.004 times the shock) is 
again quite modest, due to the inclusion of steady-state unit and marginal ad-
justment costs. Finally, as a result of the labour-augmenting technology shock, 
the variable reaches a quantitatively significant127 maximum positive deviation 
from steady state of 0.4 times the shock after 11 quarters and converges mono-
tonically to its steady-state value thereafter. The response is initially triggered by 
the inflation differential and then sustained by the dynamics of inflation expecta-
tions and the history-dependence on own past realisations of the real wage.  
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a technology unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
and a standard Taylor specification of the monetary policy rule shows that the 
only long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the capital stock 
that takes more than 60 quarters to converge. Compared to the impact of a 
monetary policy shock, convergence to the steady-state values generally appears 
to be a longer-lasting process. In addition, the inclusion of an output gap target 
causes a smaller initial response of the nominal interest rate compared to the 
case with inflation-targeting only. As a result, deviations in the real nominal 
rate, investment, capital and the output gap turn out to be of a relatively smaller 
magnitude. Moreover, output-targeting limits the oscillations in the adjustment 
paths of consumption, investment, capital and the output gap.
2.2.3. Consumption preference unit shock 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a consumption prefer-
ence unit shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
t

in the AR(1) process 1 tt t       that enters the consumption equation (3.25).
Figure 4.6 reports impulse responses to a consumption preference unit shock for 
                                                
127  The magnitude of the impulse response of real wage is significant especially compared 
to the magnitude of the responses of the other model variables.
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the model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and 
adjustment costs.  
Variable deviations, caused by a consumption preference unit shock, are of a 
very small magnitude and in each case of a much lower value than the shock 
itself. Another distinction in the case of a preference shock is that the adjustment 
to the steady-state values of nearly all variables (except for the capital stock and 
the real wage) occurs much faster than in the case of a technology or a monetary 
policy shock. Within approximately 16 quarters after the initial impulse all vari-
ables apart from capital and the real wage have returned to their steady-state 
values. The strongest deviations as a result of the shock are reported for con-
sumption, the output gap and investment.  
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
consumption as in (3.25). A positive blip of almost 0.2 is observed immediately 
after the shock, followed by a fast return to the steady-state level within the first 
5 quarters. Through its effect on consumption, the preference shock is chan-
nelled to the output gap (see equation (3.26)) which also reports a sharp rise by 
0.12, followed by a rapid convergence to steady state.
As a result of the positive output gap, the nominal interest rate is increased 
in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), but the response is of a smaller magni-
tude (0.06 times the shock at its peak). After the initial blip, the nominal interest 
rate is gradually decreased and reaches its steady-state value in the forth quarter. 
The path of the real interest rate mimics that of the nominal interest rate.  
The rise in the real interest rate releases an initial fall in investment of 0.12 
times the shock, followed by a monotonic adjustment within 4 quarters. Capital 
initially responds to the negative blip in investment by a gradual decrease, 
reaching a maximum negative deviation from its steady-state level 3 quarters 
after the shock. After that, the negative dynamics is reversed and capital con-
verges to steady state after approximately 60 quarters. The deviations of capital 
and the output gap from steady state determine the responses of marginal prod-
uct of capital and real marginal cost respectively. The maximum response of 
marginal product of capital (0.005 times the shock) occurs immediately after the 
shock. After the initial positive blip, the marginal product of capital converges to 
steady state within 4 quarters. The response in real marginal cost shows a similar 
path – an initial positive spike of 0.07 times the shock, followed by a gradual 
convergence to steady state within the first 4 quarters.
The positive initial effect on real marginal cost is transmitted to inflation as 
evident from (3.36), whereby the maximum impact on inflation occurs immedi-
ately after the shock and is quantitatively small (an increase of 0.002). The 
impulse disappears in about 4 quarters. The real wage response is driven by the 
dynamics of inflation expectations and then sustained by the positive inflation 
differential and the history-dependence on own past realisations of the real 
wage. Unlike inflation, the real wage takes about 2 quarters to reach its highest 
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negative deviation of slightly above 0.002 times the shock. This negative devia-
tion persists until about 60 quarters after the initial impulse.  
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Figure 4.6: Responses to a consumption preference unit shock  
under an active rule with inflation- and output-targeting 
In conclusion, a consumption preference unit shock has a modest effect on the 
model variables. Its initial impact on consumption, the output gap and invest-
ment is alleviated by the increase in the real interest rate (caused by the nominal 
interest rate hike). The moderate responses of all other variables are determined 
by the magnitude of the deviations in the two latter variables in particular. Com-
pared to the case with inflation-targeting only, output-targeting induces a 
stronger response of the nominal interest rate, which in turn leads to a higher 
positive spike in the real interest rate. The latter result explains the strong nega-
tive impulse to investment and the capital stock. The fall in investment partly 
offsets the initial positive blip in consumption, thus generating a more moderate 
intermediate positive output gap response. In other words, the monetary policy 
stance under an active baseline Taylor rule specification plays a stabilising role 
in the case of a consumption preference unit shock. 
2.3. The case of inflation- and output-targeting with 
interest-rate smoothing 
This subsection shows the impulse responses of tc ,  tinv , ty ,  trmc , tk ,  tmpk ,

t , t , tr  and ti  as for three shocks: the random component of monetary policy 
ti
 , the technology shock 
tA
  and the preference shock 
t
  when monetary policy 
is defined in terms of an active rule of the form (3.38). Here interest-rate 
smoothing enters the monetary policy rule ( 0.8i  ) and the effective response 
coefficients to inflation and output deviations take the values of 1.5 and 0.5 re-
spectively.
2.3.1. Monetary policy unit shock  
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, a monetary policy unit 
shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the pol-
icy rule (3.38). Figure 4.7 reports impulse responses to a monetary policy unit 
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shock for the model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous 
capital and adjustment costs. 
Large negative spikes in investment, consumption and the output gap are 
observed immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the 
steady-state level. Investment response is characterised by the sharpest fall 
(three times as large as the shock) and relatively quick adjustment (12 quarters). 
Compared to investment, consumption shows a more moderate response (-0.4). 
The output gap’s immediate response is of a comparable value to the shock it-
self. It takes both consumption and the output gap approximately 12 quarters 
until the effect of the monetary policy unit shock subsides completely.
The maximum negative response of capital (approximately 0.2 times the 
size of the shock) is significantly smaller than the initial fall in investment. Con-
trary to the immediate impact of the shock on investment, it takes about 6 quar-
ters until capital reaches its maximum negative response. Capital is also charac-
terised by a longer-lasting adjustment to its steady-state level than investment- 
only after 60 quarters capital tends to reach its steady-state level. As in the pre-
vious two subsections, the deviation of the marginal product of capital remains 
moderate and tends to persist for most of the period observed. The sluggish ad-
justment of the real wage is also familiar from the previous two experiments.     
The responses of capital, the output gap and real wage determine the dynam-
ics of real marginal cost, as evident from equation (3.33). Compared to the out-
put gap dynamics, the path of real marginal cost reaches a more moderate 
maximum negative value (0.6 the shock), but does not adjust monotonically to 
its steady-state value. Instead, 7 quarters after the shock real marginal cost over-
shoots the steady-state value, reaching a maximum positive value of slightly un-
der 0.1 about 8 quarters after the initial impulse. After that, real marginal cost 
converges monotonically to the steady—state level. While the initial negative 
impulse to real marginal cost is mainly a result of the sharp immediate decline of 
the output gap after the shock, the overshooting part is essentially explained by 
the slow and lasting response of capital and the real wage. A monetary policy 
unit shock has a quantitatively small and non-persistent impact on inflation. As 
evident from equation (3.36), the monetary impulse is transmitted by real mar-
ginal cost. Under sticky prices, despite the strong response of real marginal cost 
to the shock, inflation remains hardly affected. The effect subsides completely 
after 16 quarters. 
As far as the nominal interest rate is concerned, according to the policy rule 
(3.38) its deviation depends on the unit shock itself, the responses of the target 
variables (inflation differential and output gap) and the past deviation of the 
variable from its steady-state value. The monetary authority’s reaction to the 
unit shock involves a more gradual increase in the nominal interest rate com-
pared to the cases without interest-rate smoothing- it takes two quarters until the 
maximum response unfolds. Another distinction from the responses of the 
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nominal (and real) interest rate to a monetary unit shock when no lagged nomi-
nal interest rate enters the central bank’s rule (see Chapter IV, Subsections 2.1 
and 2.2) is that under interest-rate smoothing the maximum response of both 
variables remains more moderate (0.5 times the shock). After the initial positive 
deviation, monotonic convergence to the steady-state value occurs within 16 
quarters. Again, due to the quantitatively weak response of inflation, the real 
interest rate response (a positive blip with a maximum value of 0.5, followed by 
a monotonic decrease) matches the nominal interest rate dynamics. 
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Figure 4.7: Responses to a monetary policy unit shock 
under an active rule with inflation- and output-targeting and interest-rate smoothing 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a monetary policy unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
shows that the only long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the 
capital stock and the real wage, which take more than 60 quarters to converge. 
Consumption, the output gap, the real and the nominal interest rate, on the other 
hand, all return to their steady-state values within approximately 16 quarters. 
Compared to the results under a baseline Taylor rule in Subsection 2.2, all vari-
ables except the nominal and the real interest rate are characterised by larger de-
viations from their steady-state values when interest-rate smoothing is intro-
duced. The history-dependence of the nominal and real interest rate explains the 
smoother adjustment paths of both variables, as well as the quantitatively 
smaller but longer-lasting impact of the shock.  
2.3.2. Technology unit shock 
A technology unit shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock 
term 
tA
  in the AR(1) process 1 tt A t AA A    that enters the real marginal cost 
condition (3.33). Figure 4.8 reports impulse responses to a technology unit 
shock for the model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous 
capital and adjustment costs.
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Variable deviations, caused by a technology unit shock, are generally of a 
much smaller magnitude that those occurring as a result of a monetary policy 
unit shock and in each case of a lower value than the shock itself. Adjustment to 
the steady-state values of all variables (except for real marginal cost) is longer-
lasting than in the case of a monetary shock. An interesting result differing from 
the cases without interest-rate smoothing is the fact that the impact on invest-
ment, the output gap and consumption does not unfold immediately after the oc-
currence of the technology shock. Instead, the largest deviations from steady 
state are registered only after 2 quarters. The strongest deviations are reported 
for real marginal cost, investment and the real wage.
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
real marginal cost. A large negative spike of almost 0.9 percent is observed im-
mediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the steady-state level 
within the next 20 quarters. This negative initial impulse is then transmitted to 
inflation as evident from (3.36). As a result of the inflation differential, the 
nominal interest rate is reduced in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), but the 
response is more gradual. The largest decrease in the nominal interest rate is reg-
istered after 3 quarters and is 0.09 times as large as the shock, followed by oscil-
latory convergence to the steady-state value within more than 60 quarters. The 
initial positive blip of the real interest rate in the first quarter is explained by the 
immediate sharp decrease in inflation (and expected inflation) and the initially 
quantitatively smaller decrease in the nominal rate. After that, the nominal inter-
est rate effect prevails and path of the real interest rate mimics on a smaller scale 
that of the nominal interest rate.  
Investment, consumption, the output gap, capital and the marginal product 
of capital all reveal an initial positive response to the technology shock, fol-
lowed by a countervailing negative deviation of a comparatively smaller magni-
tude before their steady-state values are reached. The strongest deviations in 
consumption, the output gap and the marginal product of capital all occur within 
the first four quarters, while it takes about 12 quarters until the maximum impact 
of the shock on capital unfolds. The technology shock is again channelled to 
consumption and investment through its impact on the real interest rate. The 
maximum response of investment (0.5 times the shock) is significantly stronger 
than that of consumption and consumption (0.08 times the shock). The output 
gap responds by a positive blip of about 0.17 times the size of the technology 
shock.
The maximum positive response of capital (approximately 0.08 times the 
size of the shock) is significantly smaller than the strongest increase in invest-
ment. In addition, the deviations in investment are channelled with a time lag to 
the dynamics of capital. It takes the capital stock a whole 12 quarters until it 
reaches its highest positive deviation. Once again, capital is also characterised 
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by a longer-lasting adjustment to its steady-state level than investment- even af-
ter 60 quarters, capital remains under its steady-state level. 
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Figure 4.8: Responses to a technology unit shock 
under an active rule with inflation- and output-targeting and interest-rate smoothing 
In comparison to the response of capital and the output gap the magnitude of the 
deviation of the marginal product of capital in both directions is again quite 
modest, due to the inclusion of steady-state unit and marginal adjustment costs. 
Both the sluggish adjustment of marginal product of capital over 40 quarters and 
the undershooting path registered after the eight quarter following the shock can 
be traced back to the different adjustment dynamics of capital and output gap 
discussed above. Finally, the real wage reaches a maximum positive deviation 
from steady state of 0.45 times the shock after 12 quarters and converges mono-
tonically to its steady-state value thereafter. The response is initially triggered by 
the inflation differential and then sustained by the dynamics of inflation expecta-
tions and the history-dependence on own past realisations of the real wage. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a technology unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
shows that the long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern numer-
ous model variables (the capital stock, real wage, inflation, the nominal interest 
rate and investment) that take more than 60 quarters to converge. Compared to 
the impact of a monetary policy shock convergence to the steady-state values 
generally appears to be a longer-lasting process. For all variables the magnitude 
of the observed deviations is relatively smaller than in the case of a monetary 
policy unit shock. A monetary policy unit shock under a Taylor rule with inter-
est-rate smoothing generates the largest initial deviations in consumption, in-
vestment and the output gap of all active rule specifications considered. The 
largest negative response of the nominal interest rate is more modest here than 
in the two cases without interest-rate smoothing and, after the first quarter is 
quantitatively not sufficient to offset a pro-cyclical fall in the real interest rate. 
2.3.3. Consumption preference unit shock
A consumption preference unit shock is modelled as an upward blip of 1 percent 
in the shock term 
t
  in the AR(1) process 1 tt t       that enters the con-
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sumption equation (3.25). Figure 4.9 reports impulse responses to a consump-
tion preference unit shock for the model specification with sticky prices and 
wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.
Variable deviations, caused by a consumption preference unit shock, are 
again of a very small magnitude and in each case of a much lower value than the 
shock itself. Moreover, in the case of a preference shock is that the adjustment to 
the steady-state values for all variables occurs much faster than in the case of a 
technology or a monetary policy shock. Within approximately 16 quarters after 
the initial impulse all variables apart from capital, the real wage and the mar-
ginal product of capital have returned to their steady-state values. The strongest 
deviations as a result of the shock are reported for consumption, investment and 
the output gap. 
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
consumption as in (3.25). A positive blip of 0.17 percent is observed immedi-
ately after the shock, followed by a fast return to the steady-state level within the 
first 4 quarters. Through its effect on consumption, the preference shock is 
channelled to the output gap (see equation (3.26)) which also reports a sharp rise 
by 0.09 percent, followed by a rapid convergence to steady state.
As a result of the positive output gap, the nominal interest rate is increased 
in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), but the response is of a smaller magni-
tude (0.004 times the shock at its peak). After the first quarter, the nominal in-
terest rate is gradually decreased and reaches its steady-state value in the four-
teenth quarter. Because of the negligibly small impact of the shock on inflation, 
the path of the real interest rate mimics that of the nominal interest rate.  
The rise in the real interest rate releases an initial fall in investment of 0.2 
times the shock, followed by a monotonic adjustment within 8 quarters. Capital 
initially responds to the negative blip in investment by a gradual decrease, 
reaching a maximum negative deviation from its steady-state level 8 quarters 
after the shock. After that, the negative dynamics is reversed and capital con-
verges to steady state after approximately 60 quarters. The deviations of capital 
and the output gap from steady state determine the responses of marginal prod-
uct of capital and real marginal cost respectively. Due to the combined impact of 
the output gap and the capital fluctuations, the maximum response of marginal 
product of capital (0.004 times the shock) is stronger than that of capital. The 
response in real marginal cost shows an initial positive spike of almost 0.5 times 
the shock.
The positive initial effect on real marginal cost is transmitted to inflation as 
evident from (3.36), whereby the maximum impact on inflation occurs immedi-
ately after the shock and is quantitatively small (an increase of 0.001 percent). 
The impulse disappears in 12 quarters. Finally, as in (3.37) the real wage re-
sponse takes about 12 quarters to reach its highest negative deviation of 0.003 
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times the shock. This negative deviation persists until about 60 quarters after the 
initial impulse.  
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Figure 4.9: Responses to a consumption preference unit shock 
under an active rule with inflation- and output-targeting and interest-rate smoothing
In conclusion, a consumption preference unit shock has quantitatively a rela-
tively modest effect on the model variables. Its initial impact on consumption, 
the output gap and investment is alleviated by the increase in the real interest 
rate (caused by the nominal interest rate hike). The moderate responses of all 
other variables are determined by the magnitude of the deviations in the two lat-
ter variables in particular. The results for a consumption preference unit shock 
for a Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing are comparable to these under a 
baseline Taylor specification. The major difference pertains to the more moder-
ate and gradual responses of the nominal and real interest rate. The induced 
negative deviation in investment is stronger than under a baseline Taylor rule; 
thus, the positive output gap impulse is smaller under interest-rate smoothing 
and the monetary policy stance acts stabilising.
3. Passive rule 
3.1. The case of inflation-targeting only 
As it is evident from the determinacy analysis in Chapter III, Subsection 4.2.3, 
an interest-rate rule with * 1 , and * 0y   does not yield determinacy of rational-
expectations equilibrium for any value of the inflation coefficient under unity. 
Thus, the impulse response of each variable under a passive rule with a sole in-
flation target would reveal one adjustment path among several possible, gener-
ated by picking the smallest eigenvalue of the system within the unit circle. Still, 
alternative scenarios cannot be ruled out and therefore no reliable shock analysis 
can be carried out. 
3.2. The case of inflation- and output-targeting 
This subsection shows the impulse responses of tc ,  tinv , ty ,  trmc , tk ,  tmpk ,

t , t , tr  and ti  as for three shocks: the random component of monetary policy 
ti
 , the technology shock 
tA
  and the preference shock 
t
 . Monetary policy is 
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defined in terms of a passive Taylor rule with inflation and output coefficients 
both equal to 0.5128.
3.2.1. Monetary policy unit shock 
Figure 4.10 reports impulse responses to a monetary policy unit shock (an up-
ward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the policy rule (3.38) for the 
model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and ad-
justment costs.  
The variable responses to a monetary policy unit shock under a passive rule 
with inflation- and output-targeting do not differ substantially from the results 
under a baseline active Taylor rule. Compared with the case of a passive rule 
with a sole inflation target, more moderate negative spikes are observed in in-
vestment, consumption and the output gap immediately after the shock, followed 
by a gradual return to the steady-state level. Investment response reports by the 
sharpest fall (twice the shock). Compared to investment, consumption shows a 
more moderate response (0.25) and a faster adjustment to its steady-state value. 
As a weighted average of consumption and investment, the immediate response 
of the output gap has an intermediate value of about -0.7 times the size of the 
monetary policy shock. It takes both consumption and the output gap approxi-
mately 6 quarters until the effect of the monetary policy unit shock subsides 
completely.  
The maximum negative response of capital (approximately 0.1 times the 
size of the shock) is significantly smaller than the initial fall in investment. Con-
trary to the immediate impact of the shock on investment, it takes about 6 quar-
ters until capital reaches its maximum negative response. As a predetermined 
variable, capital is also characterised by a longer-lasting adjustment to its 
steady-state level than investment- even after 60 quarters, capital remains under 
its steady-state level.  
Again, in comparison to the relatively strong response of capital and the 
output gap the magnitude of the deviation of the marginal product of capital (-
0.03 times the shock at its minimum) is relatively weak. Both the sluggish ad-
justment of marginal product of capital over almost 60 quarters and the over-
shooting path registered after the forth quarter following the shock can be traced 
back to the different adjustment dynamics of capital and output gap discussed 
above. The sluggish adjustment of the real wage is determined by the partial his-
tory-dependence of the variable as seen from (3.37) and by the assumption of 
sticky wages.
                                                
128  For the values originally proposed by Casares and McCallum (2006), the effective re-
sponse coefficient assigned to the output gap in (3.39) is so small that no significant dif-
ference to the case with a sole inflation target can be observed. The reason for choosing 
* 0.5y y    is the fact that, as shown in Chapter III, Subsection 4.2.3, the coefficient 
values ** 0.5y   yield a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium.
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The responses of capital, the output gap and real wage determine the dynam-
ics of real marginal cost, as evident from equation (3.33). Compared to the out-
put gap dynamics, the path of real marginal cost reaches a more moderate peak 
negative value (0.4 times the shock), but does not adjust monotonically to its 
steady-state value. Instead, 4 quarters after the shock real marginal cost slightly 
overshoots the steady-state value; thereafter, it converges monotonically to the 
steady—state level. While the initial negative impulse to the real marginal cost 
is mainly a result of the sharp immediate decline of the output gap after the 
shock, the overshooting part is essentially explained by the slow and lasting re-
sponse of capital and the real wage.  
A monetary policy unit shock has a quantitatively small and non-persistent 
impact on inflation, transmitted by the real marginal cost. The initial negative 
blip in inflation is less than 0.01 times the shock. In addition, until the effect 
subsides completely after 16 quarters, the path of inflation reveals overshooting 
dynamics before steady-state value is reached 16 quarters after the initial im-
pulse.
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Figure 4.10: Responses to a monetary policy unit shock under a passive rule 
with inflation- and output-targeting 
The nominal interest rate adjustment is triggered the unit shock itself, as well as 
the responses of the target variables (inflation differential and output gap). The 
monetary authority’s reaction to the unit shock involves an increase in the nomi-
nal interest rate of 0.7 times the shock in the first quarter, followed by a gradual 
convergence to the steady-state level within the next 7 quarters. The Fisher 
equation 1t t t tr i E    postulates that the dynamics of the real interest rate is ap-
proximated by the difference between the paths of inflation and the nominal in-
terest rate. The real interest rate response (a positive blip with a maximum value 
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of 0.7 times the shock, followed by a monotonic decrease) matches the nominal 
interest rate dynamics. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a monetary policy unit shock in 
a model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
shows that the only long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the 
capital stock and the real wage, which take more than 60 quarters to converge. 
Consumption, the output gap, inflation, the real and the nominal interest rate, on 
the other hand, all return to their steady-state values within approximately 20 
quarters. These results are consistent with the ones under a baseline active Tay-
lor rule.
3.2.2. Technology unit shock
Figure 4.11 reports impulse responses to a technology unit shock (an upward 
blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
tA
  in the AR(1) process 1 tt A t AA A    that 
enters the real marginal cost condition (3.33) for the model specification with 
sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.  
Variable deviations, caused by a technology unit shock, are, with the 
exception of the real marginal cost, real wage and inflation responses, of a much 
smaller magnitude that those occurring as a result of a monetary policy unit 
shock and in each case of a lower value than the shock itself. Moreover, adjust-
ment to the steady-state values of nearly all variables (except capital and the real 
wage) is more sluggish in the case of a technology shock than under a monetary 
policy shock.. The strongest deviations are reported for real marginal cost, real 
wage, investment and inflation.
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
real marginal cost. A large negative spike of almost 0.9 times the shock is regis-
tered immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the steady-
state level within the next 60 quarters. This negative initial impulse is then 
transmitted to inflation as evident from (3.36). The assumption of sticky prices 
determines the negative, but relatively modest  (0.1 times the shock) deviation of 
inflation from steady state. As a result of the increased inflation differential, the 
nominal interest rate is reduced in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), ini-
tially by slightly over 0.06 times the shock. The initial positive blip in the real 
interest rate is  explained by the initial decrease in expected inflation in (3.36) 
that in the first 4 quarters quantitatively exceeds the negative effect on the 
nominal interest rate. Thus, in accordance with the Fisher equation 1t t t tr i E   ,
the real interest rate reports initially a positive deviation from steady state of al-
most 0.02. 
Investment, consumption, the output gap, capital and the marginal product 
of capital all reveal an initial negative response to the technology shock, fol-
lowed by a countervailing positive deviation of a comparatively smaller magni-
tude before their steady-state values are reached. The strongest deviations in 
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consumption, the output gap and the marginal product of capital all occur within 
the first eight quarters. The technology shock is channelled to consumption and 
investment through its impact on the real interest rate; the maximum responses 
of investment (0.1 times the shock) is much larger than that of consumption 
(0.01 times the shock). The immediate response of the output gap reaches a fall 
of about -0.03 times the size of the technology shock at its negative peak. As far 
as capital is concerned, an initial decline of 0.01 times the shock is followed by 
a longer-lasting positive deviation of a comparable maximum value. 
As a result of the labour-augmenting technology shock, the real wage 
reaches a quantitatively significant129 maximum positive deviation from steady 
state of 0.45 times the shock after 12 quarters and converges monotonically to 
its steady-state value thereafter. The response is initially triggered by the infla-
tion differential and then sustained by the dynamics of inflation expectations and 
the history-dependence on own past realisations of the real wage.  
                                                
129  The magnitude of the impulse response of real wage is significant especially compared 
to the magnitude of the responses of the other model variables.
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
122
Figure 4.11: Responses to a technology unit shock under a passive rule with inflation- 
and output-targeting 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a technology unit shock in a model 
with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs shows 
that the only long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the capital 
stock and the real wage that take more than 60 quarters to converge. Compared 
to the impact of a monetary policy shock convergence to the steady-state values 
generally appears to be a longer-lasting process. For most variables the magni-
tude of the observed deviations is relatively smaller than in the case of a mone-
tary policy unit shock. In comparison to the active specification with an inflation 
and an output gap target, here the technology unit shock has a milder impact as 
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it induces more moderate nominal interest rate cuts as a reaction to the decrease 
in inflation that cannot offset the latter and thus generate a rise in the real inter-
est rate. Through the real-interest-rate channel investment, consumption and the 
output gap report negative deviations significantly smaller than the size of the 
shock.
3.2.3. Consumption preference unit shock
Figure 4.12 reports impulse responses to a consumption preference unit shock 
(an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
t
  in the AR(1) process 
1 tt t 
      that enters the consumption equation (3.25) for the model specifi-
cation with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.  
The results for a consumption preference unit shock under a passive specifi-
cation with inflation- and output-targeting do not differ significantly from the 
findings under a baseline active Taylor rule. Variable deviations are of a very 
small magnitude and in each case of a much lower value than the shock itself. 
The adjustment to the steady-state values for all variables occurs much faster 
than in the case of a technology or a monetary policy shock. Within approxi-
mately four quarters after the initial impulse most variables apart from capital 
and the real wage have returned to their steady-state values. The strongest devia-
tions as a result of the shock are reported for consumption, investment and the 
output gap. 
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
consumption as in (3.25). A positive blip of almost 0.2 times the shock is ob-
served immediately after the shock, followed by a fast return to the steady-state 
level within the first 4 quarters. Through its effect on consumption, the prefer-
ence shock is channelled to the output gap (see equation (3.26) which also re-
ports a sharp rise by 0.12 percent, followed by a rapid convergence to steady 
state.
As a result of the positive output gap, the nominal interest rate is increased 
in accordance with the policy rule (3.38) and the response is 0.06 the shock at its 
peak. After the first quarter, the nominal interest rate is gradually decreased and 
reaches its steady-state value in the forth quarter  
The path of the real interest rate mimics that of the nominal interest rate. 
The rise in the real interest rate releases an initial fall in investment of 0.12 times 
the shock, followed by a monotonic adjustment within 4 quarters. Capital ini-
tially responds to the negative blip in investment by a gradual decrease, reaching 
a maximum quantitatively small negative deviation from its steady-state level 4 
quarters after the shock. After that, the negative dynamics is reversed and capital 
converges to steady state after more than 60 quarters. The deviations of capital 
and the output gap from steady state, entering the term  ( )t ty k   in equations 
(3.34) and (3.33) determine the responses of marginal product of capital and real 
marginal cost respectively. Due to the combined impact of the output gap and 
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the capital fluctuations, the maximum response of marginal product of capital 
(0.005 times the shock) is equal in absolute value to that of capital. The response 
in real marginal cost shows a similar path – an initial positive spike of 0.06 
times the shock, followed by a gradual convergence to steady state within the 
first 4 quarters.
The positive initial effect on real marginal cost is transmitted to inflation as 
evident from (3.36), whereby the maximum impact on inflation occurs immedi-
ately after the shock and is quantitatively small (an increase of 0.002 times the 
shock). The impulse disappears in less than 4 quarters. Finally, as in (3.37) the 
real wage response is driven by the positive inflation differential and then sus-
tained by the dynamics of inflation expectations and the history-dependence on 
own past realisations of the real wage. Unlike inflation, the real wage takes 
about 2 quarters to reach its highest negative deviation of 0.002 times the shock. 
This negative deviation persists until about 60 quarters after the initial impulse.
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Figure 4.12: Responses to a consumption preference unit shock 
under a passive rule with inflation- and output-targeting 
In conclusion, a consumption preference unit shock has quantitatively a rela-
tively modest effect on the model variables. Its initial impact on consumption, 
the output gap and investment is alleviated by the increase in the real interest 
rate (caused by the nominal interest rate hike). The moderate responses of all 
other variables are determined by the magnitude of the deviations in the two lat-
ter variables in particular. 
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3.3. The case of inflation- and output-targeting with 
interest-rate smoothing 
The impulse responses in this subsection are calculated based on a passive Tay-
lor rule with inflation and output coefficients both equal to 0.5130 and interest-
rate smoothing, whereby the lagged interest rate coefficient is equal to 0.8 as 
proposed by Casares and McCallum (2006). 
3.3.1. Monetary policy unit shock 
Figure 4.13 reports impulse responses to a monetary policy unit shock (an up-
ward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
ti
  in the policy rule (3.38) for the 
model specification with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and ad-
justment costs.  
The results under a monetary policy shock do not differ from these with a 
passive rule and inflation-targeting only. Negative spikes in investment, con-
sumption and the output gap are observed immediately after the shock, followed 
by a gradual return to the steady-state level. Investment response is characterised 
by the sharpest fall (3 times as large as the shock) and gradual adjustment within 
32 quarters. Compared to investment, consumption shows a more moderate re-
sponse (0.5 times the shock) and a faster adjustment to its steady-state value. 
Since according to equation (3.26) the output gap is a weighted average of con-
sumption and investment, its immediate response has an intermediate value ap-
proximately as large as the monetary policy shock. It takes both consumption 
and the output gap approximately 8 quarters until the effect of the monetary pol-
icy unit shock subsides completely. The paths of consumption, investment and 
output gap plotted on Figure 4.13 reveal the significance of the endogenous 
capital assumption for the model’s quantitative results. Under constant capital,  
the output gap response to a monetary policy unit shock would still be negative, 
but of a considerably smaller magnitude, as it would only incorporate the fall in 
consumption.  
The maximum negative response of capital (approximately 0.15 times the 
size of the shock) is significantly smaller than the initial fall in investment. Con-
trary to the immediate impact of the shock on investment, it takes 5 quarters un-
til capital reaches its maximum negative response. Moreover, capital is also 
characterised by a longer-lasting adjustment to its steady-state level than in-
vestment- even after 60 quarters, capital remains under its steady-state level. 
In comparison to the relatively strong response of capital and the output gap 
the magnitude of the deviation of the marginal product of capital (-0.04 times 
the shock at its minimum) might at first seem worth further consideration. Alge-
braically this is determined by the relatively small value of the steady-state mar-
                                                
130  At the end of this subsection, the results under the values originally proposed by 
McCallum and Casares (2006) for (3.39) are shown.
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ginal product of capital (0.04) that enters equation (3.34) as a coefficient, imply-
ing a relatively weaker response of marginal product of capital to deviations in 
output and capital. The sluggish adjustment of the real wage is determined by 
the partial history-dependence of the variable as seen from (3.37) and by the as-
sumption of sticky wages. The latter is modelled by the inclusion of a fixed 
probability W ( 0.75W  ) that nominal wages cannot be adjusted in the current 
quarter, which implies that on average wages are re-set once a year.     
The responses of capital, the output gap and real wage determine the dynam-
ics of real marginal cost, as evident from equation (3.33). Compared to the out-
put gap dynamics, the path of real marginal cost reaches a more moderate 
maximum negative value (0.5 times the shock), but does not adjust monotoni-
cally to its steady-state value. Instead, 4 quarters after the shock real marginal 
cost overshoots the steady-state value; thereafter, real marginal cost converges 
monotonically to the steady—state level. While the initial negative impulse to 
real marginal cost is mainly a result of the sharp immediate decline of the output 
gap after the shock, the overshooting part is essentially explained by the slow 
and lasting response of capital and the real wage.
A monetary policy unit shock has a quantitatively small and non-persistent 
impact on inflation. As evident from equation (3.36), the monetary impulse is 
transmitted by real marginal cost. Under sticky prices,  despite the strong re-
sponse of real marginal cost to the shock, inflation remains hardly affected, as 
the value of the  fixed probability that households cannot adjust their price 
0.75P   (i.e. prices adjusted once a year on average) implies that the real mar-
ginal cost coefficient (1 )(1 )(1 ) / (1 )P P PF P PF PF
            equals 0.02. Thus, 
the initial negative blip in inflation is less than 0.01 the shock. Until the effect 
subsides completely after 16 quarters, the path of inflation involves overshoot-
ing dynamics before steady-state value is reached.  
As far as the nominal interest rate is concerned, according to the policy rule 
(3.38) its deviation depends on the unit shock itself, the responses of the target 
variables (inflation differential and output gap) and the past deviation of the 
variable from its steady-state value. The monetary authority’s reaction to the 
unit shock involves an increase in the nominal interest rate half as large as the 
shock in the first quarter, followed by a gradual convergence to the steady-state 
level. The effect of the monetary impulse disappears completely after 8 quarters. 
The Fisher equation 1t t t tr i E    postulates that the dynamics of the real interest 
rate is approximated by the difference between the paths of inflation and the 
nominal interest rate. Due to the quantitatively weak response of inflation, the 
real interest rate response (a positive blip with a maximum value half as large as 
the shock, followed by a monotonic decrease) matches to a great extent the 
nominal interest rate dynamics. 
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Figure 4.13: Responses to a monetary policy unit shock under a passive rule 
with inflation- and output-targeting and interest-rate smoothing 
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a monetary policy unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
shows that the only long-lasting deviation from the steady-state value concern 
the capital stock, which takes more than 60 quarters to converge. Consumption, 
the output gap, the real and the nominal interest rate, on the other hand, all re-
turn to their steady-state values within 8 quarters. These results basically con-
firm the long-run monetary neutrality of the model.  
3.3.2. Technology unit shock 
Figure 4.14 reports impulse responses to a technology unit shock (an upward 
blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
tA
  in the AR(1) process 1 tt A t AA A    that 
enters the real marginal cost condition (3.33) for the model specification with 
sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.  
Variable deviations, caused by a technology unit shock, are generally of a 
much smaller magnitude that those occurring as a result of a monetary policy 
unit shock and in each case of a lower value than the shock itself. Another dis-
tinction in the case of a technology shock is the slower adjustment to the steady-
state values of nearly all variables (except real marginal cost and the nominal 
and real interest rate). The strongest deviations are reported for real marginal 
cost, real wage and investment. The adjustment paths of near all variables re-
semble the ones under a passive interest-rate rule and a sole inflation target. 
Compared to the active specification with interest-rate smoothing, the impulse 
responses of consumption, investment and the output gap are of a smaller mag-
nitude. Through the moderate nominal interest rate cuts, passive policy gener-
ates a rise in the real interest rate that acts in a stabilising manner.  
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
real marginal cost. A large negative spike of almost 0.9 times the shock is regis-
tered immediately after the shock, followed by a gradual return to the steady-
state level. This negative initial impulse is then transmitted to inflation as evi-
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dent from (3.36). The assumption of sticky prices determines the negative devia-
tion of 0.09 times the shock of inflation from steady state. As a result of the in-
creased inflation differential, the nominal interest rate is reduced in accordance 
with the policy rule (3.38), but the response is quantitatively smaller. The initial 
positive blip in the real interest rate is  explained by the initial decrease in ex-
pected inflation in (3.36) that in the first 10 quarters quantitatively exceeds the 
negative effect on the nominal interest rate. Thus, in accordance with the Fisher 
equation 1t t t tr i E   , the real interest rate reports a positive deviation from 
steady state. 
Investment, consumption, the output gap, capital and the marginal product 
of capital all reveal an initial positive response to the technology shock. The 
strongest deviations in consumption, the output gap and the marginal product of 
capital all occur within the first 8 quarters, while it takes longer until the maxi-
mum impact of the shock on capital unfolds. The technology shock is chan-
nelled to consumption and investment through its impact on the real interest 
rate; the considerably differing magnitudes of the maximum responses of in-
vestment (0.18 times the shock) and consumption (0.05 times the shock) are 
again observed. The immediate response of the output gap reaches a maximum 
value of about 0.08 times the size of the technology shock. 
The maximum positive response of capital is significantly smaller than the 
strongest increase in investment. In addition, the deviations in investment are 
channelled with a time lag to the dynamics of capital. Once again, capital is also 
characterised by a longer-lasting adjustment to its steady-state level. 
In comparison to the response of capital and the output gap the magnitude of 
the deviation of the marginal product of capital (about 0.002 times the shock in 
both directions) is again quite modest, due to the inclusion of steady-state unit 
and marginal adjustment costs. Both the sluggish adjustment of marginal prod-
uct of capital over 60 quarters and the undershooting path registered after the 
twentieth quarter following the shock can be traced back to the different adjust-
ment dynamics of capital and output gap discussed above. 
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Figure 4.14: Responses to a technology unit shock under a passive rule 
with inflation- and output-targeting and interest-rate smoothing 
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Finally, the impulse response of the real wage is worth some consideration. As a 
result of the labour-augmenting technology shock, the variable reaches a quanti-
tatively significant131 maximum positive deviation from steady state of 0.4 times 
the shock after 10 quarters and converges monotonically to its steady-state value 
thereafter. The response is initially triggered by the inflation differential and 
then sustained by the dynamics of inflation expectations and the history-
dependence on own past realisations of the real wage.  
In conclusion, the analysis of the impact of a technology unit shock in a 
model with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs 
shows that the long-lasting deviations from steady-state values concern the mar-
ginal product of capital, inflation and the real wage that take more than 60 quar-
ters to converge. Compared to the impact of a monetary policy shock conver-
gence to the steady-state values generally appears to be a longer-lasting process. 
For most variables except the real marginal cost, inflation and the real wage the 
magnitude of the observed deviations is relatively smaller than in the case of a 
monetary policy unit shock. The reason for the milder impact of a technology 
unit shock is it induces nominal interest rate cuts as a reaction to the increased 
inflation differential that quantitatively exceed the latter and thus generate a rise 
in the real interest rate as well. Through the real-interest-rate channel the posi-
tive impulse to investment, consumption and the output gap remains moderate 
and the variables report positive deviations significantly smaller than the size of 
the shock. 
3.3.3. Consumption preference unit shock
Figure 4.15 reports impulse responses to a consumption preference unit shock 
(an upward blip of 1 percent in the shock term 
t
  in the AR(1) process 
1 tt t 
      that enters the consumption equation (3.25) for the model specifi-
cation with sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital and adjustment costs.  
Variable deviations, caused by a consumption preference shock, are of a 
very small magnitude and in each case of a much lower value than the shock 
itself. Another distinction in the case of a preference shock is that the adjustment 
to the steady-state values for all variables occurs much  faster than in the case of 
a technology or a monetary policy shock. Within approximately 16 quarters after 
the initial impulse all variables apart from capital and the real wage have re-
turned to their steady-state values. The strongest deviations as a result of the 
shock are reported for consumption, the output gap and real marginal cost. 
The initial transmission of the shock occurs through the immediate effect on 
consumption as in (3.25). A positive blip of 0.2 the shock is observed immedi-
ately after the shock, followed by a fast return to the steady-state level within the 
first 4 quarters. Through its effect on consumption, the preference shock is 
                                                
131  The magnitude of the impulse response of real wage is significant especially compared 
to the magnitude of the responses of the other model variables.
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
133
channelled to the output gap (see equation (3.26) which also reports a sharp rise 
by 0.1 percent, followed by a rapid convergence to steady state.
As a result of the positive output gap, the nominal interest rate is increased 
in accordance with the policy rule (3.38), but the response is of a smaller magni-
tude (0.005 times the shock at its peak). After the first quarter, the nominal in-
terest rate is gradually decreased; the path of the real interest rate mimics that of 
the nominal interest rate with an initial positive blip of slightly under 0.005. 
The rise in the real interest rate releases a positive response of investment, 
followed by an adjustment within 12 quarters. The impulse to capital is also ex-
tremely modest. The deviations of capital and the output gap from steady state 
determine the responses of marginal product of capital and real marginal cost 
respectively. Due to the combined impact of the output gap and the capital fluc-
tuations, the maximum response of marginal product of capital (0.004 times the 
shock) is stronger than that of capital. After the initial positive blip, the marginal 
product of capital converges to steady state within 6 quarters. The response in 
real marginal cost shows a similar path – an initial positive spike of 0.06 times 
the shock, followed by a gradual convergence to steady state within the first 6 
quarters.
The positive initial effect on real marginal cost is transmitted to inflation as 
evident from (3.36), whereby the maximum impact on inflation occurs immedi-
ately after the shock and is quantitatively small (an increase of 0.002 times the 
shock). The impulse disappears in less than 4 quarters. Finally, as in (3.37) the 
real wage response is driven by the positive inflation differential and then sus-
tained by the dynamics of inflation expectations and the history-dependence on 
own past realisations of the real wage. Unlike inflation, the real wage takes 
about 20 quarters to reach its highest negative deviation of 0.005 times the 
shock. This negative deviation persists for more than 60 quarters after the initial 
impulse.  
In conclusion, a consumption preference unit shock has quantitatively a rela-
tively modest effect on the model variables. Its initial impact on consumption, 
the output gap and investment is alleviated by the increase in the real interest 
rate. The moderate responses of all other variables are determined by the magni-
tude of the deviations in the two latter variables in particular. 
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Figure 4.15: Responses to a consumption preference unit shock  
under a passive rule with inflation- and output-targeting and interest-rate smoothing 
In addition, the impulse responses to a monetary policy unit shock, a technology 
unit shock and a consumption preference unit shock under the policy rule speci-
fication (3.39) with * 0.3  , * 0.02y   and 0.8i   (as calibrated by Casares and 
McCallum (2006)) reveal large variable oscillations for all three shocks. This 
reveals the importance of sufficiently strong responses to inflation and the out-
put gap in the policy rule. These impulse responses are not plotted here, as a 
“bumpy” convergence path is associated with uncertainty and additional costs in 
terms of output and thus represents a monetary policy option that should rather 
be avoided
4. Preliminary summary of results 
Using the results from the determinacy analysis in Chapter III, active and pas-
sive rules in three possible specifications for each class were tested in this part: 
(i) rules with a sole inflation target; (ii) rules with an inflation and output target 
and (iii) rules with inflation and output gap target and interest-rate smoothing. 
The types of shocks entering the impulse responses are threefold: (i) a monetary 
policy unit shock; (ii) a technology unit shock and (iii) a consumption prefer-
ence shock.
There are several important findings resulting from the impulse responses in 
Sections 2 and 3. Firstly, the distinction between active and passive rules has 
implications for the sign of the variable deviations, but not for their magnitude 
or persistence. For instance, a technology unit shock induces a real interest rate 
decrease under all active rule specifications and the opposite effect under all 
passive rule specifications132. However, the speed and path of the convergence 
and the maximum deviations from steady state reported differ significantly de-
pending on the choice of target variables, the best performance under all shocks 
                                                
132  In the case of oscillatory paths the deviations in the direction mentioned above are quan-
titatively larger than the deviations in the opposite direction.
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being reported for the active and passive rule with both an inflation and an out-
put target. As evident from Chapter III, passive policy induces multiple rational-
expectations equilibria, so that only the active inflation-targeting rule specifica-
tion is relevant for monetary policy-making. However, the latter is associated 
with lengthier and more oscillatory convergence path to steady state, as com-
pared with rules with both an inflation and output gap target.  
Secondly, both for active and passive policy, longer-lasting convergence, 
relatively greater variable deviations and more frequent oscillatory adjustment 
paths for each shock are reported for the specification with a significant degree 
of interest-rate smoothing. Thirdly, the sign and exact magnitude of the model 
variables’ responses to a monetary policy unit shock do not differ between the 
active and the passive specification, as long as identical target variables enter the 
rule. The responses to a consumption preference unit shock do not differ signifi-
cantly across the six interest rate rule specifications and therefore offer very lim-
ited insights to the analysis. 
Lastly, the more significant differences between the active and passive 
specifications including identical variables are registered in the case of a tech-
nology unit shock. This can be traced back to the differing magnitudes of the 
nominal interest rate responses that induce negative real-interest rate deviations 
under active policy and positive real-interest rate deviations from steady state 
under passive policy. Thus, passive policy stance acts stabilising as the technol-
ogy shock impact is countervailed by the real interest rate increase. By analogy, 
active policy boosts the shock impulse and contributes to larger deviations of 
investment, consumption and the output gap. This tendency can be at least par-
tially offset by the introduction of an output target to the policy rule.
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V. Discussion and conclusion 
Using a model that replicates the structure of the economy as realistically as 
possible is a crucial prerequisite for delivering practice-relevant policy recom-
mendations. Assuming that the capital stock is constant or inexistent undoubt-
edly poses significant restrictions on the plausibility of the results obtained. On 
the other hand, the benefits from the inclusion of endogenous capital and in-
vestment depend on the type of the specification chosen. In particular, some de-
gree of inertia in the capital adjustment over time is needed to provide a satisfac-
tory match to empirical business-cycle observations. This study opts for intro-
ducing capital adjustment costs as a means to limit the excessive volatility in 
capital that would have been the case otherwise. However, as seen in Chapter 
III, Section 2, other solutions to this modelling issue (such as firm-specific capi-
tal, for instance) would also be worth some consideration in terms of their policy 
design implications.
In the foregoing chapters I have based my study on a dynamic optimising 
IS-LM-type model that incorporates sticky prices and wages, endogenous capital 
and investment with capital adjustment costs. The framework includes an IS 
“sector”, which allows a more differentiated analysis of the individual aggregate 
demand components, as well as the impact of their determinants. The main pur-
pose of this work has been to explore different simple interest-rate rule specifi-
cations in terms of the target variables included, by applying two criteria: the 
existence of a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium and the induced 
variable responses to shocks. Parallel to this analysis, I have presented the Tay-
lor principle (the benchmark criterion for assessing monetary policy rules) and 
tested whether in the model under standard parameter calibration a more than 
one-on-one response to inflation (i.e. active policy) is still the only condition 
needed to ensure determinacy of rational-expectations equilibrium under en-
dogenous capital. The second issue explored has been whether, determinacy 
notwithstanding, active policy with a sole inflation target actually yields the 
fastest and least distressful convergence of the economy to the steady-state level 
under shocks. 
The results obtained in Chapters III and IV reveal a very interesting picture. 
In the first place, in the New Keynesian model with endogenous capital and in-
vestment and adjustment costs I use, an inflation response coefficient above 
unity does not necessarily imply determinacy of rational-expectations equilib-
rium. For an active rule with inflation-targeting only, adherence to the Taylor 
principle is a sufficient condition for determinacy of rational-expectations equi-
librium only within a small interval of inflation coefficient values, associated 
with moderately active policy. For all other values, an output gap target is the 
solution needed to eliminate the indeterminacy problem. Under a passive rule, 
the equilibrium indeterminacy as implied by the Taylor principle is the case only 
Elena Pavlova - 978-3-653-01444-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:38:03AM
via free access
138
if inflation is the sole target; the inclusion of an output gap objective alleviates 
the occurrence of multiple equilibria. Thus, taking into consideration the output 
gap developments in the economy appears to be crucial for monetary policy de-
sign in order to guarantee stable, predictable adjustment path of the economy.   
Building upon the insights gained by the determinacy analysis, I then con-
centrated on assessing the responses to shocks under different specifications of 
active and passive policy rules (with inflation-targeting only; with inflation and 
output-targeting; with inflation- and output-gap targeting and interest-rate 
smoothing). Within both groups of rules, the specification with inflation- and 
output-targeting was characterised by the best performance in terms of variable 
deviations and speed and path of the convergence. Thus the results from the de-
terminacy analysis have been complemented by the finding that an output gap 
target is crucial not only for determinacy of rational-expectations equilibrium, 
but also for ensuring a less distressful adjustment of the economy after the oc-
currence of shocks. Both for active and passive policy, introducing a significant 
degree of interest-rate smoothing appears to be counterproductive, inducing 
longer-lasting convergence, relatively greater variable deviations and more fre-
quent oscillatory adjustment paths for each shock. 
The more significant differences between the active and passive specifica-
tions including identical variables are registered in the case of a supply (techno-
logical unit) shock. This results from the differing magnitudes of the nominal 
interest rate responses that induce negative real-interest rate deviations under 
active policy and positive real-interest rate deviations from steady state under 
passive policy. Thus, passive policy stance acts stabilising as the technology 
shock impact is countervailed by the real interest rate increase. By analogy, ac-
tive policy boosts the shock impulse and contributes to larger deviations of in-
vestment, consumption and the output gap. The latter tendency can be at least 
partially offset by the introduction of an output target to the policy rule. 
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Appendix:  Optimising IS-LM model with 
endogenous investment and capital adjustment 
costs
A. Money demand (LM equation) 
With respect to money demand, the period utility function (3.22) and equation 
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After approximating  by , (A3.1) takes the semi-log-linearised form -/ 1ti i ti
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In (A3.2), an expression for the composite disturbance - . /t t t?      can be 
substituted to yield the LM equation of the system: 
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where ( ) /t t t?      is the composite disturbance and t  and t  are real money 
balances and consumption preference shocks. In (A3.3) real money balances 
depend positively on a transaction variable (consumption) and negatively on an 
opportunity-cost variable.
B. Steady-state capital 
The first-order condition with capital (3.30) reads 
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where r  . After substitution, equation (A3.4) can be transformed into 
2
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,      (A3.5) 
where 21C     is the unit adjustment cost in steady state and 21 1 2( 1)C     
is the marginal adjustment cost in steady state. From (A3.5), the following rela-
tion for the marginal product of capital in steady state can be derived: 
1(1 ) (1 )Cmpk
rmc
   

C .       (A3.6) 
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Capital stock in steady state is then determined by substituting with a Cobb-
Douglas technology with steady-state labour of 1 in (A3.6): 
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Equation (A3.7) yields the steady-state capital 
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C. Inflation and real wage equations under flexible 
prices and wages 
When nominal rigidities are absent, the symmetry conditions  and 
 hold in equilibrium. Then, the price symmetry condition equations 
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Similarly, the wage symmetry condition and (3.15) imply a constant ratio of the 
leisure-consumption marginal rate of substitution over the real wage 
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To recall, production technology is given by the Cobb-Douglas function 
1( , ) ( ) PF PFd dt t t t t tf An k An k
  , 0 1PF, , .      (3.2) 
Then, for , from (A3.10), the period utility function (3.22), the time con-
straint (3.7), the overall resources constraint (3.26)
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where   is a leisure risk aversion coefficient from the utility function. 
D. Deriving the system’s reduced forms 
The structural equations (3.25), (3.26), (3.32’) and (3.33)-(3.35), together with 
(3.36), (3.41), (3.39) or (3.38) and (3.41)  can be reduced to a system of four 
equations, expressed in terms of inflation, consumption, capital and the real 
wage. Equation (3.35) can be written as  
133  For simplicity,  is assumed. Later in Chapter III, Subsection 4.1 the calibration is 
consistent with this assumption.
0g 
134  See Casares and McCallum (2006).
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Next, ty  can be substituted out according to equations (3.26) and (3.35’)
135:
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From  (3.41) 
1t t t tr i E          
and after rewriting (3.25)  as 
- 1tt tr E c c    .t ,         (3.25’) 
the nominal interest rate can be substituted in the policy rule equation (3.38) or 
(3.39). After substituting ty out according (3.26’), the interest-rate rule relation
becomes136:
   - . 
* * * *
1 1
1 11 y c y inv y invt t t t t t t tE c c k k E 
       
1      
0 1 
     2 3
4 5
 .  (A3.12) 
Finally, equations (3.25’), (3.33), (3.34), (3.35’), (3.26’) and (3.41) can be com-
bined with (3.32’), (3.36), (3.37) and (A3.12) to yield the system’s reduced 
forms: 
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135  Equation (3.26’) dies not include the term g tg  as in the calibration .0g 
136  Here *  and 
*
y  denote the effective values assigned to inflation and the output gap in 
the monetary rule. For the Taylor rule (3.38) * 1     and y
*
y  . For the policy 
specification (3.39) * (1 )(1 )i       and y
* (1 )y i    . For the purpose of the sub-
sequent determinacy analysis no interest-rate smoothing is assumed, i.e. . The 
possibility of pursuing interest-rate smoothing will be further considered when the im-
plications of shocks are examined.
0i 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For convenience, the system (3.32’’), (3.36’), (3.37’) and (A3.12’) can be re-
written as: 
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policy as well as in modern monetary theory. Besides giving a comprehensive 
insight into this line of research the study incorporates the term structure of 
interest rates into interest rate rules. This is performed analytically as well as 
empirically. In doing so, state of the art techniques of modern fi nance for 
the analysis of the term structure of interest rates are introduced into the 
macroeconomic concept of interest rate rules. The study implies that from the 
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interest rate rules. From an empirical perspective it shows that including term 
structure effects in interest rate reaction functions improves our understanding 
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Central Bank.
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